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1. Introduction
Under these conditions, the erotic relation seems to offer the unsurpassable peak of 
the fulfillment of the request for love in the direct fusion of the souls of one to the 
other. The boundless giving of oneself is as radical as possible in its opposition to 
all functionality, rationality, and generality. It is so overpowering that it is treated 
“symbolically”: as a sacrament. The lover realizes himself to be rooted in the kernel of 
the truly living, which is eternally inaccessible to any rational endeavor. He knows 
himself to be freed from the cold skeleton hands of rational orders, just as completely 
as from the banality of everyday routine. Max Weber, 1958
Even Max Weber – one of the early proponents of the social analysis of 
rational man – recognized the essential irrationality of emotions such as love. 
Today it has become so very fashionable to criticize economic theory for 
focusing too much on rationality and ignoring the imperfect and emotional 
way in which decisions are reached in the “real world.” Psychologists and 
other social scientists have been especially vocal in their dismay. A bright 
new group of behavioral economists has picked up the criticism: 
Economics traditionally conceptualizes a world populated by calculating, 
unemotional maximizers that have been dubbed Homo economicus. 
The standard economic framework ignores or rules out virtually all the 
behavior studied by cognitive and social psychologists. This “unbehavioral” 
economic agent was once defended on numerous grounds: some claimed 
that the model was “right”; most others simply argued that the standard 
model was easier to formalize and practically more relevant. Behavioral 
economics blossomed from the realization that neither point of view was 
correct. (Thaler and Mullainathan, 2010)
The authors go on to point out how modern economics is based on a 
foundation of sand.
The standard economic model of human behavior includes three unrealistic 
traits – unbounded rationality, unbounded willpower, and unbounded 
selfishness – all of which behavioral economics modifies.
behaviouraleconomics.indd   1 9/6/12   5:43 PM
2 Behavioral Economics Doomed
Those who have read about – and who has not? – the current economic 
crisis may wonder indeed just how rational an economic man or woman 
might be. Behavioral economics has become the modern rage. Is, therefore, 
rational economic man – homo economicus – dead? Has the economics 
profession moved on to recognize the true irrationality of humankind? 
Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Strangely, the criticisms that have caused behavioral economics 
to blossom are nothing new. Writing in 1898 Thorstein Veblen wrote 
sarcastically of rational economic man as 
a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a 
homogenous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli.
Students of economic history can argue about whether Veblen’s description 
of homo economicus is an accurate reflection of economics as it was practiced 
then – it is definitely not an accurate reflection of economics as it is 
practiced today. For starters, while mainstream economics does indeed 
presume unlimited self-control, it does not presume unlimited rationality 
or unbounded selfishness. The paradigmatic man (or more often these 
days woman) in modern economics is that of a decision-maker beset on all 
sides by uncertainty. Most important, the central focus of economics is on 
how successful we are in coming to grips with that uncertainty.
Remarkably, for a long period of time during the 1960s and 1970s, 
irrational economic man dominated economics. It was the abysmal failures 
of the “neoclassical synthesis” leading to absurd and costly failures of 
economic policy – I am old enough to remember waiting in long lines 
to buy gasoline – that led to the modern and much-criticized theory of 
rational expectations. The fact is that irrational economic man is a poorer 
description of how we behave than that of a “lightning calculator of 
pleasures and pains.” As Robert Lucas wrote in 1995, in many ways the 
rational expectations model was a reaction to 
[t]he implicit presumption in these… models [of irrational man]… that 
people could be fooled over and over again.
Modern economics is not the theory imagined by critics – including 
apparently some Nobel Prize winning economists – who are unfamiliar 
with it. The theory used by working economists is far more sophisticated 
and successful than is generally imagined. The fact that policy makers 
choose to ignore our warnings does not make us wrong. Weaknesses in 
economic analysis exist – but bear little connection to those cited by critics. 
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My objective in this volume is to set the record straight by explaining 
some of the true successes and failures of both economics and behavioral 
economics. 
To understand whether or not behavioral economics is doomed is 
to first ask the question whether mainstream economics has failed. If it 
has not, then surely behavioral economics is doomed. And mainstream 
economics has not failed. Existing economic theory in those situations of 
greatest interest to economists makes strong and robust predictions. Those 
predictions are borne out by the facts – in the laboratory as well as in the 
field. 
In some situations less central to economics the theory makes weak 
predictions. These are also borne out by the facts – but the theory is less 
useful as it fails to narrow down the range of possibilities. It is here – in 
strengthening existing theory – that there exists a potential for behavioral 
ideas. Indeed – long before the term “behavioral economics” existed – many 
of the ideas discussed by “behavioral economists” had already been 
incorporated into mainstream economic models. Here I will tell the story 
of both the successes and failures.
“Wait!” you say. Does not the inability of economists to forecast the 
current economic crisis show that all you claim is false? How can you 
defend a science that has met with such an abysmal failure? In response 
I ask – do you condemn quantum mechanics as useless because it cannot 
predict simultaneously the location and velocity of subatomic particles? 
Because not only can it not do so – according to the theory it is impossible 
for it to do so. Just so: according to economic theory – for reasons I will 
elucidate – it is equally impossible to predict the timing of economic crises. 
Does that make us useless? If we can – and we certainly can – tell how 
economic crises can be avoided, how they can be mitigated, and how best 
to recover from them – then surely you ought to listen to what I have to say.
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2. Does Economic Theory 
Work?
It is impossible to have an intelligent discussion of economics, of game 
theory, or of behavioral economics – let alone their successes and 
failures – without some idea of what they are about. Homo economicus is a 
far different creature than commonly imagined. Let us begin by examining 
this mythical construct more closely.
What is Game Theory?
The heart of modern “rational” economic theory is the concept of a 
non-cooperative or “Nash” equilibrium of a game. If you saw the movie 
A Beautiful Mind this theory – created by Nobel Laureate John Nash – is 
briefly described, albeit inaccurately. But to put the oxen before the cart, let 
us first describe what a game is. A game in the parlance of a game theorist 
or economist does not generally refer to a parlor game such as checkers or 
bridge, nor indeed to Super-Mario III. Instead, what economists call game 
theory psychologists more accurately call the theory of social situations. 
There are two branches of game theory, but the one most widely used in 
economics is the theory of non-cooperative games – I shall describe that 
theory here. 
The central topic of non-cooperative game theory is the question of how 
people interact. A game in the formal sense used by economists is merely a 
careful description of a social situation specifying the options available to 
the “players,” how choices among those options result in “outcomes,” and 
how the participants “feel” about those outcomes. The timing of decisions 
and the information available to players when undertaking those decisions 
must also be described. 
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The critical element in analyzing what happens in a game (or social 
situation) is the beliefs of the players: what do they think is likely to happen? 
How do they think other players are likely to play? From a formalistic 
perspective the beliefs of players are generally described by probability 
distributions – we assign a probability to an outcome – although in more 
advanced theories – such as epistemic game theory – beliefs are more 
sophisticated and mathematically complicated objects. Please observe that 
the notion that we are uncertain about the world we live in and about the 
people we interact with is at the very core of game theory.
Given beliefs about consequences and sentiments about those outcomes 
it is almost tautological to postulate that players choose the most favorable 
course of action given their beliefs. At one level this is what it means for 
players to be “rational” and should scarcely be controversial… yet many 
dense books have been written criticizing this notion of rationality. 
Of course a theory that says that players believe something and do the 
best they can based on those beliefs is an empty theory because it does not 
say where beliefs come from. I sell my stocks? I must believe the market 
is going down. I spend all my money? I must believe the world is coming 
to an end. And so forth. The formation of beliefs is at the center of modern 
economic theory. 
Our beliefs surely depend on what we know. I believe that if I drop this 
computer it will fall to the ground – because I have a lifetime of experience 
with falling objects. By way of contrast I have no idea when I wake up 
tomorrow morning whether the stock market will have gone up or down, 
and even less what might be the consequences of clean coal technology for 
global warming over the next decade.
Historically the economics profession has been most interested in 
situations where the players are experienced. For example, investment 
decisions are typically made by investors with long and deep experience 
of investment opportunities; most transactions are concluded between 
buyers and sellers with much experience in buying and selling. Under 
these circumstances it is natural to imagine that beliefs reflect underlying 
realities. In the theory of competitive markets this has been called rational 
expectations. In game theory it is called Nash equilibrium. Notice, however, 
that such a theory does not demand that people know the future – we 
call that “perfect foresight” not “rational expectations” – only that the 
probabilities they assign to the future are the same probabilities shared by 
other equally experienced individuals. Put differently: while I have no idea 
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whether when I wake up tomorrow morning the stock market will have 
gone up or down, I do know that both outcomes are about equally likely. 
As this view is widely shared, it represents “rational expectations” about 
tomorrow’s stock prices.
Another way to describe Nash equilibrium is this: Nash equilibrium 
represents a setting in which no further learning is possible. That is – if 
some player holds wrong beliefs the possibility exists that they will discover 
their mistake and learn something new. When possibilities for learning are 
exhausted what we find is Nash equilibrium.
How well does the theory of Nash equilibrium work? One of the 
most widely used empirical tools in modern behavioral economics is the 
laboratory experiment in which paid participants – many times college 
undergraduates, but often other groups from diverse ethnic and social 
backgrounds – are brought together to interact in artificially created social 
situations to study how they reach decisions individually or in groups. 
Many anomalies with theory have been discovered in the laboratory – and 
rightfully these are given emphasis among practitioners – we are, after all 
more interested in strengthening the weaknesses in our theories than in 
simply repeating that they are correct. Amidst all this the basic fact should 
not be lost that standard economic theory works remarkably well in the 
laboratory.
Let me be more specific. Let us take as our theory the theory of Nash 
equilibrium. Let us also suppose (we will talk more about this later) that 
laboratory subjects care only about bringing home the most possible 
money from the experiment. Do we observe Nash equilibrium in the 
laboratory? 
Voting
One of the most controversial applications of the theory of rational man is 
to voting. Modern voting theory, for example the 1996 theory of Feddersen 
and Pesendorfer, is based on the idea that your vote only matters when it 
decides an election – when your vote is pivotal. This has implications for 
voter participation. If elections are not close there is no chance of your vote 
mattering, and no incentive to participate. To be an equilibrium, elections 
must be so close that the chance of changing the outcome is enough to 
compensate for the cost of participating. Whether this is how voters 
behave is quite controversial: it is often referred to as “the paradox of voter 
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turnout.” It is central to Green and Shapiro’s harsh 1994 critique of rational 
choice theory in which they assert that
Those tests that have been undertaken [of rational choice theory] have either 
failed on their own terms or garnered theoretical support for propositions 
that, on reflection, can only be characterized as banal: they do little more 
than restate existing knowledge in rational choice terminology.
In 2007 Levine and Palfrey examined voter participation in the laboratory. 
Our subjects were UCLA (University of California, Los Angeles) 
undergraduates. After arrival at the laboratory the subjects were divided 
into unequal teams of voters. Later, various elections were conducted: in 
some elections one “party” had a 2/3rds majority, in others a one-vote 
majority. We conducted elections with numbers of participants ranging 
from three to fifty-one. 
In these elections voters had a choice between casting a vote for 
their own party and abstaining. Voters received a small payment for 
participating in the experiment plus the members of each winning party 
received a prize of $0.37 each. This was split between the two parties in case 
of a tie. Voting in the laboratory – as in real life – was costly. Each voter was 
randomly assigned a cost of voting ranging from $0.00 to $0.185. This cost 
was known only to the voter to whom it was assigned – all other aspects of 
the experiment were commonly known to all the voters. 
Notice that in this setup the most you can hope to do is to swing a losing 
election to a tie, or swing a tie to a win, in either case garnering an additional 
$0.185. So if you drew the lowest voting cost of $0.00 it makes sense to vote 
as long as there is even a small chance of changing the outcome, while if 
you drew the highest cost of $0.185 you would never vote unless you were 
absolutely certain to change the outcome. For other costs whether it is a 
good idea to participate or not depends on how likely you think you are to 
alter the outcome. For instance, if you think the probability of influencing 
the election is high you should accept a higher cost of voting.
Sticking with the (not entirely plausible) assumption that voters are 
strict moneygrubbers, it is possible but not easy to compute the Nash 
equilibrium of this game. Depending on the probability of making a 
difference there is a threshold cost below which it is rational to vote, and 
above which it is not – this is known as a “cut-off” decision. The participation 
rate is determined by this threshold – the higher the threshold, the higher 
the participation rate. Conversely the higher the participation rate, the less 
likely it is that voters make a difference. This kind of interdependence is 
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described by economists and mathematicians as a fixed-point problem, 
and requires solving – in this case – some rather complex non-linear 
equations. This can be done only on the computer, and while in principle 
there could be more than one solution to these equations, in fact there 
is only one. Thus using the computer we made this difficult calculation 
determining for each election what was the Nash equilibrium.
As indicated, we then re-created the theoretical environment in the 
laboratory. We had no expectation that voters could guess, calculate, or 
otherwise intuitively figure out how best to behave – as I mentioned it is 
quite a complex problem. Rather, as is central to modern economic theory 
(see the quote of Lucas above), we imagined that if voters were given an 
opportunity to learn they would reach an equilibrium. Hence, we gave them 
ample opportunity to learn – voters got to participate in fifty elections each. 
To measure how well the theory worked we focused on how likely it 
was for a player to make a difference. A pivotal event in this experiment is a 
situation that is either a tie, or one party wins by a single vote. Since voters 
only participate because they have a chance of being pivotal, in equilibrium 
the chance of such an event cannot be too small. Since elections “often” have 
to be close, it follows that there must also be upsets in which the minority 
party wins. The theory also predicts how frequently this will occur. For 
each type of election we computed what was the probability of pivotal 
events and upsets. For those of you familiar with social science research, 
you should notice what we did not do. We did not collect a bunch of data 
about behavior and fit a curve to it and declare that our curve “fits the 
data well” or is “statistically significant.” We did not declare that if there 
are more voters the participation rate should be “lower.” For any election 
with any number of voters, and any size of prizes and probabilities of 
drawing participation costs the theory of Nash equilibrium makes precise 
quantitative predictions about the frequency with which we should observe 
elections results that are pivotal and elections that result in an upset.
What happened with real people in our experimental laboratory? The 
figure below shows the results on a graph in which the horizontal axis has 
the frequencies we computed from the theory of Nash equilibrium and the 
vertical axis has the corresponding frequencies of actual election results 
in the laboratory. Each different election setting with different numbers 
of voters in each party corresponds to a different point on the graph. If 
the theory worked perfectly all of these points should lie on the 45 degree 
line where the theory exactly matches the data – for instance if the theory 
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predicts 0.4 then we should observe 0.4. As you can clearly see – that is 
exactly what happens – the theory works more or less perfectly. If you do 
not believe this, try dropping tennis balls out your window and calculating 
the force of gravity and see how accurate your measurement is. Less good 































Probability of Pivotal and Upset Elections
Let us again emphasize what we did not do. Often when social scientists 
say their theory fits the data what they mean is that they “estimated 
free parameters” and given their best estimate of those parameters the 
corresponding model reflects the data. This would be as if instead of 
saying that our observations should lie on the 45 degree line, we said they 
should lie on some unknown line – the slope and intercept of that line 
being “free parameters” – and declaring victory if we could find a line that 
more or less passed through the data. Here there are no free parameters; 
nothing is estimated, there are no unknowns. We take the information 
about the setting – how many voters; what prizes, and so forth – and we 
calculate a number – the probability of a pivotal event or upset using the 
sharp predictions of Nash equilibrium. This number is then either right 
or wrong – in fact it is right. But there is no wiggle room to “estimate 
parameters” or otherwise fudge around with things. 
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Economics is a Quantitative Subject
The voting experiment illustrates what economics is and what it is not. 
It is not about the intersection of supply and demand curves, and about 
what direction prices move if a curve “shifts.” It is a quantitative theory 
of human behavior both individually and in interaction with other people. 
The importance of the quantitative nature of economics often eludes 
clever observers, especially philosophers and lawyers. Take for example the 
following (possibly apocryphal) quotation – from the “original” behavioral 
economist Kenneth Boulding
anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world 
is either a madman or an economist.
This appears to involve a straw man, since as far as I know no economist 
would argue that exponential growth can go on forever – at best this is 
something we are uncertain about. The point is not debatable. But what 
conclusion can we draw from the fact that exponential growth cannot go 
on forever? Boulding evidently would like us to conclude that if it cannot 
go on forever, it cannot go on for very long. Of course that does not follow. 
Exponential growth might be possible for only the next ten years – or it 
might be possible for the next ten thousand years. If the latter, there is 
hardly any point in arguing over it – and a model in which exponential 
growth can go on forever can certainly be useful and relevant despite its 
obvious falsity. On the other hand if we are going to run out of resources 
in ten years time – then indeed fooling around with models of exponential 
growth is a waste of time.
The point is that philosophers’ and lawyers’ reasoning – trying to draw a 
practical conclusion from an extreme hypothetical statement – “exponential 
growth cannot go on forever” – is false reasoning. All the action is in the 
quantitative dimension: some numbers are big, some numbers are small 
and how big and how small matters, not whether numbers are exactly 
equal to zero, or “infinite.”
Here is a practical application of quantitative reasoning: let’s consider 
whether or not torture should be against the law. Notice the question is 
not whether or not torture is “good” or “bad” or whether it is “moral” 
or “immoral.” A standard argument that torture should be legal is based 
on a simple hypothetical choice experiment. Many people if faced with a 
choice of torturing a suspect to determine the location of a nuclear weapon 
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set imminently to explode in a large city would be in favor of doing so. 
Under those circumstances I would be prepared to do so. The conclusion 
is then derived that torture should be legal under these circumstances, and 
therefore the debate should be about when not whether torture should be 
legal. But in fact the conclusion does not follow. 
As I indicated I would be willing to torture a suspect under the 
specified circumstances – yet I believe that it should be illegal for me to 
do so. Of course were I to be brought to trial I would hope to be let off on 
the grounds of necessity, or to get a Presidential pardon – but the point is 
that because the act is illegal – hopefully with severe penalties – I would 
certainly not be inclined to torture someone for frivolous reasons. Thus here 
is an economic argument against legalizing torture: if it is legal, despite the 
limited circumstances under which it is legal, then – in practice – there will 
be far too much torture. By the way – the evidence is overwhelming – in 
every instance in which a government has bureaucratized torture it has 
quickly gotten out of hand. But again the basic point: from an economic 
point of view the issue is not “will there be torture” or “will there not be 
torture” but “what will be the impact of making torture legal or illegal 
on the amount of torture that is practiced.” Hypotheticals about nuclear 
bombs in cities do not help us answer this quantitative question.
I should also add a warning at this point. Be careful in debating lawyers 
and philosophers. At this point in the argument they will introduce yet 
another irrelevant hypothetical “suppose that torture can be made legal 
without leading to excessive torture – should it be legal then?” To which 
the only relevant answer is “don’t waste my time.”
If – as is likely – you aren’t planning on debating any lawyers or philosophers 
over economic issues – at least when a behavioral economist insists that people 
exhibit this or that form of irrationality, please ask: how many people and how 
irrational is the behavior in question? Theories by their nature are false. The 
question is always – are they quantitatively useful or not?
The Rush Hour Traffic Game
Beware of lawyers and philosophers bearing hypothetical examples. 
But beware also of social scientist bearing only laboratory results. After 
all – our main interest is: does the theory work outside the laboratory? 
In particular – does Nash equilibrium work outside the laboratory? That 
question is easier to answer than you might think.
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There is a game that most of us are intimately familiar with. It is 
played five days a week in every major city in the world: it is the 
rush hour traffic game. In the “morning game” the “players” are 
commuters trying to get to work. Their choices are which route to take. 
Their objective is to minimize the time it takes to get to work – the 
more time it takes to get to work, the less happy you are. A moment 
of reflection should convince you that the sheer size of this game is 
overwhelming – in a large city it involves millions of players each of 
whom chooses between millions of routes. Yet the outcome of this 
game is a Nash equilibrium.
Wow! How can I possibly know that? Even the biggest supercomputer in 
the world can’t compute the Nash equilibrium of this game. Recall, though, 
what a Nash equilibrium is. It simply means that each commuter is taking 
the quickest route given the routes of all the other commuters. So the test 
of the Nash equilibrium theory is a simple one: are there commuters who 
can find quicker routes?
This test, by the way, is why I want to focus on rush hour traffic. 
During non-rush times there are many inexperienced drivers on the 
road, some making one of a kind trips to unfamiliar locations, and 
often they take routes that are much slower than the fastest available. 
Nonetheless during rush hour commuters are experienced, and have 
tried a lot of routes in the past – there is no much room for learning. 
So – if you try to take a tricky combination of side streets rather than 
the main boulevard you discover that just enough traffic has spilled 
over on to the side streets that you can gain no advantage. How do 
I know this? I’ve tried – I suggest you do. For years I commuted about 
an hour to work through Los Angeles rush hour. I was often stuck on a 
very slow boulevard in Beverly Hills. In frustration I experimented with 
many alternative combinations of side streets. Sadly it never got me to 
work faster. In fact on one occasion, I was behind a large truck when 
I got off the main boulevard, and after ten minutes of tricky driving, 
I got back on the main boulevard – just to find myself behind exactly the 
same truck. In short: Nash equilibrium.
Now you may believe that I am right that what we observe at rush hour 
throughout the world is a Nash equilibrium. You may also wonder – since 
we can’t possibly compute what it is – what good that observation does us. 
As it transpires it does us quite a bit of good – but we’ll talk about that in 
the next chapter. 
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Competitive Markets
Economists who study voting and traffic patterns are few and far between. 
For the most part what economists study is trade taking place in markets. 
And few things seem more controversial than the assertion that markets 
“clear.” Or that markets are competitive when there are only a handful 
of firms. For example a former Presidential advisor, N. Gregory Mankiw 
writes
New Keynesian economists, however, believe that market-clearing models 
cannot explain short-run economic fluctuations. (2010)
Given this controversy, the experimental evidence may surprise you: it 
is easy to identify what settings are competitive, and in these settings we 
observe exactly the price that economists expect based on theory. 
The most striking example is the work by Roth et al. in 1991 examining 
a simple market auction with nine identical buyers. These buyers must bid 
on an object worth nothing to the seller, and worth $10.00 to each of them. 
If the seller accepts he earns the highest price offered, and a buyer selected 
from the winning bids by lottery earns the difference between the object’s 
value and the bid. Each player participates in 10 different market rounds 
with a changing population of buyers. In all these possible situations, bids 
must be in increments of five cents.
What does game theory predict should happen? Suppose the highest 
bid is some amount, call it in the time honored tradition, x. If you bid x 
then there is a tie and you have at most a 50% chance of getting the object 
and can earn at most an expected payoff of ($10 – x)/2. If you raise the bid 
by a nickel – you get the object with certainty – you can earn $ 9.95 – x. As it 
happens if x < $ 9.90 it is better to raise by a nickel and get $ 9.95 – x rather 
than ($10 – x)/2. Also if x < $10 you never want to bid less than x since 
then you would get nothing, while by bidding x you would get a share of 
something. Finally, if everyone else bids $9.90 you can do better by bidding 
$9.95 getting the entire five cents for yourself, rather than a 1/9th share of 
ten cents. Therefore at a Nash equilibrium the winning bid has to be at least 
$9.95 and of course it cannot be more than $10.00.
So what happened in the laboratory? By the time the participants had 
played in seven auctions the price was $9.95 or $10.00 in every case – and in 
most cases this happened long before the seventh try.
Notice the key feature of this auction: no individual buyer can have 
much impact on the price: since everyone else is bidding $9.95 or $10.00 
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the question for a buyer is not so much about changing the price, but rather 
their willingness to buy given that price. This idea – that market participants 
can have little impact on prices – is a central one in the economic theory of 
competitive markets. The corresponding theory – the theory of competitive 
equilibrium – is an important variation on Nash equilibrium. It is a theory 
in which traders in markets choose their trades ignoring whatever small 
impact they may have on market prices. Equilibrium occurs at prices that 
reconcile the desire of suppliers to sell with consumers to buy.
At one time a great deal of effort was expended by economists trying to 
understand the mechanism by which prices adjusted. Modern economic 
theory recognizes that the particular way in which prices are adjusted is not 
so important. An important modern branch of game theory is mechanism 
design theory. While game theory takes the game as given, mechanism 
design theory asks – how might we design a game to achieve some desired 
social goal? To emphasize that the choice of the game is part of the problem, 
the way in which decisions of players are mapped into social outcomes is 
called a mechanism rather than a game.
From the mechanism design point of view, an auction is just one of many 
price setting mechanisms. It is a mechanism that acts to reconcile demand 
with supply – to clear the market. There are many mechanisms that do 
this. They are all equivalent in that they perform the same function of 
clearing markets. Consequently the exact details are of no great importance. 
Perhaps it is done electronically as it is the case with the Chicago Board 
of Trade. Or, perhaps, by shouting out orders as on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE).
How well does the theory of competitive equilibrium and market clearing 
work? Let’s consider a simple market with five suppliers. Suppose that each 
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The profit of a firm is just the amount it receives from sales – its revenue – minus 
this cost. For any particular price we can work out from the cost data how 











I did this computation using calculus – and that is why we demand our 
undergraduate students know calculus. But obviously business people 
do not generally choose their production plans by using calculus. Rather 
they weigh the cost of hiring a few more workers against the additional 
revenue from a few more sales and decide whether or not to expand – or 
shrink – their operation. Of course in the end they get exactly the same 
result as I do by using calculus.
The price that consumers will pay depends on how many units are 
offered for sale in total. Suppose that this is given by the demand schedule







Notice that for the firms to decide how much to produce they must 
guess what price they will face. In the competitive market clearing 
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equilibrium – also called the rational expectations or perfect foresight 
equilibrium – they guess correctly. Inspecting the table for profit 
maximization – the supply, and the table for consumer willingness 
to pay – the demand, we see that when price is 60 consumers wish to 
purchase 360 units, and firms wish to provide this same number. Thus 
60 is the price that “clears the market” or the “competitive equilibrium 
price.”
Bear in mind that in a competitive equilibrium firms are strategically 
naïve. They ignore the fact that by producing less there will be less 
supply and consumers will be willing to pay more resulting in a 
higher profit. Since each firm is only 20% of the market the ability of 
an individual firm to manipulate prices is not large, but it is not zero 
either. If we apply the theory of Nash equilibrium so that each firm 
correctly anticipates the choices of their rival firms, then firms produce 
less – 63 instead of 72 – and the Nash equilibrium price is higher: 65 
rather than the competitive price of 60. The difference between the Nash 
and competitive equilibrium is not all that great, so that even with as 
few as five firms, competitive equilibrium with market clearing is a 
reasonable approximation.
Undoubtedly, real people are not unboundedly rational. They can 
scarcely be expected to rationally forecast “equilibrium” prices. Let us 
instead consider a “behavioral” model: let us suppose that firms forecast 
prices next period to be whatever prices were last period. This is exactly the 
behavioral model of adaptive expectations formation that was widely used 
before the rational expectations revolution of which behavioral economists 
are so critical.
What happens when prices are forecast to be the same next period 
as last? If the starting price is 90, then firms will wish to produce 
990 units of output. Consumers are not willing to buy so many units, 
so price falls to 0. At that price firms aren’t willing to produce anything, 
so now price then rises to 100. The following period the industry 
produces 1200. The cycle then continues with the market alternating 
between overproduction leading to a zero price, then underproducing 
leading to a price of 100. This is the so-called “cobweb” although we 
might also refer to it as a business cycle – the failure of the capitalist 
system by flooding the market with cheap goods and then falling into 
recession. Karl Marx pointed out exactly this self-destructive tendency 
of capitalism.
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Which theory is correct? In 2004 Sutan and Willinger implemented 
this market in the laboratory with real subjects playing for real money. 
Participants had an opportunity to play variations of this game 40 times. 
There were three different experimental markets. The graph below plots 
the actual price in each of those markets against the number of times 












Market Prices over Time
After about the first ten periods prices fluctuate within a relatively narrow 
band in all three markets. It is generally higher than the rational expectations 
competitive price of 60, which is marked by the dotted line in the graph. 
Interestingly Sutan and Willinger view this as a minor contradiction of 
economic theory. In fact the subjects are cleverer here than the experimenters: 
the price is essentially the Nash equilibrium price of 65. As we shall see 
later it is not so uncommon for subjects to outwit experimenters. Often 
“anomalous” experimental results supposedly contradicting economic 
theory simply reflect the fact that the experimenter misunderstood what 
the theory says. As the fundamental theory is that of Nash equilibrium 
which predicts a price of 65 – the results of this experiment are just what 
the theory predicts. Competitive equilibrium is merely an approximation. 
Here it is a useful approximation as the competitive price of 60 is close to 
the Nash equilibrium price of 65, but it is not exact.
By way of contrast the behavioral theory does about as badly as a theory 
can. The average price according to the behavioral theory is 50 – much lower 
than the actual market price which is always above 60 – and prices remain 
within a tight band – they certainly do not cycle abruptly from 0 to 100. 
The key point here is that while it is no doubt true that people do not 
have unbounded rationality, we have only very simple and naïve models 
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of bounded rationality. It is a fact that people are very good at learning, and 
even very sophisticated computer programs produced over many years by 
very skilled computer scientists working on artificial intelligence are much 
less capable of learning than even small children. By contrast “behavioral” 
models of “bounded rationality” such as expecting next period price to 
equal this period price are extremely simplistic. Hence the quantitative 
question: is a model of unbounded rationality or an extremely primitive 
model of learning a better approximation to reality? In this experiment it is 
clear that the model of unbounded rationality is vastly better.
The results of this experiment are by no means atypical. Experiments 
on competitive equilibrium have been conducted many times, dating back 
at least to the work of Vernon Smith in 1962 – work that is hardly obscure 
as he won a Nobel Prize for it. Most of these experiments involve real paid 
subjects in the role of both buyer and seller. The results are highly robust: 
competitive equilibrium predicts the outcome of market experiments with 
a high degree of accuracy, with experimental markets converging quickly 
to approximately the competitive price. 
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The Al-Qassam Brigade is about killing, being killed, and the celebration of killing. 
None of this killing seems to serve any strategic plan, except as blind revenge, 
an expression of religious hysteria, and as a placeholder for a viable program for 
creating a Palestinian state. In short, the Al-Qassam Brigade can best be described 
as a psychotic death cult. Sharkansky, 2002
One of the most frustrating experiences for a working economist is to be 
confronted by a psychologist, political scientist – or even in some cases 
Nobel Prize winning economist – to be told in no uncertain terms “Your 
theory does not explain X – but X happens in the real world, so your 
theory is wrong.” The frustration revolves around the fact that the theory 
does predict X and you personally published a paper in a major journal 
showing exactly that. One cannot intelligently criticize – no matter what 
one’s credentials – what one does not understand. We have just seen that 
standard mainstream economic theory explains a lot of things quite well. 
Before examining criticisms of the theory more closely it would be wise 
to invest a little time in understanding what the theory does and does 
not say.
The point is that the theory of “rational play” does not say what you 
probably think it says. At first glance, it is common to call the behavior 
of suicide bombers crazy or irrational – as for example in the Sharkansky 
quotation at the beginning of the chapter. But according to economics it is 
probably not. From an economic perspective suicide need not be irrational: 
indeed a famous unpublished 2004 paper by Nobel Prize winning 
economist Gary Becker and U.S. Appeals Court Judge Richard Posner 
called “Suicide: An Economic Approach” studies exactly when it would be 
rational to commit suicide. 
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The evidence about the rationality of suicide is persuasive. For example, 
in the State of Oregon, suicide is legal. It cannot, however, be legally done 
in an impulsive fashion: it requires two oral requests separated by at least 
15 days plus a written request signed in the presence of two witnesses, at 
least one of whom is not related to the applicant. While the exact number of 
people committing suicide under these terms is not known, it is substantial. 
Hence – from an economic perspective – this behavior is rational because it 
represents a clearly expressed preference.
What does this have to do with suicide bombers? If it is rational to commit 
suicide, then it is surely rational to achieve a worthwhile goal in the process. 
Eliminating ones enemies is – from the perspective of economics – a rational 
goal. Moreover, modern research into suicide bombers (see Kix [2010]) 
shows that they exhibit exactly the same characteristics of isolation and 
depression that leads in many cases to suicide without bombing. That is: 
leaning to committing suicide they rationally choose to take their enemies 
with them.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Fallacy of 
Composition
Much of the confusion about what economics does and does not say 
revolves around the distinction between individual self interest and what 
is good for society. If people are so rational how can we have war and 
crime and poverty and other social ills? Why do bad things happen to 
societies made up of rational people? The place to start understanding this 
non-sequiter is with the most famous of all games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game so popular Google shows over 
564,000 web pages devoted to it. As this game has two players it can 
conveniently be described by a matrix, with the choices of the first player 
labeling the rows, and the choices of the second player labeling the 
columns. Each entry in the matrix represents a possible outcome – we 
specify the feeling players have about that outcome by writing two 
numbers representing the utility or payoff to the first and second player 
respectively. 
In the original Prisoner’s Dilemma the two players are partners in a 
crime who at the onset of the game have been captured by the police and 
placed in separate cells. As is the case in every crime drama on television, 
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each prisoner is offered the opportunity to confess to the crime. The matrix 
of payoffs can be written as
Not confess Confess
Not confess 10,10 –9,20
Confess 20,-9 2,2
Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoffs
Each player has two possible actions – to Confess or to Not confess. The row 
labels represent possible choices of action by the first player “Player 1.” The 
column labels those of the second player “Player 2.” The numbers in the 
matrix represent payoffs also called utility. The first number applies to player 1,
and the second to player 2. Higher numbers means the player likes that 
outcome better. Thus if player 2 chooses not to confess, then player 1 would 
rather confess than not, as represented by the fact that the payoff 20 is larger 
than the payoff 10. This reflects the fact that the police have offered him a 
good deal in exchange for his confession. By way of contrast, player 2 would 
prefer that player 1 not confess, as represented by the fact that the payoff –9 
is smaller than the payoff 10. This reflects the fact that if his partner confesses 
but he does not, he is going to spend a substantial amount of time in prison. 
We will go through the rest of the payoffs in a bit, but first – what do these 
numbers really mean? I want to emphasize that “utility” numbers are not 
meant to represent some sort of units of happiness that could be measured in 
the brain. Rather, economists recognize that players have preferences among 
the different things that can happen and are able to rank them. Assigning a 
utility of 10 to player 1 when the outcome is Not Confess/Not Confess and 20 
when it is Confess/Not Confess is just a way of saying “Player 1 prefers the 
outcome Confess/Not Confess to the outcome Not Confess/Not Confess.”
More broadly, if certain regularities in preferences are true – for example 
they satisfy transitivity meaning that if you prefer apples to oranges and 
oranges to pears, then you also prefer apples to pears – then we can find 
numbers that represent those preferences in the sense that the analyst can 
determine which decision the player will make by comparing the utility 
numbers. However, while these utility numbers exist in the brain of the 
analyst we do not care whether or not they exist in the brain of the person.
The meaning of the utility numbers in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is 
this: if neither suspect confesses, they go free, and split the proceeds of their 
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crime which we represent by 10 units of utility for each suspect. Alternatively, 
if one prisoner confesses and the other does not, the prisoner who confesses 
testifies against the other in exchange for going free and having some other 
charges dismissed and prefers this to simply splitting the proceeds of the 
crime. We represent this with a higher level of utility: 20. The prisoner who 
did not confess goes to prison, represented by a low utility of –9. Similarly, 
if both prisoners confess, then both are given a reduced term, but both are 
convicted, which we represent by giving each 2 units of utility: better than 
not confessing when you are ratted out, but not as good as going free.
This game is fascinating for a variety of reasons. First, it is a simple 
representation of a variety of important strategic situations. For example, 
instead of Confess/Not confess we could label the choices “contribute to 
the common good” and “behave selfishly.” This captures a variety of 
circumstances economists describe as public goods problems, for example the 
construction of a bridge. It is best for everyone if the bridge is built, but best for 
each individual if someone else builds the bridge. Similarly this game could 
describe two firms competing in the same market, and instead of Confess/
Not confess we could label the choices “set a high price” and “set a low price.” 
Naturally it is best for both firms if they both set high prices, but best for 
each individual firm to capture the market by setting a low price while the 
opposition sets a high price. This is a critical feature of game theory: many 
apparently different circumstances – prisoners in jail; tax-payers voting 
on whether to build a bridge; firms competing in the market – give rise to 
similar strategic considerations. To understand one is to understand them all.
A second feature of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is that it is easy to 
find the Nash equilibrium, and it is self-evident that this is how intelligent 
individuals should behave. No matter what a suspect believes his partner is 
going to do, it is always best to confess. If the partner in the other cell is not 
confessing, it is possible to get 20 instead of 10. If the partner in the other cell 
is confessing, it is possible to get 2 instead of –9. In other words – the best 
course of play is to confess no matter what you think your partner is doing. 
This is the simplest kind of Nash equilibrium. When you confess – even 
not knowing whether or not your opponent is confessing – that is the best 
you can do. This kind of Nash equilibrium – where the best course of play 
does not depend on beliefs about what the other player is doing – is called a 
dominant strategy equilibrium. In a game with a dominant strategy equilibrium 
we expect learning to take place rapidly – perhaps even instantaneously.
The striking fact about the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the reason it 
exerts such fascination is that each player pursuing individually sensible 
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behavior leads to a miserable social outcome. The Nash equilibrium results 
in each player getting only 2 units of utility, much less than the 10 units 
each that they would get if neither confessed. This highlights a conflict 
between the pursuit of individual goals and the common good that is at 
the heart of many social problems.
Pigouvian Taxes
Now let us return to question raised in the traffic game: what good does 
Nash equilibrium do us if we cannot figure out what it is? The answer 
is straightforward: the traffic game is like the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each 
commuter by choosing to drive – rather than, for example, taking the 
bus – derives an individual advantage by getting to work faster and 
more conveniently. She also inflicts a cost – called by economists a 
negative externality – on everyone else by making it more difficult for 
them to get to work. In other words, the private value of each commuter 
is higher than the social value of driving. Hence, as in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game, the Nash equilibrium is not for the common good: Nash 
equilibrium results in too many people driving – everyone would be 
better off if fewer people commuted by car and chose alternatives such 
as living closer to work, implementing car pools, or occasionally taking 
the bus or telecommuting. 
Economists have understood the solution to this problem since Pigou’s 
work in 1920. If we set a corrective tax – known as Pigouvian tax in honor 
of this French economist – and charge each commuter for the cost that they 
impose on others (and therefore we internalize this external cost), then 
Nash equilibrium will result in social efficiency. In this example social 
efficiency differs from the solely private interaction because of the fact that 
commuters do not consider the cost of congestion on other drivers. In the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma above, by choosing to confess you cause a loss of 19 to 
your opponent – the external effect. If we charge a Pigouvian tax of 19 for 
confessing the payoffs become
Not confess Confess
Not confess 10, 10 –9,1
Confess 1,–9 –17, –17
Payoffs in Prisoner’s Dilemma with Pigouvian Tax
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In this case the best thing to do irrespectively of your beliefs about 
your opponents’ actions – the dominant strategy – is to Not confess, and 
everyone gets 10 instead of 2. Notice that in this example – in the resulting 
equilibrium – nobody actually pays the tax.
To implement a Pigouvian tax in the traffic game is not so difficult. In some 
circumstances it may be hard to compute the costs imposed on others. But 
not so in the traffic game where traffic engineers can easily do simulations 
to calculate the additional commuting time from each additional commuter 
and economists can give a relatively accurate assessment of the social cost 
of the lost time based on prevailing wage rates. Moreover, with modern 
technology, it is quite feasible to charge commuters based on congestion 
and location – this is done using cameras and transponders already in cities 
such as London.
Given that the social gain from reducing commuting time dwarfs such 
things as the cost of fighting a war in Afghanistan, why do not large U.S. cities 
charge commuters a congestion tax? Unfortunately there is another game 
involved – the political game. As we observed in our analysis of voting, the 
benefit of voting is very small when the chances of changing the outcome 
are small. So voters are rationally going to avoid incurring the large cost 
of investigating the quality of political candidates through their platforms. 
This is particularly the case for something like commuting – although 
the total benefits are large, they are spread among a very large number 
of people. Since voters do not spend much effort monitoring politicians, 
politicians have a lot of latitude in what they do – and therefore voters 
quite rationally distrust them. 
Voters are especially suspicious of offers by politicians to raise their taxes. 
Those who lean left notice that a commuter tax will favor the rich – who 
can afford the toll – at the expense of the poor – who would be forced into 
public transportation. The right leaners oppose additional taxes because 
they are afraid the government will squander the proceeds. In the end 
both parties collaborate to prevent an efficient solution to the problem of 
congestion. The obvious compromise is to charge a commuting fee and use 
the revenue to reduce the local sales tax – which also disproportionately 
falls on the poor. However: who in the world would believe a politician’s 
promise that this is what she will do?
Many solutions to economic problems are obvious. For example: 
virtually all economists favor raising the gas tax – this serves as a tax on 
pollution, and whatever one’s views of global warming, raising the gas tax 
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is much more desirable than mandating fuel efficiency standards for cars, 
which is what we currently do. Unfortunately we do not yet have a good 
recommendation for what to do about the problem of voters who rationally 
invest little in monitoring politicians and the politicians of both parties 
who are rationally bought and paid for by special interests. As Winston 
Churchill said in a speech in the House of Commons in 1947.
No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been 
said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other 
forms that have been tried from time to time.
The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is counterintuitive. If a prisoner 
rats out his partner should he not fear future retaliation? That depends on 
whether he is likely to meet the partner in the future or not. Implicit in the 
original formulation of the problem is that the prisoners will not meet in 
the future. In many practical situations this is not the case.
A simple model game theorists use for studying this problem is that 
of the repeated game. Suppose that after the first game ends, and the 
suspects either are freed or are released from jail, they will play the same 
game one more time. In this case – the first time the game is played – the 
suspects may reason that they should not confess because if they do their 
partner will follow suit when the game is played again. Strictly speaking, 
this conclusion is not valid, since in the second game both suspects will 
confess no matter what happened in the first game. However, repetition 
opens up the possibility of being rewarded or punished in the future for 
current behavior, and game theorists have provided a number of theories 
to explain the obvious intuition that if the game is repeated often enough, 
the suspects ought to cooperate rather than confess.
To analyze a repeated game we must consider the fact that the utilities 
or payoffs are received at different time periods. As a rule payoffs you 
receive in the future are worth less than those you receive today – “a bird 
in the hand” and all that. The standard model that economists use is that 
of discounting the future. More formally, the discount factor is a positive 
number less than one that is used to weight payoffs received in the “next 
period.” As an example, take the discount factor to be ¾. Suppose that 20 
is received today and 12 next period. Then the present value consists of the 
20 today plus ¾ of the 12 tomorrow, that is, 20 + 9 = 29. Notice that the 
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discount factor depends – among other things – on the amount of time 
between “periods.” The longer the time considered between time periods, 
the smaller the discount factor.
A fundamental fact about Nash equilibrium in a repeated game is that 
while there can be more equilibria than in the one-shot game – the game 
played once – there can never be fewer. That is: suppose that all players 
follow the strategy of playing as they would in the one-shot game no 
matter what their opponents do. Since it was best for each player to play 
that way when the game was played once, it is still best when the game is 
played over and over again.
There are two different kinds of repeated game: there are games that 
are repeated with a definite ending. For example, the game may be played 
once, or twice, or four times – or any finite number of times. And there 
are games with an indefinite ending – for example every time the game is 
played, say, there might be a 50% chance it will be played again and a 50% 
chance it will end.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma it makes quite a bit of difference whether 
there is a definite or indefinite ending. If there is a definite ending, 
then the last time the game is played everyone knows it is being 
played only once: thus both players confess no matter what has gone 
before – they not expect to interact ever again. But now think of the next to 
last period: everyone anticipates that no matter what happens today, 
tomorrow everyone will confess. Hence you might as well confess 
today since failing to do so will not result in favorable consideration 
by your partner next time around. A moment of reflection should 
convince you that the same is no true in the next-to-next to last period 
and so forth, working backwards to the first game. Consequently both 
players always confess.
The situation changes when there is an indefinite ending. Suppose 
the discount factor is 9/10 – you can think of the discount factor as the 
probabilistic ending. For simplicity, limit attention to three strategies in the 
repeated game which we label Grim, Not Confess and Confess. Not Confess 
means just that: don’t confess ever. Similarly Confess means always confess 
no matter what. Grim is trickier: don’t confess the first time you play, then 
starting the second time the game is played do whatever the other player 
did the first time the game was played. If your opponent plays Grim like 
you neither player ever confesses. The same happens if your opponent 
plays Not Confess, but if he plays Confess, then you also confess beginning 
in the second period.
behaviouraleconomics.indd   28 9/6/12   5:43 PM
 3. Why Is the World so Irrational?  29
Let us compute the payoffs – in present value – when neither 
player ever confesses. In every period each player gets 10. This must 
be properly discounted, as a result the present value in this case is 
10 + (9/10) 10 + (9/10)2 10+ ... = 100. Here I am using the property of geometric 
sums that says that  ∑t=0 
∞
 r t = 1/(1 - r)  with 0 < r < 1. More interesting is the 
case where a player choosing Grim meets an opponent playing Confess. The 
grim player gets -9 + (9/10) 2 + (9/10)2 2 + ... = 9 and the confessor gets 
20 + (9/10)2 + (9/10)2 2 + ... = 38. The complete payoffs to all the different of 
combinations is shown in the matrix below:
Grim Not Confess Confess
Grim 100*,100* 100,100* 9,38
Not Confess 100*,100 100,100 -90,200*
Confess 38,9 200*,-90 20*,20*
Simplified Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoffs
To find the Nash equilibrium, we start by asking the hypothetical question: 
if your opponent played Grim (Not Confess, Confess respectively), what 
would you like to do? If you thought your opponent was playing Grim, you 
would like to either play Grim or to Not Confess as this would result in a 
payoff of 100 rather than 38. This is marked with an asterisk in the matrix, 
and is called by game theorists a best response. If you think your opponent 
is not confessing, you would like to Confess and get 200, and you would 
also like to Confess and get 20 if your opponent is confessing. The Nash 
equilibria are the mutual best responses where both players are playing best 
responses to each other at the same time – the cells in the matrix with two 
asterisks. As you can see there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria – we 
leave the third Nash equilibrium using randomization for later analysis. 
As we observed – the original Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game at 
Confess-Confess is still a Nash equilibrium. Further there is an additional 
Nash equilibrium: Grim-Grim. If your opponent is playing Grim you do not 
want to cross her by confessing – the gain of 20 for one period is more than 
offset by the fact that you will lose 8 every period forever after.
Does that sound a bit theoretical? In 2005 Pedro Dal Bo took the 
Prisoner’s dilemma theory to the laboratory. He had players play the 
one-shot game. He had them play for two periods and for four periods 
(without any discounting). And then he had them play an indefinite 
ending – he had them play “dice games” where at the end of each round 
behaviouraleconomics.indd   29 9/6/12   5:43 PM
30 Behavioral Economics Doomed
a dice was used to determine whether play would continue. He studied 
games where the chance of continuing was ½ and also games where it 
was ¾. To give players a chance to “learn their way to equilibrium” each 
player played 10 of these repeated games. The table below reports how 
often players succeeded in cooperating (not confessing) based on the type 





Dice  1 _2 28% 28% 36%
 3 _4 40% 34% 46%
One Shot 26% 14% 6.4%
Finite 2 20% 13% 8.9%
4 32% 27% 18%
Percentage of Cooperation
Recall the predictions of the theory. In the one-shot and finite games players 
should not cooperate. Inexperienced players do cooperate in violation of 
the theory. This had also been remarked on by earlier investigators who 
concluded the theory was deficient. However, as players become more 
experienced their willingness to cooperate declines dramatically. Even 
when the game is repeated four times, cooperation falls to 18%, less than 
is the case in any game with inexperienced players. By way of contrast, in 
the dice games there are equilibria where players do not cooperate, but 
also equilibria in which they do. Here – in comparison to the finite length 
games – cooperation rather than diminishing over time actually increases 
over time. When there is a ¾ chance the game will continue – meaning on 
average the game will last four periods – experienced players cooperate 
46% of the time.
Altruism and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The theory of Nash equilibrium does not perfectly describe how people 
played in Dal Bo’s experiment. Some cooperation is taking place with 
relatively experienced players even when the game has a definite 
ending. This is not completely unexpected as in laboratory experiments 
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about 10–20% of the participants are not paying attention to the instructions 
and play in a way unpredictable by any theory, rational or behavioral. 
The presence of a modest number of foolish players is a topic we will take 
up later. For the moment notice that the 18% of experienced cooperators 
during four period games cannot easily be dismissed as “inattentive.” 
What conclusion can we reach about these “irrational” cooperators? 
One possibility is that they engage in a kind of magical reasoning that “if 
I cooperate then my opponent will cooperate,” or “the only way we can 
beat this dilemma is if we both cooperate so I better cooperate.” However, 
unless players are mind readers, this reasoning is wrong: there can be no 
causal link between what you do in the privacy of your own computer 
booth, and your unknown opponent does in hers. Experienced players 
have had ample opportunity to learn the fallacy of this reasoning, so it is 
difficult to explain their play this way. 
A more likely explanation is players are rational and altruistic in the 
technical sense that they care not only about their own monetary payoff, 
but also that of their opponent. It is, after all, our common experience 
that some people are sometimes altruistic and as we shall see, we observe 
altruism in many other laboratory experiments.
A second possibility is that players have not completely learned the 
equilibrium. That is, if players start out cooperating in hopes of eliciting 
future cooperation, the first thing they will discover is that it is a mistake 
to cooperate in the fourth period. After players stop cooperating in the 
fourth period they will then discover it is a mistake to cooperate in the third 
period – and it may take a while before they stop cooperating in the 
first period. The fact that this can take a long while was first shown in 
simulations by John Nachbar in 1989.
What can we say about these two explanations? Economists have studied 
altruism for many years – it was central to Barro’s 1984 study of who bears 
the burden of taxes, for example. Yet while it is certainly real it is often 
ignored by economists because it is quantitatively small. People do give 
to charities, but for example in the United States – which has the highest 
rate of giving – only about 2.2–2.3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
given. Moreover some of this is not strictly speaking “charitable” but rather 
fee for services, such as the 35% of donations that are given to religious 
organizations (GivingUSA, 2009). Further, as we shall see, in experiments 
where we can measure the relative contribution of “behavioral” preferences 
such as altruism and imperfect learning, imperfect learning is two to three 
times more important.
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Despite the fact that it is unimportant in many settings, a little bit of 
altruism can go a long way – for example, a willingness to be altruistic only 
in the final period of a repeated game can dramatically change the strategic 
nature of the game. A player who is willing to cooperate in the final period 
can hold that out as a prospective reward to a not so altruistic opponent, 
and so get them to cooperate. This sort of altruism – kind to those people 
who are kind to you – is called reciprocal altruism. It is present in Dal Bo’s 
experiment. From his data we can look at the final period of the two period 
games with a definite ending. Against an experienced player (one who has 
already engaged in six or more matches) if you cheat in the first period 
probability of getting cooperation in the final period is only 3.2% – much 
less than the 6.4% chance of finding an experienced cooperative opponent 
in the one-shot game. On the other hand, if you cooperate the chance of 
getting cooperation in the final round jumps to 21% - much higher than the 
6.4% cooperation in the one-shot case.
Reciprocal cooperation is interesting and much studied for two reasons: 
first, because in games taking place over time it has a big impact on 
equilibrium outcomes. Second, because it is difficult to distinguish from 
strategic non-altruistic behavior. That is: did I take care of my aged parent 
because I am altruistic or because I want to get an inheritance? Even in 
the experimental laboratory we must worry that the students who are 
the experimental subjects get together and share experiences afterwards. 
If I am a poor liar, I may be reluctant to behave selfishly in fear that I may 
spill the beans to my friends, and so earn their disrespect – a fate fare worse 
than losing a few dollars in the laboratory.
Although altruism has been studied by economists for many years, 
the social preferences of fairness and reciprocal altruism have not been as 
thoroughly examined, and are a major subject of current research interest 
by economists such as Rabin [1993], Levine [1998], Fehr and Schmidt 
[1999], Bolton and Ockenfels [2000], Gul and Pesendorfer [2004], and Cox, 
Friedman and Sadiraj [2008]. 
Do Better People Make a Better Society?
We can demonstrate some of the power and meaning of game theory by 
considering the following statement: “If we were all better people the 
world would be a better place.” This may seem to be self-evidently true. 
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Or you may recognize that as a matter of logic this involves the fallacy of 
composition: just because a statement applies to each individual person 
it need not apply to the group. Game theory can give precise meaning to 
the statement of both what it means to be better people and what it means 
for the world to be a better place, and so makes it possible to prove or 
disprove the statement. 
A sensible meaning of “being a better person” is to obey the biblical 
injunction to “love your neighbor as yourself” – that is, to be altruistic. 
If I truly value you – my neighbor – as myself, then I should place the 
same value on your utility as on my own: simply adding the two together. 
Hence if my selfish utility is 20 and yours is –9, my “altruistic utility” is 
just the sum of the two, that is to say, 11. If we begin with the payoffs in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game above, we may proceed in this way to compute 
the payoffs in the Biblical Game:
Not confess Confess
Not confess 20*,20* 11*,11
Confess 11,11* 4,4
Biblical Game Payoffs
This game is easy to analyze: it has a dominant strategy equilibrium. No 
matter what you do and what I think you will do, the best thing for me to 
do is not to confess. For that reason the Nash equilibrium is that neither of 
us confesses and consequently we both get 10 – clearly a better outcome 
than the original equilibrium outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
where we each get 2. As a result it seems if we were perfect people the 
world would be a better place.
The assertion, however, was not “if we were all perfect people the world 
would be a better place,” but rather “if we were all better people the world 
would be a better place.” A simple example adapted from Martin Osborne’s 
[2003] textbook illustrates the basic concept. Consider the Bus Seating 
Game. There is only one vacant bench on a bus and two passengers. If both 
passengers sit on the bench, both receive 2. If both stand, both receive 1 as 
it is less pleasant to stand than to sit. If one sits and one stands, the sitting 
passenger gets 3 as it is more pleasant to sit by one’s self than to share a 
bench, and the standing passenger gets 0 as it is more pleasant to share the 
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discomfort of standing than to watch someone else seated in comfort. The 




Bus Seating Game Payoffs
Here it is a dominant strategy for each passenger to sit and the dominant 
strategy equilibrium is Sit/Sit. Moreover, this is a desirable outcome – Pareto 
efficient in the sense that it cannot be improved on for both players – in that 
both players get 2 rather than one. In other words, by making one player 
better off we will be making the other player worse off.
Next suppose that rather than love our neighbor as ourselves, we 
are excessively altruistic, caring only about the comfort of our fellow 




Polite Bus Seating Game Payoffs
In this game it is dominant for both passengers to stand – that is the Nash 
equilibrium is Stand/Stand – and both get 1 rather than 2. By excessive 
altruism, a game with a socially good dominant strategy equilibrium – Sit/
Sit – is converted into a Prisoner’s Dilemma type of situation with a socially 
bad dominant strategy equilibrium. 
Now you may feel this is unfair: perhaps excessive politeness and 
caring only about other people and not ourselves is perhaps not what we 
mean by “being a better person” and certainly is not very realistic. But the 
central idea – that the changes in payoffs due to greater altruism can change 
incentives in such a way so as to lead to a less favorable equilibrium is true 
more broadly. If we consider situations in which players have more than 
two strategies, we can cause a switch to a less favorable equilibrium with a 
more sensible and moderate interpretation of what it means to be a “better 
person.” The game we will use to illustrate this is a variant on the repeated 
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Prisoner’s Dilemma game with discount factor 9/10 that we studied earlier. 
There we considered three strategies: Not Confess ever, always Confess and 
Grim. In this game, instead of Grim, there is a strategy called Tough. This is 
similar to Grim, except that if you play Tough you get a bonus of 15 at a cost 
to your opponent of 35. Hence the Tough Game has payoff matrix given by:
Tough Not confess Confess
Tough 80*,80* 115,65 24*,3
Not confess 65,115 100,100 -90,200*
Confess 3,24* 200*,-90 20,20
Tough Game Payoffs
Using the tool of best-responses, we see that this game has a unique Nash 
equilibrium of Tough-Tough giving both players 80. We can easily show this 
is the only possible equilibrium using a method called iterated dominance. 
Notice that Not confess is dominated by Tough, since no matter what the 
other player is doing, Tough always does better. Hence we throw out the 




Reduced Tough Game Payoffs
In this reduced game, we see that Tough-Tough is a dominant strategy 
equilibrium: this procedure of eliminating dominated strategies is called 
iterated dominance, and experimental evidence suggests that players learn 
their way to equilibrium without much difficulty in such games.
The Tough Game is very different than the Prisoner’s Dilemma game: 
while the unique equilibrium is not quite the best possible – players get 80 
rather than the 100 they would get if the both played Not confess it is still 
quite a bit better than the 20 they each get from Confessing. In this sense the 
Tough Game is very like the Bus Seating Game in that the equilibrium is 
rather good for both players. 
What happens if we “become better people?” Let us now take 
the reasonable interpretation that while I care about you, I am not 
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completely altruistic. Suppose in particular that I place a weight of two 
on my selfish utility and a weight of one on yours. So, for example, in the 
Tough Game, if I get 65 and you get 15 then in the Altruistic Tough Game 
I get 2 × 65 + 115 = 245. The payoffs in the Altruistic Tough Game can be 
computed as:
Tough Not Confess Confess
Tough 240,240 295,245* 51,30
Not Confess 245*,295 300,300 –20,310*
Confess 30,51 310*,–20 60*,60*
Altruistic Tough Game Payoffs
What happens? Using the tool of the best-response – look at those cells 
in the matrix with two asterisks – we see that the only equilibrium is the 
one in which both player Confess. When we compare the Tough Game to 
the Altruistic Tough Game, we see that greater altruism has disrupted the 
Tough-Tough equilibrium by causing players to generously switch to Not 
confess in order to give 55 to their opponent at a cost of only 5 to themselves. 
Unfortunately this does not result in an equilibrium: when both players are 
Not confessing they are still selfish enough to prefer to Confess.
Our conclusion? Far from making us better off, when we both become 
more altruist and more caring about one another, instead of us both getting 
a relatively high utility each period of 8, the equilibrium is disrupted, and we 
wind up in a situation in which we both get a utility each period of only 2. 
Notice how we can give a precise meaning to the “world being a better place.” 
If we both receive a utility of 2 per period rather than both receiving a utility of 
8 per period, we agree the world is a worse place regardless of how altruistic or 
selfish we happen to be – or even how concerned about fairness we might be.
The key to game theory and to understanding why better people may 
make the world a worse place is to understand the delicate balance of 
equilibrium. It is true that if we simply become more caring and nothing else 
happens the world will at least be no worse. However: if we become more 
caring we will wish to change how we behave. In this example in which we 
both try to do this at the same time, the end result will make us all worse off.
We can put this in the context of day-to-day life: if we were all more 
altruistic we would choose to forgive and forget more criminal behavior – to 
turn the other cheek. The behavior of criminals has a complication though. 
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More altruistic criminals would choose to commit fewer crimes. However, 
as crime is not punished so severely, they would be inclined to commit 
more crimes. If in the balance more crimes are committed, the world could 
certainly be a worse place. Our example shows how this might work.
The example of the Tough Game is very simple and not especially 
realistic. It is based on a 2008 academic paper by Hwang and Bowles. If 
you know some basic calculus the paper is very readable. They provide a 
much more persuasive and robust example tightly linked to experimental 
evidence showing how altruism can hurt cooperation.
Is Compromise Good?
The Tough Game illustrates a situation where the extremes are better 
than the intermediate case. If people are completely selfish the world is 
reasonably good; if they are completely altruistic it is even better, but if 
they are neither completely selfish nor completely altruistic then the 
world is a miserable place. Situations where a compromise is worse than 
either extreme are not so uncommon in economic analysis. Two important 
practical examples are the cases of bank regulation and of health insurance. 
In the case of bank regulation, we have a system where deposits are 
insured by the Federal Government, which also oversees bank portfolios to 
ensure that banks do not engage in overly risky behavior. Some economists 
argue that a system without regulation and insurance would be a superior 
system. Others think the regulatory regime is better. Yet all economists 
agree that a system in which deposits are guaranteed – either explicitly 
through an insurance agency such as the FDIC or implicitly through “too 
big to fail” – and bank portfolios are not regulated would be a disaster. 
Then banks would acquire portfolios that promised a high rate of return but 
also a high risk of getting wiped out. Depositors and issuers of short-term 
bonds would head for the banks that offered the highest returns – knowing 
that the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve System will bail them out if 
things go south. Which of course eventually they will – leaving the 
taxpayer holding the bag. Does that sound familiar? It has happened twice 
in the last quarter century – during the Savings and Loan crisis of the late 
1980s, and again in the crisis of 2008. Beware when bankers or other crony 
capitalists appear before Congress or State Legislatures arguing the merits 
of “deregulation.” What they mean is that they should be allowed to do 
whatever they want – especially paying themselves huge salaries for doing 
it – but that when things go wrong taxpayers should pay for all the losses.
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Economists are not perfect people – like anyone else we put more weight 
on our own selfish interest than the common good. Because of this I am 
sure that some economists have managed to argue that this kind of “partial 
deregulation” is a good idea. However no economist who is not being paid 
to do so would argue for such a policy, and even those who do know better.
A similar problem arises with respect to health insurance. It is popular 
to argue that insurance companies should not be allowed to discriminate 
based on whether people are sick. After all, what good is insurance that 
you can’t have when you need it? However: if the decision to participate 
in health insurance is voluntary, then in such a system nobody would buy 
insurance until they were sick – meaning that there would be no health 
insurance at all. Economists refer to this as “adverse selection” – only the bad 
risks choose to get insured. Therefore we can have a system that excludes 
people based on pre-existing conditions, and we can have a system that 
does not discriminate but in which coverage is mandatory. Certainly the 
system that is halfway in between does not work. The reason that employer 
based health insurance works is because coverage is mandatory – if you 
work for that employer you must accept their health insurance. Indeed, as 
health care costs rise eventually only sick people will choose to work for 
firms that offer health insurance, while the healthy will choose to earn a 
substantially higher wage working for a firm that does not offer insurance. 
When that happens, the employer-based system will break down.
Bank Runs and the Crisis
The financial market meltdown in October 2009 has convinced many that 
markets are irrational, and rational models are doomed to failure. Only 
behavioral models recognizing the emotional “animal spirits” of investors 
can hope to capture the events that occur during a full blown financial 
panic. Most of this sentiment springs, however, from confusion about what 
rationality is and what rational models say.
Is it irrational to run for the exit when someone screams that the movie 
theater is on fire? Let’s analyze this problem using the tools of rational 
game theory. There are effectively two options: to exit in an orderly fashion, 
or to rush for the exit. To keep things simple, we’ll put your choice on the 
vertical and what everyone else does on the horizontal in the payoff matrix 
of this game. If everyone else is orderly and you rush, you get to the exit 
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first, so are sure of escaping the fire. Let’s give this 10 units of utility. If 
you exit in an orderly way, you may not be first, consequently there is a 
chance – say 10% – you will be caught in the fire. Let’s assign that event a 
utility of 9. If everyone rushes and you are orderly, then you are likely not 
to escape – let’s assign that a utility of 0. If you rush along with everyone 
else, then you have a chance of escape – but less than if everyone exits in an 
orderly way, so let’s say that has a utility of 5. The table below shows your 





Fire in the Theater Payoffs
This is simply a variation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. No matter what 
you think everyone else is doing – the dominant strategy for you is to rush. 
Of course in the resulting equilibrium everyone gets 5, while if they all 
exited in an orderly way they would all get 9. 
Notice that the theory of rational play has no problem explaining the 
fact that everyone rushes for the exits – indeed that is exactly what the 
theory predicts. Nowhere do we model the very real sick feeling of panic 
that people feel as they rush for the exits. That is a symptom of being in a 
difficult situation, not an explanation of why people behave as they do. It 
isn’t paranoia if they are really out to get you.
The situation in a market panic is similar. Suppose you turn on the 
television and notice the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, hands 
trembling slightly, giving a speech indicating that the financial sector is 
close to meltdown. It occurs to you that when this happens, stocks will 
not have much value. Naturally you wish to sell your stocks – and to do 
so before they fall in price, which is to say, to sell before everyone else can 
rush to sell. Thus there is a “panic” as everyone rushes to sell. Individual 
behavior here is rational – and unlike the rushing to the exits where more 
lives would be spared if the exodus was orderly, in the stock market there 
is no real harm if people rush to sell rather than selling in an orderly way.
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Panel (b): Theoretically Predicted Price Path
In some circumstances people overdo it – and the price drops so much that 
it bounces right back up as soon as people get their wits back. Perhaps this 
is due to irrationality? Not at all – there is a beautiful paper written in 2009 
by Lasse Pedersen analyzing the so-called “quant event” of August 3–14 
2007, where prices did exactly that. The first figure above shows the minute 
by minute real market price and the second figure shows prices computed 
from the theory. The two figures speak for themselves. The key thing to 
understand is that the theory is of pure rational expectations – irrationality, 
psychology, and “behavioral” economics do not enter the picture.
The same idea applies to bank runs. If you think your bank is going to fail 
taking your life savings with it, it is perfectly rational to try to get your money 
out as quickly as you can. If everyone does that it pretty much guarantees the 
bank will fail. A formal model of bank runs along these lines was first proposed 
by Diamond and Dybvig in the prestigious Journal of Political Economy in 1983. 
And no, I’m not picking some obscure paper that nobody in economics has paid 
any attention to – according to Google there have been 3,639 follow up papers. 
So far nobody has pointed out any facts or details about the financial crisis that 
is inconsistent with or fails to be predicted by these models of rational behavior.
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Rational Expectations and Crashes
One problem with defending economics in public forums is that people 
you don’t know write you emails. The most common theme is “You guys 
didn’t predict the crisis so you are useless.” I’m not entirely clear on why 
the only possible use of economics should be to predict crises, but I can at 
least sympathize with the idea that failing to predict a giant crisis is a huge 
failure.
But is it? Step back a moment. Suppose that we could. We’d run a big 
computer program that all economists agreed was right, and everyone else 
believed, and it would tell us “Next week the stock market will fall 20%.” 
What would you do? Knowing the stock market will drop 20% next week, 
would you wait until next week to sell? Of course not, you’d want to dump 
your stocks before everyone else did. And when everyone tried to do that 
the stock market would drop by 20% – but not next week, it would happen 
right now. You don’t wait until you feel the flames before you rush for the 
theater exits.
Put another way, there is an intrinsic interaction between the forecaster 
and the forecast – at least if the forecaster is believed. Predicting economic 
activity isn’t like predicting the weather. Whether or not there is going to be 
a hurricane doesn’t depend on whether or not we think there is going to be a 
hurricane. Whether or not there is going to be an economic crisis depends on 
whether or not we think there is going to be one. And this is why the economics 
profession came to adopt the rational expectations model. Unlike behavioral 
models – which treat economic activity like hurricanes – the rational 
expectations model captures the intrinsic connection between the forecaster 
and the forecast. In fact one description of a model of rational expectations 
is that it describes a world where the forecaster has no advantage in making 
forecasts over anyone else in the economy – which if people believe his 
forecasts will have to be the case.
Did you get that? When people speak of “self-fulfilling prophecies” 
they aren’t talking about models of irrational behavior. Models of irrational 
behavior do not predict that there can be “self-fulfilling prophecies.” Only 
models of rational behavior do.
Let’s look at the criticism of the economics profession for having failed 
to predict the crisis more closely. One articulate critic of modern economics 
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is a Nobel Prize winning economist – a New York Times columnist by the 
name of Paul Krugman who wrote in 2009 about
…the profession’s blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic failures in a 
market economy. During the golden years, financial economists came to believe 
that markets were inherently stable – indeed, that stocks and other assets were 
always priced just right. There was nothing in the prevailing models suggesting 
the possibility of the kind of collapse that happened last year.
But is that true? Some years earlier, in 1979, an economist wrote a paper 
called “A Model of Balance-of-Payments” showing how under perfect 
foresight crises are ubiquitous when speculators swoop in and sell short. 
The paper is deficient in that it supposes that crises are perfectly foreseen 
and – as indicated above – this cannot lead to catastrophic drops in prices. 
However, the paper is not obscure, there having been some 2,354 follow-on 
papers, including a beautiful paper written in 1983 by Steve Salant. Salant 
uses the tools of modern economics, in which the fundamental forces 
driving the economy are not perfectly foreseen, to show how rational 
expectations lead to speculation and unexpected yet catastrophic price 
drops. Lest you think that this 27 year old paper is lost in the mists of time… 
in 2001 I published a paper with Michele Boldrin entitled “Growth Cycles 
and Market Crashes.” The message was most assuredly not that the “kind 
of collapse that happened last year” is impossible or even unlikely.
Despite the fact that the idea of the Salant paper is integral to most 
modern economic models, it still never fails to surprise non-economists 
when market crises do occur. It has happened in England, Mexico, Argentina, 
Israel, Italy, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, and of course more than once in 
the United States. Perhaps policy makers and ordinary citizens should 
pay more attention to economists? The plaintiveness and whining when 
it happens are always the same: for example, in 1992, nine years after the 
Salant paper, Erik Ipsen reported in the New York Times that
Sweden’s abandonment Thursday of its battle to defend the krona, in a 
grudging capitulation to currency speculators, bodes ill for Europe’s other 
weak currencies and threatens to send new waves of turbulence through the 
European Monetary System.
The central bank, which jacked interest rates to an astronomical 500 
percent to stave off devaluation during the European currency crisis in 
September, raised rates to 20 percent Thursday morning, from 11.5 percent, 
in a last attempt to bolster the krona, only to concede defeat hours later.
“The speculative forces just proved too strong,” Prime Minister Carl Bildt 
said in announcing that Sweden would let the krona float.
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Those who forget history are doomed to repeat it. Oh, by the way – the 
author of that 1979 paper pointing out the ubiquity of crises? Paul Krugman.
The Economic Consequences of John Maynard 
Keynes
We have got quite a bit of mileage from variations of the theme of running for the 
exits – from the Prisoner’s dilemma game. But this is not the only game fraught 
with economic consequence. The coordination game – introduced by Thomas 
Schelling in 1960 – is another simple model with significant ramifications.
In the story told by Schelling, two strangers are told to meet in New 
York City on a specific day, but are unable to communicate with each other 
about the meeting place. Bear in mind that Schelling was writing in 1960, 
when the modern cell phone was not even a gleam in the science fiction 
novelists’ eye. It turns out that most people manage to say “noon in Grand 
Central station,” meaning that they mostly succeed in meeting each other. 
To analyze this game theoretically, let’s imagine that the only other 
possible meeting place is Times Square. Specifically, we’ll suppose that the 
game matrix is a slight variation on the game analyzed by Schelling:
Grand Central Times Square
Grand Central 3*,3* 0,0
Times Square 0,0 2*,2*
Schelling’s Meeting Game Payoffs
Here if they miss connections they get nothing, but we assume that since 
Times Square is more crowded than Grand Central, that they get slightly 
less – two instead of three – if they try to meet there.
This game is very different than the prisoner’s dilemma in that the interests 
of the two players are perfectly aligned – I would like to coordinate with you 
to meet at the same place. In particular, altruism or “goodness” has no role 
to play in this game. You might think that is pretty much the end of the story, 
but analysis of Nash equilibrium shows it is not. If you think the other person 
is going to Times Square – you should do the same. As a result the game has 
two rather than one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, one where they meet 
at Grand Central and one where they meet in Times Square. There is also a 
Nash equilibrium involving randomization – I will talk about this later.
behaviouraleconomics.indd   43 9/6/12   5:43 PM
44 Behavioral Economics Doomed
“This is silly,” you say, obviously Grand Central is better, we’ll meet 
there. And economists and game theorist agree. Alternatively suppose that 
it is much worse to be in Grand Central by yourself than in Times Square, 
so that the payoffs are really.
Grand Central Times Square
Grand Central 3*,3* –10,0
Times Square 0,–10 2*,2*
Grand Central Meeting Game Payoffs
Now are you so sure it is a good idea to go to Grand Central? After all if 
you are wrong about the other person you’ll be stuck with –10, while if you 
go to Times Square and the other person doesn’t show up you at least get 0. 
Similarly the other person reasoning the same way may also head to Times 
Square…. Then, in fact the relevant Nash equilibrium of this game may be 
Times Square/Times Square. This is worse than meeting in Grand Central – both 
get 2 instead of 3, and it is called a coordination failure equilibrium. 
There is a theory of these coordination failure equilibria – but the 
concept of risk dominance that is used to analyze it and the probabilistic 
theory of learning that was created by Kandori, Mailath and Rob, and by 
Peyton Young in 1993 is too mathematical and complex to describe here. 
However – if you are a fan of the idea that economics spends too much time 
on rationality and not enough time on evolution, let me point out that these 
famous and highly cited articles employ…an evolutionary model.
That is digressive. The key point is that insofar as anybody has been able 
to make head or tails out of the confusing jumble of thought found in John 
Maynard Keyes General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, it is the 
idea that there can be a coordination failure. That is, firms don’t produce 
because they don’t think anybody will buy their products, and consumers 
don’t buy because they don’t have any money because firms won’t employ 
them. There is no doubt that this makes logical sense – enough so that 
current pundits such as the ubiquitous Professor Krugman still wish to 
convince us that Keynes makes sense. The fact that nobody has been able 
to make sense out of Keynes isn’t because of ill-will or lack of effort on 
the part of the economics profession, however. Google shows some of the 
articles I’ve discussed with as many as several thousand citations; Keynes 
book, on the other hand, garners over ten thousand – and those are only 
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the citations available by computer, which, since the book was published in 
1936, misses most of them.
No, the problem with Keynes isn’t that it is impossible to construct 
a plausible yet logical model of what he had in mind. It’s just that every 
attempt to construct such a model has fallen victim of the evidence. First of 
all, if coordination failure was that easy, we would see it all the time – yet 
we’ve only had one Great Depression. At the time of the Great Depression, 
of course, models of the ubiquity of great depressions were very popular. 
For example, the leading growth model at that time was the Harrod-Domar 
model that said that the capitalist economy teetered on the razor’s edge, 
ready to fall into depression at an instant notice. It is perhaps unfortunate 
that the model was created between 1939 and 1946 – immediately 
proceeding one of the longest unbroken spells of growth and prosperity 
in history.
There have been valiant attempts – for example Leijonhufvud’s 1973 
notion that there is a “classical corridor” in which as long as only moderately 
bad things happen, the economy behaves classically as predicted by some 
of the very early rational expectations models. However if something big 
and bad enough occurs – the collapse of the housing market? – then we are 
thrust into a Keynesian world of coordination failure.
The key problem is that Keynesian models are extremely 
delicate – writing in 1992 Jones and Manuelli show that coordination failure 
can occur only under very implausible assumptions about the economy. 
More to the point – there simply isn’t any empirical evidence pointing to 
coordination failure. We are rebounding from the current crisis – the theory 
of Keynes says we should not be doing so. Additionally modern analysis of 
the Great Depression, such as that of Cole and Ohanian [2004] suggests that 
the prolonged length of the depression was due more to bad government 
policies – the crony capitalism of the New Deal, for example – than to an 
intrinsic inability of a capitalist economy to right itself.
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Economic theory works some of the time. But perhaps not always? 
There is an experimental literature that argues there are gross violations 
of economic theory. Since these failures are not with the theory of Nash 
equilibrium, I will explain an important variation – the notion of subgame 
perfect equilibrium. How well does the theory of subgame perfection do 
in the laboratory? In three games – a public goods game called Best-shot, 
a bargaining game called Ultimatum and the game of Grab-a-dollar the 
simple theory with selfish players fails. 
Subgame Perfection
Our notion of a game is a matrix game in which players simultaneously 
choose actions one time and one time only. Situations like this are 
rare outside the laboratory. The “real” theory of games has long-since 
incorporated both the presence of time – and that ubiquitous phenomenon 
known as uncertainty. Often when I am teaching a course and I get to this 
point, I say “now we start the real theory of games.” So let us begin.
A “real” game involves players taking moves. Some may be simultaneous, 
in other cases we get to make choices after observing what other people have 
done. For example, we generally buy groceries after the store has posted 
the prices. To keep things easy, focus on sequential move games – although 
the complete theory allows both simultaneous and sequential moves. We 
model sequential moves by a game tree, a diagram of circles and arrows, 
with the circles indicating that a player is making a move, and the arrows 
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the options available to that player. Below is illustrated a simple and 











In this simple game player 1 moves first. Her decision node is represented by 
the circle labeled with her name “1.” She has two choices represented by 
arrows: to Enter the market or Exit the market. If she exits, the game ends 
and everyone gets a payoff of zero. If she enters, player 2 gets to move, as 
represented by the circle labeled with “2.” Player 2 has two possible responses 
to entry: either to Fight, or to Cave. If he fights, everyone loses, as indicated by 
the numbers -2, -2 representing the payoff to player 1 and player 2 respectively. 
If he Caves, player 1 wins and gets 1, while player 2 loses and gets -1. Notice 
that for player 2 it is better to cave and avoid the fight. Note the sequential 
nature of this game – player 2 gets to play only if player 1 decides to enter.
There are two ways to play this game. One is to play it as described. 
The other is to make advance plans. The idea of advance plans, or strategies 
is the heart of game theory. A strategy is a set of instructions that you 
can give to a friend – or program on a computer – explaining how you 
would like to play the game. It is a complete set of instructions: it must 
explain how to play in every circumstance that can arise in the game. As 
you can imagine this may not be very practical: think of trying to write 
down instructions for a friend to play a chess game on your behalf. Chess 
has a myriad of possible configurations – and you have to tell your friend 
how to play in each possible situation. Of course the IBM Corporation did 
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provide a very effective set of instructions to the computer Deep Blue – so 
effective that Deep Blue beat the human world chess champion in 1997. For 
the rest of us implementing complex and effective strategies may not be so 
practical, but regardless, the idea of a strategy is very useful conceptually.
In the Selten Game, each player has two strategies. Player 1 can either 
exit or enter, and player 2 can either fight or cave. Notice that player 2’s 
strategy is conceptually different from player 1’s. Player 1’s strategy is a 
definite decision to do something. Player 2’s strategy is hypothetical: “if 
I get to play the game, here is what I will do.”
Strategies are chosen in advance – and each player has to choose 
a strategy without knowing what the other player has chosen. Thus, 
when the game is described by means of strategies it is a matrix game: 
each player chooses a strategy, and depending on the strategies chosen, 
they get payoffs. The matrix that goes with the Selten Game is below:
Fight Cave
Enter -2,-2 1*,-1* (SGP)
Exit 0*,0*(Nash) 0,0*
Selten Game Payoffs
Notice how when player 1 chooses to exit it doesn’t matter what player 2 
does – in that case player 2 does not get the chance to play. 
We can analyze this game using our usual tools of best-response and 
Nash equilibrium. As marked in the matrix: if player 2 is going to fight, it 
is best for player 1 to exit; if player 2 is going to cave it is best for player 1 to 
enter. If player 1 is going to enter, it is best for player 2 to cave. If player 1 is 
going to exit, players do not interact at all, so it doesn’t really matter what 
player 2 does: she is indifferent.
The game has two Nash equilibria – exit/fight labeled “Nash” and enter/
cave labeled “SGP” for reasons to be explained momentarily. Here is the 
thing: exit/fight while a Nash equilibrium is not completely plausible. 
Player 1 may reason to herself – if I were to enter rather than exit, it would 
not be in player 2’s interest to fight. So I believe that if I enter he will cave. In 
conclusion I see that I should go ahead and enter.
The notion that player 1 should enter is captured by the notion 
of subgame perfect equilibrium. This insists that not only should the 
strategies form an equilibrium, but, since (or if!) we believe the theory 
of Nash equilibrium, in every subgame the strategies in that subgame 
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should also form a Nash equilibrium. In the Selten Game, there is 
one subgame: the game in which player 1 had chosen to enter – the 
subgame is very simple, it just consists of player 2 choosing whether 




As there is only one player in this subgame, the Nash equilibrium is 
obvious -1 is better than -2 so player 2 should cave.
This analysis is fine as far as it goes. But if I were player 2 and was 
discussing the game with player 1 before we played I would say “Don’t 
you dare enter – if you do I will fight.” I would say this because if I could 
convince player 1 of my willingness to fight he wouldn’t enter, and 
I would get 0 instead of -1. In game theory this is called commitment or 
precommitment, and is of enormous importance. 
A practical example of the Selten game is the game played by the United 
States and Soviet Union during the Cold War – with nuclear weapons. We 
may imagine that player 1 is the Soviet Union, and entry corresponds to 
“invade Western Europe,” while fight means that the United States will 
respond with strategic nuclear weapons – effectively destroying the entire 
world. Naturally if the Soviet Union were to take over Western Europe it 
would hardly be rational for the United States to destroy the world. On the 
other hand, by persuading the Soviet Union of our irrational willingness 
to do this, we prevented them (perhaps) from invading Western Europe. 
As Richard Nixon instructed Henry Kissinger to say to the Russians “I am 
sorry, Mr. Ambassador, but [the president] is out of control… you know 
Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can’t restrain him when he is 
angry – and he has his hand on the nuclear button.”
From a game-theoretic point of view, the game with commitment 
is a different game than the game without. In the Stackelberg Game 
illustrated below player 2 moves first and chooses whether to play 
or commit. If he chooses to play then the original game is played. If 
he chooses to commit, then a different game is played with the same 
structure and in which one payoff has been changed: the payoff to cave 
which is now -3 rather than -1. That is, the role of the commitment is to 
make it more expensive to cave.
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The dashed arrows in the diagram show how to analyze subgame perfection. 
We start at the end of the game and work backwards towards the beginning. 
This is called backward induction, dynamic programming, or recursive analysis, 
and is a method widely used by economists to analyze complex problems 
involving the passage of time. We already implicitly used this method when 
we examined the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: there we noticed 
that the final time the game was played it was optimal to confess. Here in the 
play subgame if player 2 gets the move, it is best – as shown by the dashed 
arrow – to cave. Working backwards in time knowing player 2 will cave it is 
best for player 1 to enter. In the commit subgame if player 2 gets the move it 
is best to fight since caving is now expensive. That means that in the commit 
subgame player 1 should exit. Should player 2 commit? If he chooses to 
play we see that player 1 will enter, he will cave and get -1. If he chooses to 
commit player 1 will exit and he will get 0. Consequently it is better to commit.
The Stackelberg Game illustrates the two essential components of 
effective commitment. First, it must be credible. There is no point in my 
threatening to blow up a hand grenade because I don’t like the service at a 
restaurant – nobody will believe me. In the Stackelberg Game the commitment 
is credible because it changes the payoff to caving from -1 to -3. This could be 
because of simple pride – having said I am committed to fighting I may feel 
humiliated by caving. Or it could be due to a real physical commitment. 
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A good example of commitment is in the wonderful game-theoretic 
movie Dr. Strangelove. Here it is the Soviet Union attempting to make a 
commitment to keep the United States from attacking. To make fight credible 
they build a doomsday device. This is an automated collection of gigantic 
atomic bombs buried underground in the Soviet Union and protected 
against tampering. If their computers detect an attack on the Soviet Union 
the doomsday device will automatically detonate and destroy the world. 
Because the device is proof against tampering the threat is credible: if 
the United States attacks, nobody, American or Soviet, can prevent the 
doomsday device from detonating. Devices like this were seriously 
discussed during the Cold War – and similar devices known as deadman 
switches have been used in practical wartime circumstances. A deadman 
switch is a switch that goes off if you die – for example, you remove the 
pin from a hand grenade, but keep your finger on a spring-loaded trigger. 
If your enemy kills you, your hand releases the trigger and blows you both 
to kingdom come. The advantage of such a device is that your enemy is not 
so tempted to kill you.
One essential element of commitment is that it must be credible. The 
other is that your opponent must know you are committed. A deadman 
switch is useless if your enemy doesn’t know you have one. A secret 
doomsday device is equally useless – and that is the heart of the movie 
Dr. Strangelove. The Soviets – apparently not being very bright – activate 
their doomsday device on Friday with the intention of revealing it to 
the world on Monday. Unfortunately a mad U.S. general decides to 
attack the Soviet Union over the weekend… go watch the movie – Peter 
Sellers plays half a dozen characters and is great as all of them.
And as long as I am on the subject of Peter Sellers, let me mention 
another fine example of commitment – this from his excellent Pink 
Panther movies in which Sellers plays the bumbling Inspector Clouseau. 
Clouseau has an assistant named Kato who is even more bungling 
than Clouseau himself. In order to provide himself incentive to stay 
alert against attackers, Clouseau instructs Kato to attack him without 
warning whenever he is not expecting it. Kato does so – always at 
especially inopportune moments such as the middle of a phone call or 
during a particularly elegant dinner date. Naturally – as with all good 
commitment – after the fact Clouseau has no interest in fighting with 
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Kato and invariably instructs Kato to go away. Kato, obedient servant that 
he is, stops fighting – at which point Clouseau sneakily restarts the fight 
and gives Kato a long lecture about remaining alert. That game-theoretic 
point is that with a commitment there is always a tension since there is 
always a temptation not to carry out the threat. 
In the end it doesn’t matter whether commitments are completely 
credible – with a truly awful threat just a small chance it will be carried 
out is enough to serve as an effective deterrent. Thankfully we will never 
know if the threat of nuclear holocaust which prevented the Cold War from 
becoming hot was credible.
Best-Shot
In 1989 Glenn Harrison and Jack Hirshleifer examined subgame perfection 
in a public goods contribution game called Best Shot. There are two 
players – player 1 moves first and chooses how much to contribute to the 
common good. After seeing player 1’s contribution player 2 decides also 
how much to contribute. The public benefit is determined by the largest 
contribution between the two players – that greatest contribution brings a 







Best Shot Public Benefit
We can analyze this using the tool of best response. If your opponent 
contributes nothing then selfish you get the difference between your benefit 
and your contribution as shown below – the best amount to contribute is 
$3.28 giving you a net private benefit of $0.42. 
behaviouraleconomics.indd   53 9/6/12   5:43 PM
54 Behavioral Economics Doomed






Best Shot Private Benefit
On the other hand, if your opponent contributes something, your 
contribution only matters if you contribute more than her, and it is easy 
to check that it is never worth contributing anything. For example, if 
your opponent contributes $1.64 you get $1.95; if you contribute $1.64 
you still get $1.95; if you contribute more than that your additional 





Additional Benefit when Opponent Contributes $1.64
so that the additional benefit of contribution is always less than the amount 
you have to put in.
What does subgame perfection say about this game? If I contribute 
nothing, then it is best for my opponent to put in $3.28 giving me $3.70. 
If I contribute anything it is best for my opponent to put in nothing, so 
I should put in $3.28 giving me a net of $0.42. So it is in fact best for me 
as the first mover not to contribute and force my opponent to make the 
contribution. Moreover, when Harrison and Hirshleifer carried out this 
experiment in the laboratory this is more or less what they found.
In 1992 Prasnikar and Roth carried out a variation on the Harrison 
and Hirshleifer experiment. They noticed that while Harrison and 
Hirshleifer had not told participants what the payoffs of their opponent 
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were, they allowed them to alternate between being moving first and 
second, so implicitly allowed them to realize that their opponent had 
the same payoffs that they did. To understand more clearly what was 
going on Prasnikar and Roth forced players to remain in one player role 
for the entire ten times they got to play the game – that is they either 
moved first in all matches, or they moved second in all matches. They 
carried out the experiment under two different information conditions. 
In the full information condition players were informed of their own 
payoffs and that their opponent faced the same payoffs. In the partial 
information condition players were informed only of their own payoffs 
and were not told that their opponent faced the same payoffs.
In the full information treatment in the final eight rounds as the 
theory predicts the first mover never made a contribution. In the partial 
information treatment the bulk of matches also resulted in one player 
contributing $3.28 and the other $0.00 – but in over half of those matches 
the player who contributed the $3.28 was the first player rather than – as 
predicted by subgame perfection – the second player.
On the one hand this is a rather dramatic failure of the notion of 
subgame perfection. On the other hand – if players don’t know the payoffs 
of their opponent, they can hardly reason what their opponent will do in 
a subgame, so subgame perfection does not seem terribly relevant to a 
situation like this. Nor can we expect players necessarily to learn their 
way to equilibrium – if I move first and kick in $3.28 my opponent will 
contribute nothing – and I will never learn that had I not bothered to 
contribute my opponent would have put the $3.28 in for me. We will 
return to these learning theoretic considerations later.
If we view subgame perfection as a theory of what happens when 
players are fully informed of the structure of the game we should not 
expect the predictions to hold up when they are only half informed. 
Information and Subgame Perfection
It is silly to expect subgame perfection when players have no idea what 
the motivations of their opponents might be. We might, however, hope 
that the predictions hold up when there is only a small departure from 
the assumption of perfect information about the game. Unfortunately the 
theory itself tells us that this is not the case.
In 1988 – before the Harrison and Hirshleifer paper was 
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published – Drew Fudenberg, David Kreps and I conducted a theoretical 
study of the robustness of subgame perfect equilibrium to informational 
conditions. The main point can be illustrated in a simple variation of the 





















Elaborated Selten Game Tree
This diagram augments the earlier portraits of an extensive form game – that 
is, a game played over time – in two ways. First, it introduces an artificial 
player called Nature labeled N. Nature is not strategic but simply moves 
randomly. The moves of Nature are labeled with probabilities: in this game 
with probability 0.99 Nature chooses the Selten game. With probability 0.01 
Nature chooses an alternative game. Player 1, who moves first, learns which 
game is being played. Player 2 who moves second does not. To represent 
player 2’s ignorance we draw a dashed line – an information set – connecting 
the two different nodes at which he might move. This means that while 
player 2 knows the probabilities with which Nature chooses the game that 
is played, he is uncertain about which one is actually being played. Notice 
how a game theorist approaches the issue of “not knowing what game we 
are playing” by explicitly introducing the possibility that there might be 
more than one game that can be played.
In this game particular strategies for the two players are shown by the 
dotted arrows. If Nature chooses the original game, player 1 exits – exactly 
what subgame perfection convinces us that player 1 should not do. If 
Nature chooses the alternative game player 1 enters. If player 2 gets the 
move he fights. Notice that the information set for player 2 means that 
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player 2 – not knowing which eventuality holds – must fight regardless of 
which game is played.
The alternative game has payoffs similar to the Selten game, except that 
the payoffs to fight have been changed from ( –2, –2) to (1, 0). Moreover, 
given the strategy of player 1, player 2 expects to play sometimes. 
What does player 2 think when he gets to play? Knowing player 1’s 
strategy, he knows that he is getting to play because Nature chose the 
alternative game. Hence he knows that it is better to fight than to cave. But 
player 1 in the alternative game understands that if she enters player 2 will 
fight – and she will get 1 rather than 0 by exiting so entering is in fact the 
right thing for player 1 to do. On the other hand in the original game she 
also knows if she enters player 2 will fight, so now exiting is the right move.
As it happens this Elaborated Selten Game is not usefully analyzed by 
subgame perfection – it has no subgames! Game theorists have introduced 
a variety of methods of bringing subgame perfection like arguments to 
bear on such games: sequential equilibrium, divine equilibrium, intuitive 
criterion equilibrium, proper equilibrium and hyperstable equilibrium are 
among the “refinements” of Nash equilibrium that game theorists have 
considered. However: the equilibrium we have described has the property 
that it is a strict Nash equilibrium meaning that no player is indifferent 
between their equilibrium strategy and any alternative. A strict Nash 
equilibrium is “all of the above:” it is subgame perfect, sequentially rational, 
divine, proper, hyperstable, and satisfies the intuitive criterion. In this sense 
the prediction of subgame perfection is not robust to the introduction of a 
small amount of uncertainty about the game being played: the equilibrium 
play that fails to be subgame perfect – exit by player 1 – appears as part of 
a strict and therefore robust Nash equilibrium. If players are a little unsure 
of what game they are playing it is merely glib to rule out this possibility. 
This major theoretical deficiency of the theory of subgame perfection helps 
explain why it does not do so well in practice.
Ultimatum Bargaining
One of the famous “failures” of economic theory is in the ultimatum 
bargaining game. Here one player proposes the division of an amount of 
money – often $10, and usually in increments of 5 cents – and the second 
player may accept, in which case the money is divided as agreed on, or 
reject, in which case neither player gets anything. If the second player is 
selfish, he must accept any offer that gives him more than zero. Given this, 
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the first player should ask for – and get – at least $9.95. That is the reasoning 
of subgame perfect equilibrium. Notice, incidentally, that in this game 
players are fully informed about each other’s payoffs.
Not surprisingly this prediction – that the first player asks for and gets 
$9.95 – is strongly rejected in the laboratory. The table below shows the 
experimental results of Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir [1991]. 
The first column shows how much of the $10 is offered to the second player. 
(The data is rounded off.) The number of offers of each type is recorded in 
the second column, and the fraction of second players who reject is in the 
third column. 
Amount of Offer Number of Offers Rejection Probability
$3.00 or less  3 66%
$4.75 to $4.00 11 27%
$5.00 13  0%
U.S. $10.00 stake games, round 10
Ultimatum Bargaining Experimental Results
Notice that the results cannot easily be attributed to confusion or inexperience, 
as players have already engaged in 9 matches with other players. It is far from 
the case that the first player asks for and gets $9.95. Most ask for and get $5.00, 
and the few that ask for more than $6.00 are likely to have their offer rejected.
Looking at the data a simple hypothesis presents itself: players are not 
strategic at all they are “behavioral” and fair-minded and just like to split 
the $10.00 equally. Aside from the fact that this “theory” ignores slightly 
more than half the observations in which the two players do not split 
50-50, it might be wise to understand whether the “economic theory” of 
rational strategic play has really failed here – and if so how.
The place to start is by looking at the rejections. Economic theory does 
not demand that players be selfish, although that may be a convenient 
approximation in certain circumstances, such as competitive markets. 
Yet it is clear from the rejections that players are not selfish. A selfish 
player would never reject a positive offer, yet ungenerous offers are 
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likely to be rejected. Technically this form of social preference is called 
spite: the willingness to accept a loss in order to deprive the opponent 
of a gain. Once we take account of the spite of the second player, the 
unwillingness of the first player to make large demands becomes 
understandable.
There is a failure of the theory here, but it is not the fact that the 
players moving first demand so little. Indeed, from the perspective of 
Nash equilibrium rather than subgame perfection, practically anything 
can be an equilibrium: I might ask for only $4.00 thinking you will reject 
any less favorable offer – and you not expecting to ever be offered less 
than $6.00 can “hypothetically” reject all less favorable offers at no cost 
at all. This highlights a key fact about Nash equilibrium – the main 
problem with Nash equilibrium isn’t that it is so often wrong – it is that 
many times it has little to say. A theory that says “player 1 could offer 
$5.00… or $2.00… or $8.00” isn’t of that much use. Unfortunately the 
theory does say that all the player 1’s must make exactly the same offer 
as each other. Clearly that is not the case as about half the players offer 
$5.00 and about half offer less than that.
Recall our rationale for Nash equilibrium: it was a rationale of players 
learning how to expect their opponent to play. Here if I continually 
offer my opponent $5.00 I won’t learn that they would have been 
equally likely to accept an offer of $4.75. From the point of view of 
learning theory Nash equilibrium is problematic in a setting where not 
everything about your opponent is revealed after each match. We will 
return to this issue subsequently when we discuss learning theory.
To sum up, the experimental evidence is dramatic: the “theory” predicts 
the first mover asks for and gets $9.95 or more, while in the experiment nearly 
half the first movers ask for only $5.00. Yet on closer examination we see that 
the failure is not so dramatic. The “theory” in question is that of subgame 
perfection which we know not to be terribly robust. The assumption of 
selfishness fails, but that is not part of any theory of “rational” play. There is 
a failure, but it is a different – and more modest – failure. The robust theory 
of Nash equilibrium is on the one hand weak and tells us little about what 
sort of offers should be made. On the other hand it predicts all the first 
movers should make the same offers, and while 90% of them offer in the 
narrow range between $5.00 and $4.00, they do not all make the same offer.
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Grab a Dollar
In a sense the strongest test of subgame perfection is in a game lasting 
many rounds – can players indeed carry out many stages of recursive 
reasoning from the end of such a game? One such game is called Grab a 
Dollar. In this game there are two players and a dollar on the table between 
them. They take turns either passing or grabbing. Each time a player 
passes the money on the table is doubled. If as player grabs, she gets the 
money and the game ends. After a certain number of rounds specified in 
advance, there is a final round in which the player whose turn it is to move 
can either grab the money, or leave double the amount to her opponent.
What does subgame perfection say about such a game? Once again 
we use backward induction to solve the game. In the final round a 
selfish player should grab. Knowing your opponent will grab in the 
final round, the player moving next to last should grab right away, so 
on and so forth. We conclude that in the subgame perfect equilibrium 
the first player to moves grabs the dollar immediately. It is a little more 
difficult to show – but the same is true in Nash equilibrium as well.
In 1992 McKelvey and Palfrey tried a variant of this game in the laboratory. 
Rather than 100% of the money pile, the player who grabbed got only 80% 
while the loser got the remaining 20%. They also started with $0.50 rather than a 
dollar. Nevertheless both the subgame perfect equilibrium and indeed all Nash 
equilibria have the first player to grabbing the $0.50 right away rather than 
waiting and getting only $0.20 when her opponent grabs in the second round. 
In the experiment there were four rounds: the game tree is illustrated 
below with the options labeled as G1, P1, G2, P2, G3, P3, G4, P4 for grabbing 
and passing on moves 1, 2, 3 or 4 respectively. Next to each option is 
shown the fraction of the players who chose that option in brackets. The 
failure of subgame perfection – and Nash equilibrium – is as dramatic, 
or perhaps more so, than in ultimatum bargaining. According the theory 
100% of people should choose G1, while in fact only 8% of them do.
As in ultimatum bargaining, the place to begin to understand whether 
the theory has in fact “failed” – and if so, how – is in the final round. Notice 
that 18% of the player 2’s who make it to the final round choose P4 – that is to 
pass rather than to grab. There is no strategic issue that they face: the game 
is over – they must decide whether to take $3.20 leaving $0.80 to player 1, 
or whether to give up $1.60 in order to increase the payment to player 1 by 
$5.60. Apparently 18% of player 2’s are altruistic enough to choose the latter.
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What may not be so obvious is that 18% of player 2’s giving money away at 
the end of the game changes the strategic nature of play quite a lot. What 
should a selfish player 1 do on the third move? If he grabs he gets $1.60. 
If he passes he has an 18% chance of getting $6.40 and an 82% chance of 
getting $0.80 – that means on average he can expect to earn slightly over 
$1.80 by passing. In other words – it is better to pass than to grab. The same 
is true for all the earlier moves – the best thing to do is to stay in as long as 
you can and hope if you are player 1 you have a kind player 2, and if you 
are player 2 that you make it to the last round where you can grab.
The puzzle here is not that players are not dropping out fast enough – it 
is that they are dropping out too soon! Yet perhaps that should not be 
such a puzzle from the perspective of learning theory: if I am one of the 
8% of players who choose to drop out in the first round I will not have 
the chance to discover that 18% of player 2’s are giving money away in 
the final round.
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5. You Can Fool Some of the 
People…
You may fool all the people some of the time, you can even fool some of the people 
all of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all the time. Abraham Lincoln
What can economic theory reasonably hope to say? Any model is an 
idealization in which many things that are thought to be relatively 
unimportant are ignored: decision costs, social preferences, costs of 
acquiring information, and so forth and so on. Moreover in applied work 
it is necessary to adopt specific mathematical functions which are at best 
approximations to an underlying reality. A caricature of homo economicus 
asserts that in the laboratory everyone is selfish and that all the participants 
understood the instructions. Or more strongly that all students always get 
all exam questions correct – the falsity of which even academic economists 
must surely be aware.
Modern economic theory is not such a caricature. As we have seen Nash 
equilibrium sometimes predicts well – and sometimes does not. Whether 
a theory that is sometimes right and sometimes wrong is useful depends 
on whether we can tell in advance when it will be correct. For example, 
Newtonian mechanics does poorly at speeds close to that of light, but 
is very useful at lower speeds. It is true that Nash equilibrium is a core 
concept in modern economic theory. It is, however, the starting point of 
economic theory, not the ending point – economists have developed a set of 
tools that enables us to determine when Nash equilibrium is a reasonable 
approximation and when not. 
I have discussed the theory of social preferences and will subsequently 
discuss learning theory. Besides these specific models, economists have 
theories that enable us to understand what happens when everyone is a 
little “irrational” and a few people are very “irrational.”
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Approximate Equilibrium 
In standard Nash equilibrium it is assumed that every player makes the 
best choice possible. In 1980 Roy Radner introduced the weaker concept 
of approximate Nash equilibrium: this supposes only that each player makes 
a relatively good choice. In a correct model for a player to choose her best 
option given her beliefs is essentially a tautology. Given that models are 
never correct there is no reason to presume that theoretical players do 
better than “relatively well.”
The idea that players do “well” but not “perfectly” can be found in 
some of the earliest behavioral criticisms of standard economics. Simon’s 
1956 notion of satisficing behavior – for which he won the Nobel Prize in 
Economics – supposes that people are satisfied and stop attempting to learn 
if they achieve a desirable goal that falls short of the very best possible. In 
Simon’s theory this goal is based on historical data about how well the 
decision-maker has done in the past. 
Although it is not widely known modern economics incorporates 
satisficing concepts in two ways. The first is through the notion of habit 
formation where preferences change over time as experience is acquired. 
More on that later. The second is through the notion of approximate 
optimization. 
The idea of approximate optimization is hardly new and scarcely 
originates either with Simon or Radner. The traditional theory of 
competitive behavior is a model of approximate optimization. That is, in 
practice and in any economic model, a trader always has a little bit of 
market power – even the smallest wheat trader can change prices a tiny bit 
in her favor by withholding some wheat from the market. But in practice 
nobody is going to take the time and effort to figure out how to manipulate 
a market in order to garner a few cents. The theory of competitive behavior 
supposes that traders ignore the possibility of such small gains.
The use of approximate optimization is also widespread in the 
modern economic theory of learning. To take two examples: in Foster 
and Young’s 2003 paradigm of the hats it is assumed that a player only 
try new things if there is evidence of a strategy that works at least a 
bit better than the status quo. In Fudenberg and Levine [1995] players 
are assumed to randomize between nearly indifferent alternatives 
even though this results in slightly less than the optimum payoff. This 
randomization provides strong protection against an opponent who is 
cleverer than you are.
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The notion of approximate equilibrium is also important for 
measurement. Given the objective play of other players, and what a player 
actually did, we can ask “how much more money could that player have 
earned?” In Nash equilibrium the answer is zero – it is not possible to do 
better. In approximate Nash equilibrium the answer may be positive – and 
is often referred to by the Greek letter e (pronounced epsilon), which in 
mathematics is traditionally used to refer to a small number. Notice that 
modifying Nash equilibrium to allow an e loss contains two possibilities. 
One may be that a player consistently earns a bit less than she might. The 
other is that she occasionally earns a lot less than she might. That is “all of 
the people some of the time” and “some of the people all of the time.” The 
former possibility – people occasionally earning a lot less than they might 
is of particular importance when the population is large, since it implies 
that a small fraction of the population will be “misbehaving” quite a lot.
Turning back to measurement, e is our measure of how much the 
“true” preferences of the player differ from the preferences that we have 
written down. So we allow the possibility that the true “payoff” from a 
choice might be somewhat different than captured by the model, but by 
no more than e. In effect e is a measure of the approximation we think we 
made when we wrote down a formal mathematical model of player play, 
or of the uncertainty we have about the accuracy of that model. To make 
the long story short, if I write down a model in which the outcome x gives 
you a payoff of 10 then I allow that payoff to be 10.001, that is 10 + e, but 
not more.
The measure of “success” for Nash equilibrium should not be whether 
play “looks like an equilibrium” but whether ε is small. Take the case 
of ultimatum bargaining. Fudenberg and Levine [1997] computed the 
losses to players playing less than a best-response as averaging $0.99 per 
player per game out of the $10.00 at stake. What is especially striking 
is that most of the money is not lost by second players to whom we 
have falsely imputed selfish preferences, but rather by first movers who 
incorrectly calculate the chances of having their offers rejected. As we 
have noted, however, a first player who offers a 50–50 split may not 
realize that she could ask for and get a little bit more without being 
rejected, nor if she continues to offer a 50–50 split, will she learn of her 
mistake.
The message here is not that the theory worked well, but rather 
that the failure of the theory is much less than a superficial inspection 
suggests. Simply comparing the prediction of subgame perfection to the 
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data indicates that players offered $5.00 when they should have offered 
$0.05. Yet a more reasonable measure of the success of the theory is that 
players lose only $0.99 out of the possible $10.00 that they can earn.
Equilibrium: The Weak versus the Strong
The problem with approximate (or ε) equilibrium is not that it makes 
inaccurate predictions, but that it makes too many predictions. The 
ultimatum bargaining game is a perfect example: with e = $0.99 half of 
the offers at $5.00 is an approximate equilibrium – and so are all the offers 
at $0.05.
Weak predictions are not a good thing in a theory. Yet a theory that 
is sometimes weak and sometimes strong can be useful if it lets us know 
when it is weak and when it is strong. When there is a narrow range 
of predictions – as in the voting game, or in games such as best shot or 
competitive bidding – the theory is useful and correct. When there is a 
broad range of predictions such as in ultimatum bargaining the theory is 
correct, but not as useful.
The role for behavioral economics – if there is to be one – is not to 
overturn existing theory, but to strengthen it. The evidence is strong that 
psychological factors are weak compared to economic factors, but in certain 
types of games that may make a great deal of difference.
Voting Redux
To get a sense of the limitations of existing theory, it is useful to take a look 
under the hood of the voting game described earlier. At the aggregate level 
the model predicts with a high degree of accuracy. However, as anyone 
who has ever looked at raw experimental data can verify, individual play 
is very noisy. 
The figure below from Palfrey and Levine [2007] summarizes the play 
of individuals in the voting experiment. Depending on the probability of 
being pivotal (deciding the election) and on the cost of participation, we 
can calculate for each player how costly it is to participate. This is shown 
on the horizontal axis. If – in a given election – the cost is positive the player 
should not vote; if it is negative then the player should vote. The vertical 
axis is the actual frequency with which voters participated. The crosses are 
the results of individual elections. The squares are averages of the crosses 
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Participation Cost versus Participation Rate
The theory of Nash equilibrium says that we should observe a “best 
response” function that is flat with the probability of participating equal 
to one for all negative losses (gains) and flat with a probability of zero for 
all positive losses. This is far from the case: some players make positive 
errors, some make negative errors. However in this voting game the 
errors tend to offset each other. Over voting by one voter causes other 
voters to want to under vote, so aggregate behavior is not much affected 
by the fact that individuals are not behaving exactly as the theory 
predicts. A similar statement can be made about the competitive auction 
and other games in which equilibrium is strong and robust. By way 
of contrast in ultimatum bargaining a few players rejecting bad offers 
changes the incentives of those making offers: they will wish to make 
lower offers – moving away from the subgame perfect equilibrium, not 
towards it.
A key feature of the individual level data in the voting game is that 
behavior is sensitive to the cost of “mistakes.” That is, voters are more 
likely to play “sub-optimally” if the cost of doing so is low. The same is 
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true in ultimatum bargaining: bad offers are less costly to reject than good 
ones, and are of course rejected more frequently.
Quantal Response Equilibrium
One response to the fact that in some games such as ultimatum 
bargaining equilibrium theory makes weak predictions is to try to 
explicitly model psychological forces to get a more accurate model 
that can make more exact predictions. A more naïve approach is to 
ignore psychological forces entirely and just assume that costly 
deviations from equilibrium are less likely than inexpensive ones. This 
captures the important fact that when incentives are weak play is less 
predictable. It leads to a theory known as quantal response equilibrium 
(or QRE) introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey in 1995. It is built on the 
standard logistic choice model introduced to economics by McFadden 
in 1980. 
QRE supposes that play is somewhat random. It assumes a non-negative 
numerical parameter usually represented by the Greek letter l (pronounced 
lambda). This parameter describes how noisy choices are. At one extreme, if 
l = 0 the player simply chooses a strategy at random – there is no strategic 
behavior. As the parameter l grows large her play approaches the best 
response of Nash equilibrium. For intermediate values of l strategies with 
higher payoffs are more likely to be used than those with lower payoffs, 
but there is still a chance that lower valued alternatives will be chosen. 
In a Nash equilibrium players must play optimally given their beliefs 
and their beliefs must be correct. Similarly, in a QRE players must employ 
probabilities consistent with l given their beliefs and their beliefs must be 
correct. Rather than a best response they play a “quantal response.”
To give an idea how this theory works in the voting experiment we 
can estimate a common value of l for all players. The corresponding 
equilibrium probabilities of play are given by the smooth curve in 
the figure above. This does an excellent job of describing individual 
play – although it makes roughly the same predictions for aggregate play 
as Nash equilibrium.
While QRE is useful in explaining a many experimental deviations from 
Nash equilibrium in games where Nash equilibrium is weak, it captures 
only the cost side of preferences. That is, it recognizes – correctly – that 
departures from standard “fully rational” selfish play are more likely if 
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they are less costly in objective terms, but it does not attempt to capture 
the benefits of playing non-selfishly. It does not well capture, for example, 
the fact that under some circumstances players are altruistic, and in others 
spiteful. 
Selling a Jar of Pennies
Enough theory – would you like to make some money? Here is a surefire 
way to do it. Put a bunch of pennies in a jar, and get together a group of 
friends. Then auction off the jar of pennies. You will find if you have about 
thirty friends that you can sell a $3.00 jar of pennies for about $10.00.
Jar of Pennies
This illustrates an important phenomenon known as the winner’s curse. 
Your friends all stare at the jar and try to guess how many pennies there 
are. Some under guess – they may guess that there are only 100 or 200 
pennies. They bid low. Others over guess – they may guess that there are 
1,000 pennies or more. They bid high. Of course those who overestimate 
the number of pennies by the most bid the highest – so you make out like 
a bandit.
According to Nash equilibrium this shouldn’t happen. Everyone should 
rationally realize that they will only win if they guess high, so they should 
bid less than their estimate of how many pennies there are in the jar. They 
should bid a lot less – every player can guarantee they lose nothing by 
bidding nothing. So in equilibrium, they can’t on average lose anything, let 
alone $7.00.
QRE – by recognizing that there is a small probability that people aren’t 
so rational – makes quite a different prediction. People no doubt perceive 
that there is some most possible profit they could make by getting the 
most number of pennies at zero cost. Let’s call this amount of utility l. 
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They also perceive that there is some least possible profit by getting a jar 
with no pennies at the highest possible bid. Let’s call that utility u. As a 
formal mathematical theory, QRE says that the ratio of probabilities 
between two different strategies is a function of l times the difference in 
utilities – specifically that the ratio of the probability between two bids 
that give utility U, u is exp[l ( U – u)] where exp stands for the exponential 
function of mathematics. Now whatever is the difference in utility between 
two strategies it cannot be greater than that between U and u. What this 
means is that the probability of the highest possible bid is always at least 
some number r > 0 that may depend on how many bids are possible, but 
not on how many bidders there are or what strategies they employ.
What happens as the number of bidders grows? Each bidder according 
to QRE has at least a r probability of making the highest possible bid. With 
many bidders it becomes a virtual certainty that one of the bidders will 
(unluckily for them) make this high bid, so with enough bidders, QRE 
assures the seller a nice profit.
Break Left? Or Right?
The role of approximate equilibrium, of QRE, and of altruism can be seen 
in analyzing the game of Matching Pennies. Each player has a penny, and 
secretly places it heads up or heads down. If the two pennies match – either 
both heads or both tails – one player, the matching player, wins both 
pennies; if the two pennies do not match her opponent wins both pennies. 
Matching Pennies is an example of a zero sum game: one player’s gain 
is the other’s loss. It is not a new game – it is described in Conan Doyle’s 
“The Final Problem” written in 1893. In that story Sherlock Holmes is being 
pursued by his arch-enemy the brilliant but evil Professor Moriarty. If 
Holmes can escape to France he wins; if Moriarty can catch Holmes first 
Moriarty wins. The climactic conclusion of the story finds Holmes on a 
train bound for Dover and Moriarty pursuing Holmes on another train. 
The only stop is at Canterbury. If both get off at the same stop Moriarty 
catches Holmes (the “pennies” match) and Moriarty wins. If they get off 
at different stops Holmes wins. Despite the supposed brilliance of Holmes 
and Moriarty, their creator Conan Doyle was not a terribly good game 
theorist – in the story Holmes reasons that Moriarty thinks he is going to 
Dover, so he gets off at Canterbury while Moriarty continues to Dover and 
loses the game. But why does not the supposedly brilliant mathematician 
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Moriarty understand Holmes reasoning so get off at Canterbury himself? 
And why does not Holmes anticipating this get off at Dover? Despite the 
fact that we can repeat this logic endlessly there is a Nash equilibrium – it 
necessarily requires that players choose randomly. If each has a 50% chance 
of getting off at Canterbury or Dover, then each has a 50% chance of winning 
the game no matter what the other player does.
Does that sound realistic? Choosing randomly? The problem of evading 
capture does not occur only in novels. The best selling book ever released 
by the RAND Corporation is their 1955 table of random numbers. Folklore 
has it that at least one captain of a nuclear submarine kept it by his bedside 
to use in plotting evasive maneuvers. More familiar are sporting events. 
The soccer player kicking a penalty goal must keep the goal keeper in the 
dark about whether he will kick to the right, to the left or to the center of 
the goal; the tennis player must be unpredictable as to which side of the 
court she will serve to, the football quarterback must not allow the defense 
to anticipate run or pass, or whether the play will move to the right or the 
left, and the baseball catcher must keep the batter uncertain as to how his 
pitcher will deliver the ball. Indeed, at one time in Japan catchers were 
equipped with small mechanical randomization devices with which to call 
the pitch – this was later ruled unsporting and banned from play.
In 2001 – in a paper published in what is often viewed as the leading 
journal in economics – Holt and Goeree studied several variations of 
Matching Pennies in the laboratory. In the first variation the payoffs were 
80 for the winner and 40 for the loser. As in other versions of matching 
pennies the only Nash equilibrium is for players to randomize 50–50 – and 
indeed, unlike Holmes and Moriarty – they did just that. The table below 
shows the theoretical Nash equilibrium of 50% and in parentheses the 
actual fraction of subjects that chose the corresponding row and column. 
As you can see it is quite close to 50%.
50% (48%) 50% (52%)
50% (48%) 80,40 40,80
50% (52%) 40,80 80,40
Matching Pennies: Payoffs and Results
This type of randomization is called a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Fifty-fifty is a particularly easy strategy to implement, and even though 
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Conan Doyle couldn’t figure it out the experimental participants did. 
However, the theory of mixed strategy equilibrium is peculiar in that it 
predicts that each player must randomize so as to make his opponent 
indifferent. This implies that in a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium each 
player’s play depends only on his opponents’ payoffs and not on his own. 
This can be counterintuitive. 
To study randomization Holt and Goeree changed the payoffs by 
increasing (from 80 to 320) or decreasing (from 80 to 44) the payoff to 
Player 1 in the upper left corner. In theory this should change Player 2’s 
equilibrium play, but Player 1 should continue to randomize 50–50. The 
two tables below show the theoretical predictions of Nash equilibrium and 
in parentheses what actually happened: far from continuing to randomize 
50–50 Player 1 played the row containing the highest payoff at least 92% of 
the time.
12.5% (16%) 87.5% (84%)
50% (96%) 320,40 40,80
50% (4%) 40,80 80,40
87.5% (80%) 12.5% (20%)
50% (8%) 44,40 40,80
50% (92%) 40,80 80,40
Asymmetric Matching Pennies: Payoffs and Results
As is the case with some of the earlier experiments, the theory here does 
about as badly as it can: the theory predicts equal probability between the 
two rows, but the actuality is that one row is played pretty much all the 
time. However: unlike the other experiments this one involves players 
who are inexperienced in the sense that they only got to play the game 
once. From the perspective of learning theory there is no reason we should 
expect to see a Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless it is interesting to see how 
well our theoretical tools work in understanding what happened.
The figure below is taken from Levine and Zheng [2010] and illustrates 
our main concepts. The horizontal axis is the frequency with which Player 1 
chooses the Top row; the verticle axis the frequency with which Player 2 
chooses the Left column. The laboratory results are shown by the black 
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dots labeled Lab Result with the upper left dot corresponding to the second 
matrix – the 44 game, and the lower right dot corresponding to the first 
matrix – the 320 game. The theoretical prediction of Nash equilibrium – that 
Player 1 (and only Player 1) randomizes 50–50 – are labeled as Original 
Nash Equilibrium.
We consider several different ways of weakening the theory of 
selfish Nash equilibrium. The first is by computing all the approximate 
equilibrium in which the losses are no greater than those actually suffered 
by the participants. This is the light gray shaded region. The second is by 
computing the QRE corresponding to different levels of noisy decision 
making. These are the inner curves that begin at the respective Nash 
equilibria and – as decision making becomes more noisy – move eventually 
towards the completely random outcome where both players simply make 
each choice with equal 50% probability. The dark gray region and the 
outer curves also examine approximate and QRE – but do so under the 
hypothesis that players are altruistic.
Fraction Playing Left and Top
To understand what this diagram does and does not show, it is useful to 
start with QRE. One prediction of quantal response is a tendency toward 
the middle. For example in the 320 game Player 2 plays Left in Nash 
equilibrium 12.5% of the time. Quantal response says that errors in play 
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will push that towards the middle – toward a 50–50 randomization, and 
indeed we see that in actuality 16% rather than 12.5% of Player 2’s play Left. 
This in turn has a substantial impact on the incentives of Player 1: with “too 
many” player 2’s playing Left, the best thing for Player 1 to do is to play Top 
and try to get the 320 – and again this is what we see participants do. We see 
it also in the diagram. As we vary the parameter of noisy choice away from 
Nash equilibrium and perfect best response we see that QRE play shifts 
towards to the right – towards the lab result with more Player 1’s playing 
Top. Similarly in the 44 game, “too many” player 2’s play Right – 20% rather 
than 12.5% – and this tilts the Player 1’s towards playing Down. Again, the 
initial effect of increasing the noise parameter is to move the QRE towards 
the lab result.
Eventually, when the noise becomes too great, QRE approaches a pure 
50–50 randomization. What the diagram also shows is that this happens 
“too soon” in the sense that play in the QRE “starts back” towards 50–50 
before it gets to the laboratory result. That effect is much more pronounced 
in the 44 game than the 320 game.
Next consider altruism. This is potentially important in the 320 game 
since Player 2 by giving up 40 can increase the payoff of Player 1 by 
280 – you don’t have to be that generous to take such an opportunity. 
This also can explain why “too many” Player 2’s play Left. If we assume 
a combination of errors due to quantal response and some altruistic 
players, it turns out we can explain the 320 game quite well, as the 
curve combining the two effects passes more or less directly through 
the laboratory result.
In the 44 game the situation is different. Even combining altruistic 
players with quantal response errors quantitatively we can explain only 
about half the laboratory result. Here the approximate equilibrium regions 
can help us understand what is going on. Notice that in the 320 game 
the approximate equilibrium region while wide is not very tall. While 
there are many possible strategies by player 1 that are consistent with a 
relatively small loss, there are very few strategies by player 2: Player 2 
must play Right with between about 10% and 20% probability. On the 
other hand, in the 44 game approximate equilibrium indicates we can 
say little beyond Player 1 should play Top more frequently than Bottom 
and Player 2 should play Right more frequently than Left. The reason 
for this is not hard to fathom. In the 320 game incentives are relatively 
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strong: by making a wrong choice players can lose between 40 and 280. 
In the 44 game by making a wrong choices player can lose between 4 
and 40. Naturally when incentives are less strong the set of approximate 
equilibrium is larger and we are less able to make accurate predictions of 
how players will play.
Finance Theory and Noise Traders
The notion of approximate equilibrium, especially in the form of QRE, 
is widely used in experimental economics. But has it taken root in 
mainstream economics? In the analysis of real economic problems? 
Like most tools in economics it is applied by economists where it is 
relevant – where there is empirical and conceptual reason to think that it 
is important. Nowhere is this more true than in the theory of information 
in financial markets – and here, in the form of noise traders – it is a key 
tool of analysis.
Central to any theory of financial markets is the extent to which they are 
“informationally efficient,” meaning how well they incorporate information 
available to investors about economic circumstances. In a world in which 
you cannot fool anybody ever the tiniest bit of information would typically 
be revealed nearly instantaneously – leading to the conundrum that 
nobody could profit from inside information, and so nobody would bother 
to acquire any in the first place. 
On the other hand – you surely can fool some of the people some 
of the time – and this idea far from being ignored by economists is the 
foundation of the modern theory of information in financial markets. 
It originates in modern form in the dissertation of Anat Admati, 
published in 1985 in Econometrica the leading journal in economic 
theory. The idea was picked up by Fischer Black. Black’s description 
of noise traders – the small but important irrational component of the 
market – was published in 1986, and Google assures us there have 
been some 1328 follow-on papers. Black is hardly an obscure figure: 
he avoided joining his co-author Myron Scholes on the stand to 
receive the Nobel Prize in Economics by the time honored tradition of 
dying too soon. In the event, it would be ridiculous to assert, as many 
commentators do, that the central finding in modern finance theory is 
that markets are informationally efficient.
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Conclusion
The chapter started with a quote attributed to Abraham Lincoln: “you 
cannot fool all of the people all of the time.” By way of contrast modern 
rational expectations theory seems to say “you cannot fool anybody 
ever.” Are economists fools for being slavish disciples of so ridiculous a 
doctrine? We are not. Modern economic theory is much closer to Abraham 
Lincoln’s point of view than it is to the popular caricature of rational 
expectations. Approximate equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium and 
the introduction of noise traders are all widely used methods designed to 
admit into rational expectations theory the idea that small irrationalities 
abound. It is fair to say that the basis of modern economics is that most 
people are rational most of the time. This is far from a slavish devotion to a 
ridiculous doctrine – it well captures the spirit of Abraham Lincoln.
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Biases and Irrationality
It is true that from a behavioral economics perspective we are fallible, easily 
confused, not that smart, and often irrational. We are more like Homer Simpson 
than Superman. Dan Ariely at danariely.com
Economic theory has its weaknesses: the theory of approximate Nash 
equilibrium may be “correct” but it doesn’t always yield strong predictions. 
Understanding the psychological elements that predominate when 
economic incentives are weak – understanding the “epsilons” – would 
be of great value to economics. So you might think that behavioral 
economics carefully searches through the psychology literature to 
identify ideas that would help remedy these weaknesses. You would not 
suppose that behavioral economics was an attempt to remake those areas 
of economics that are strong and well studied. Nor would you suppose 
that behavioral economics was an effort to put a mathematical gloss over 
psychology – perhaps because the salaries for academic economists are 
much higher than those of psychologists? – in an attempt to develop a theory 
of what goes inside the mind. That, after all, is a topic of little relevance to 
economics. And given the propensity of behavioral economists to pick on 
the most trivial deviations from standard theory, you would imagine that 
behavioral theories are subject to deep and careful scrutiny by behavioral 
economists. For the most part you would be wrong.
Behavioral economics is hard to define. Because it is a terribly 
trendy term some research that antedates the invention of the word 
and has little to do with psychological theory or data – such as learning 
theory – is sometimes referred to also as “behavioral.” Sometimes it seems 
as if anything these days besides the purest of rational models sells itself 
as “behavioral.” 
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To get a handle on what behavioral economics is, let’s turn to some self 
identified behavioral economists. George Akerlof in his 2001 Nobel lecture 
lists a number of topics he regards as “behavioral”: reciprocity, fairness, 
identity, money illusion, loss aversion, herding, and procrastination. A 2009 
article by Stefano DellaVigna – in the very mainstream Journal of Economic 
Literature – provides a nice outline of the issues examined in behavioral 
economics as well as some of the evidence. DellaVigna lists three main 
categories of topics as “behavioral”: non-standard preferences, incorrect 
beliefs, and systematic biases in decision making.
DellaVigna lists three types of non-standard preferences: time preferences, 
risk preferences and social preferences. Akerlof’s procrastination along 
with what is known as present bias fall into the category of time preferences. 
Akerlof’s loss aversion, the psychological theory of decision making under 
uncertainty called prospect theory along with what are known as the Allais 
and Rabin paradoxes fall into the category of risk preferences. Akerlof’s 
reciprocity and fairness are examples of social preferences – it means 
simply that people care about the fate of other people.
DellaVigna discusses several ways in which people systematically 
have incorrect beliefs. One is that people are systematically overconfident; 
that they tend to put too much reliance on small samples, and that they 
systematically underestimate their ability to adapt to future circumstances. 
Akerlof’s money illusion, presumably, is also an example of incorrect beliefs.
Finally, DellaVigna lists a number of systematic biases in decision 
making. None will come as a great shock to anyone with a modicum of 
common sense. Framing refers to the fact that the answer often depends 
on the way a question is framed. What is 2.2 times 75? How about 2 times 
75 plus 10%? I find the latter question much easier to answer than the first, 
although they are in fact the same question. Additional biases DellaVigna 
discusses are the fact that we have limited attention, that our current 
emotions have an impact on our decisions and that we respond to social 
pressure – the identity and herding that Akerlof refers to.
Some History
The effort to incorporate more “psychological” elements into economic 
models is not new. The description of this effort as “behavioral economics” 
seems to have come into use to describe this sub-genre of economics only 
in the last decade or so.
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To reiterate a point made in the introduction Thorstein Veblen was 
criticizing economics for excessive use of the notion of rationality in 
1898. More recently several Nobel Prizes in Economics have been given 
for what can only be described in modern terms as behavioral economics. 
One – the aforementioned George Akerlof – wasn’t awarded the prize 
for his behavioral research, but rather his research on models of rational 
agents in “markets where sellers of products have more information than 
buyers about product quality.” Since “he showed that low-quality products 
may squeeze out high-quality products in such markets, and that prices of 
high-quality products may suffer as a result” one might think that he is 
aware that traditional economic models can result in market outcomes that 
appear to be “behavioral” in nature. 
Several earlier Nobel Prizes in Economics were for work that was 
explicitly “behavioral”: that awarded to Herbert Simon in 1978 as well 
as that awarded to Daniel Kahneman – a psychologist – in 2002. In both 
cases, of course, the work for which the prize was awarded took place 
years before. In Kahneman’s case the work was conducted with Amos 
Tversky who was ineligible for the prize in 2002 on account of his having 
died in 1996.
I previously discussed the work of Herbert Simon and his invention of 
the alternative to optimization called satisficing. This supposes that, rather 
than optimizing, people simply try to do “reasonably” well. Although 
the model has never been widely used in economics, I explained how the 
basic idea has become part of mainstream economics through the notion of 
approximate optimization. Likewise Simon’s notion of a target that grows 
and declines based on past experience is also widely used both in learning 
theory and in preference theory where it reappears in the widely used 
habit formation model.
Kahneman and Tversky, along with Richard Thaler, pointed out a wide 
variety of psychological paradoxes with standard decision theory. One of 
them – the Allais paradox – was first pointed out by Maurice Allais in 1953. 
They have also pointed out a wide range of other anomalies or supposed 
anomalies most of which emerge in an experimental setting. This includes 
framing – people making different choices based on how the problem is 
presented, as well as systematic biases in decision-making. Kahneman and 
Tversky are also responsible for a theoretical effort to remedy some of these 
problems – a decision-making theory called prospect theory. This differs 
from the standard economic theory of expected utility in two ways. First, it 
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supposes loss aversion – that people care about gains and losses relative 
to some (unspecified) starting point. Second, it supposes that people 
systematically overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high 
probabilities. This theory has had no impact on economics whatsoever but 
has become the gold-standard for psychologists.
More recently Matt Rabin, an economist and winner of the highest 
award given by the American Economic Association – the John Bates 
Clarke medal – has explored the fact that people are not always selfish, 
but often altruistic or spiteful, and in many instances care about 
fairness. He also pointed out a considerably bigger problem with 
expected utility theory than the Allais paradox, a problem now called 
the Rabin paradox.
Notice that there is a sense in which behavioral economics is mainstream: 
many of the critics of existing theory and practice have had their work 
recognized by traditional honors such as the Nobel Prize and the John 
Bates Clarke medal. 
Framing and Anchoring
Are preferences unstable as some behavioral economists such as Dan Ariely 
would have us believe? One of the key paradoxes that drives behavioral 
economics is what is called the framing effect. DellaVigna, for example, lists 
this as an important systematic bias in decision making. Framing refers 
to the fact that the answer to a question often depends on the way the 
question is framed. As I pointed out above 2.2 times 75 is a more difficult 
question than what is 2 times 75 plus 10% although they are in fact the 
same question. By the same token, if I ask you whether you would prefer 
to vote for the candidate who dropped out of Harvard or the one who 
founded Microsoft, you will probably choose the latter, even though both 
are Bill Gates. Put this way, framing is hardly controversial. As always the 
devil is in the details.
Closely connected to the framing effect is the idea in prospect theory of 
loss aversion – that losses relative to the status quo are what matters. One 
variation on this theme is what is called the endowment effect. This asserts that 
the way in which you value an item depends on whether you are buying it 
or selling it. Precisely, we can try to determine what is called willingness to 
pay for an item, which is just what it sounds like, and willingness to accept 
payment for an item, which is the opposite. For example, if we ask people 
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how much they are willing to pay for a coffee cup they will state a relatively 
low value; if we give them a coffee cup and ask how much they will sell it 
for they will state a relatively high value. 
On the surface this is not much of a paradox: we all know to buy low and 
sell high. However: the elicitation of values is done using a method called 
the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak [1964] elicitation procedure. A willingness 
to pay or accept payment is stated, and then a random draw is made. If the 
random draw is lower than the stated value (in the willingness to pay case) 
then the item is sold at the randomly drawn price. If the draw is higher 
than the stated value then no transaction takes place.
Is it obvious to you that when this procedure is used that the 
unambiguously best course of action is to bid your true value and not buy 
low and sell high? It is true, and subjects are often informed of this fact. So: is 
there a paradox here, as some behavioral economists and psychologists 
would argue, or, returning to the theme of which kinds of mistakes are 
most likely, is it simply the case that people have trouble understanding a 
complex and unfamiliar procedure? 
The answer is that people don’t understand the procedure: Plott and 
Zeiler [2004] show that if subjects are well trained in understanding the 
elicitation procedure – that is, they clearly understand that the best thing 
to do is to state their true value – then there is no difference between 
willingness to pay and willingness to accept payment.1 If the observation 
that people have trouble understanding complex decisions and sometimes 
make mistakes is “behavioral” then we scarcely need experimental 
evidence to prove the point – the fact that students get exam questions 
wrong should be proof enough that people fall short of complete and 
total rationality.
Another case in point is the anchoring effect. This says that we can get 
people to bid pretty much anything by telling them an irrelevant number 
before they submit their bid. This was documented in an experiment 
of Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec [2003]. They first asked people to 
record the final digits of their social security number, then solicited 
their willingness-to-pay for various items. They discovered that people 
who recorded high numbers bid high, and vice versa. The only problem 
with this experiment appears to be an artifact that can’t be replicated. 
Fudenberg, Levine and Maniadis [2011] carried out a similar experiment 
1  At least for objects such as coffee cups – when the objects are lotteries the situation is 
less clear.
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in which subjects were asked to record random numbers then solicited 
their willingness to accept. The table below reports their findings, in 
particular, the median willingness to accept for those who recorded the 
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Median Willingness to Accept: Size of Payment
The magnitudes are far less than found in Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec 
[2003]; the cordless keyboard and cordless mouse go in the wrong direction. 
They are also quite robust, for example, if willingness-to-pay is elicited, 
rather than willingness to accept the results are quite similar.
A Short History of Social Preferences in Economics
I’m not going to talk extensively about social preferences – I’ve talked 
about it already and there isn’t anything particularly “non-standard” about 
it. “Externalities” in preferences, meaning that people care about other 
people’s consumption is hardly new in economics, nor is the assumption 
that people are selfish a core precept of modern economic theory.
So let me instead give an extremely brief history of social preferences 
in economic thought. We can start with Edgeworth’s theory of 
competitive equilibrium in 1881. He explicitly allowed for the possibility 
that consumers might have preferences over each other’s consumption. 
Moving ahead to 1978, Goldman wrote about gift giving equilibria 
and economic efficiency: this was published in the mainstream Journal 
of Economic Theory. Trout Rader’s 1980 paper “The Second Theorem of 
Welfare economics when Utilities are Interdependent” was also published 
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in that journal, and made his reputation as an outstanding economist. In 
more recent years we have contributions such as Kranich’s 1988 work in 
the Journal of Public Economics. Or even more recently in 2011 there is the 
work of Dufwenberg et al. from which I stole this history.
While social preferences are interesting for a variety of reasons, 
few have suggested that they are terribly important to the things that 
concern economists: economic crises, for example. The exception is 
George Akerlof who in his Nobel lecture talks about a theory called 
efficiency wages as a source of economic fluctuations. Efficiency wages 
says that employers pay workers more than their “market wage” so 
that they will fear being fired. To make this work employers have to 
ration jobs – they must turn away some people who would work at 
this supra-market wage. These people are described as involuntarily 
unemployed – meaning they are willing and able to work at the prevailing 
wage. There are two explanations of why employers might do this. 
One, discussed by Shapiro and Stiglitz in 1984, is a perfectly standard 
economic explanation. Workers effort is unobserved, so to get them to 
work hard they have to be punished – that is fired – if they are caught 
shirking. But if workers are paid sufficiently little they won’t care if they 
are fired, so they must be paid a premium for the threat to be effective. 
The other explanation is “behavioral.” Workers will have good feelings 
(social preferences) towards their employer if they are paid a bonus 
over the market and bad feelings if they are not.
I don’t really want to get into a debate about this: no doubt both things 
are true – and likely not very quantitatively significant. But the key thing 
is: as far as economic research has been able to tell – with many efforts 
and noble failures – unemployment is a symptom rather than a cause 
of business cycles. As best we can tell – and that is pretty well – it is 
fluctuations in productivity, in asset prices and in investment that drives 
the business cycle, not changes in the labor market.
Incorrect Beliefs and Systematic Biases
In his survey DellaVigna lists several ways in which people systematically 
have incorrect beliefs. One is that people are systematically overconfident, 
that they tend to put too much reliance on small samples, and that they 
systematically underestimate their ability to adapt to future circumstances. 
To this we may add Akerlof’s money illusion.
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Money illusion basically means that if your salary goes up by 10% and 
prices go up by 10% you feel richer – despite the fact that you can’t afford 
any more than you could originally. Of course we may be more aware of 
changes in our salaries than changes in other prices. Regardless, the main 
implication that Akerlof and others point to is what is called price stickiness: 
when demand falls there is a tendency not to lower prices. The evidence as to 
whether this is true is mixed, to say the least. But true or false, it can scarcely 
be said that economists have ignored the possibility – price stickiness is the 
foundation of what is called the New Keynesian macroeconomics. The idea 
is that prices are listed on menus and there is a (likely quite small) cost of 
printing a new menu. We find, for example, that Mankiw’s 1985 paper on 
menu costs is cited by around 900 follow-on papers. It was published in 
the very mainstream Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Mankiw himself 
was the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors – under President 
George W. Bush, no less! 
Turning from money illusion to systematic overconfidence it is not 
that easy to tell if people are genuinely overconfident or if they merely 
want the world to believe they are confident. After all, there are many 
advantages in other people believing you are capable – and if you do 
not act confident, other people will lack confidence in you. Everybody 
knows that the captain of the sinking ship must act as if everything is 
under control. Moreover – we are all familiar with Lake Wobegon where 
all the children are above average – and we laugh because we understand 
that everyone cannot be above average. Except – they can be. Sobel and 
Santos-Pinto pointed this out in an article in the American Economic Review 
in 2005. 
How can everyone be above average? Ability and capability are 
measured on many dimensions. Take driving for example – how fast can 
you drive? How well do you avoid accidents? How well can you park? Can 
you corner? And so forth and so on. So any question about “how good a 
driver do you think you are” implies a value judgement about the relative 
important of all these different dimensions of driving. Naturally I tend to 
excel at those elements of driving I think are important – I drive fast and 
corner well, but have a lot of accidents and I’m a lousy parker. Therefore 
according to what I think is important I am above average driver. Of course 
you probably think that avoiding accidents and parking well are important, 
so naturally you are good at that. Of course according to your values you 
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are also an above average driver. The point is undoubtedly we can be – and 
are – all above average.
Another systematic bias is that we do not understand properly the laws 
of probability applied to small numbers. That is, many people if a coin is 
flipped several times and comes up heads each time will say that the coin 
is now “due” to come up tails – although this is not true. 
A less clear-cut bias is that people appear not to use prior information 
effectively. For example, if we describe Steve as “shy and withdrawn, 
invariably helpful, but with little interest in people or the world of 
reality…” and so forth then ask people whether he is more likely to be a 
librarian than a salesman, many people will say librarian. Given the fact 
that there are vastly many more salesmen than librarians this is not in fact 
terribly likely. However, this finding is controversial, because in settings 
involving real decisions people seem to account for prior information 
more appropriately. For example, police investigating the homicide of 
a woman rarely dismiss the husband as a suspect merely because he is 
meek in manner.
DellaVigna argues that we systematically underestimate our ability 
to adapt. For example, academics who do not get tenure find that it 
makes them much less unhappy than anticipated. This may well be true. 
If so it would mean, among other things, that people may over-react to 
economic crises that force them to change their way of life. What exactly 
we can do about this is unclear. Trumpeting from the rooftops “life isn’t 
so bad – look for another line of work” probably isn’t going to win many 
political campaigns.
DellaVigna also points out that we have limited attention. We are 
surrounded by facts and can scarcely incorporate them all into our beliefs 
in some magical and efficient way. For the most part this is innocuous – but 
work especially by Chris Sims on “rational inattention” indicates that the 
impact of economic shocks may be muffled by our inability to immediately 
recognize what is happening. 
Finally, DellaVigna mentions that decisions depend on emotions. We 
are far more likely to buy that expensive car relaxing in a comfortable 
chair sipping coffee than if we are standing in the freezing rain – a fact 
that every car dealer knows. However, besides car dealers and other sales 
people – how this observation might enable us to build better economic 
institutions is uncertain.
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Identity
In his survey, DellaVigna suggests that the fact that we respond to 
social pressure is a systematic bias. Basically, we are more likely to give 
the answer we think everyone else is likely to give. This is not so 
clearly behavioral – preferences for conformity have been part and parcel 
of economics at least since Duesenberry’s work on consumption in 1949. 
I suppose calling this “behavioral economics” gives a modern sheen to an 
oft-investigated topic. Certainly it forms the center-piece of Akerlof’s Nobel 
lecture discussion of the role of identity in reinforcing poverty.
...behavioral economics also offers insight on the most enduring 
macroeconomic problem facing the United States: the disparity in income 
and social condition between the majority white population and the African 
American minority… The black poverty rate of 23.6% in 2000 was roughly 
triple the white rate of 7.7… the problems of the poorest African-Americans 
go beyond mere poverty. They include extraordinarily high rates of 
crime, drug and alcohol addiction, out-of-wedlock births, female-headed 
households and welfare dependency…
Because standard economic theory, in our view, is incapable of explaining 
such self-destructive behavior, Rachel Kranton and I have developed models, 
based upon sociological and psychological observations to understand the 
persistence of African-American disadvantage. Our theory stresses the role 
of identity and the decisions that individual make about who they want 
to be. In our theory… dispossessed races… face a Hobbesian choice. One 
possibility is to choose an identity that adapts dominant culture. But such 
an identity is adopted with the knowledge that full acceptance by members 
of the dominant culture is unlikely. Such a choice is also likely to be 
psychologically costly to oneself since it involves being someone “different”; 
family and friends, who are also outside the dominant culture are likely also 
to have negative attitudes towards a maverick…
Let us start by acknowledging that no social problem of this magnitude 
has an easy solution. Low education and ambition are undoubtedly passed 
from parent to child. While some succeed in overcoming this handicap 
of early childhood, far more do not. I do not imagine that any economist, 
behavioral or otherwise would be likely to dispute this point.
The story Akerlof tells is a version of what is called the herding model – in 
the simplest version this just says that people follow the crowd. As far as 
I can tell there is nothing irrational about this. If we care about our social 
interaction with people – if we want to have friends, and I don’t see anything 
particularly irrational in that – then the game theorist in me feels impelled 
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to point out that we can have coordination equilibria in which everyone 
conforms, and anyone who does not conform is excluded, including those 
foolish enough not to exclude non-conformists.
However, before worrying about identity and crowd following, we 
might also want to start with more basic questions about poverty and 
rationality. For example: is drug use irrational when you are poor? If the 
alternatives are to live in miserable poverty or escape to drug-induced 
fantasy – well the fantasy doesn’t sound so bad to me. Drug use is hardly 
particular to poor African Americans. Not surprisingly poor whites who 
live in rural areas of the southern United States are the center of the modern 
methamphetamine epidemic. 
Is criminal activity irrational? From an economic point of view it 
is – criminals don’t do that well financially. But when we factor in the 
excitement of being a criminal the choice is less obvious. Certainly if I grew 
up in a poor neighborhood, being part of a criminal gang would have a lot of 
appeal. With respect to out-of-wedlock births, female-headed households 
and welfare dependency: it would be useful to keep in mind that the 
government will give you money if you are poor and have dependent 
children – unless of course you are married. 
Lack of education is certainly an important source of poverty. This in 
turn depends on the effort put into education. Does a student give up 
social activity to study hard? Does the parent give up luxuries to pay for 
the child’s education? Standard economics suggests that whether this is 
so depends on incentives. In the case of the African American community, 
do not forget that until the mid-1960s African Americans were excluded 
from many educational opportunities by force of law. The story of the great 
American mathematician – and hero to all economists – David Blackwell 
is a striking case in point. After finishing his Ph.D., Blackwell was turned 
down for an assistant professor job at Berkeley (University of California) 
for one reason and one reason only: he was African American. If I were a 
young African American I would certainly be inclined to think: if one of the 
greatest mathematicians of the century with all of his education can’t get a 
job – what hope is there for me? 
The negative discrimination of the 1960s eventually turned into positive 
discrimination called affirmative action. If negative discrimination made 
it rational for African Americans not to invest in education, why did not 
reverse discrimination result in a flowering of education? Perhaps as 
Akerlof suggests the problem lies in some sort of social identity.
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I am not unsympathetic to that idea, but I think it is useful to look more 
closely at the consequences of discrimination. Does reverse discrimination 
result in the flowering of education? The reputation in educational 
institutions held by the English upper class and rich Saudis speaks for 
itself. Does negative discrimination necessarily discourage education? 
When my father attended Harvard University shortly after World War II, 
he was quite lucky to do so – he is Jewish, and at that time Harvard had 
explicit Jewish quotas. The affirmative action in favor of African Americans 
generally discriminates against other races and social groups – not so much 
whites as Asians. Yet these other groups who were discriminated against 
put enormous effort into education.
Let’s step back for a moment, and try to view all this through the lens of 
common sense. First, African Americans were heavily discriminated against 
and provided low effort in attaining education. Later, they were discriminated 
in favor of and – like other groups who were discriminated in favor of – they 
provided low effort. By way of contrast Jews and Asians who were mildly 
discriminated against provided high effort. Could it be that both heavy 
discrimination against and favorable discrimination provide incentives for 
low effort, while middle levels of discrimination against provide incentives 
for high effort? That would reconcile all these facts without recourse to 
identity or social pressure, or indeed anything “behavioral.”
To show how an economist would approach this, I will build a simple 
mathematical model of discrimination and effort in education. Suppose a 
student makes an effort f and draws a test score s. If the score exceeds 
a threshold t the student is admitted to college. A very simple model 
hypothesizes that the test score is drawn from what is called an exponential 
distribution with mean equal to the level of effort – so that higher effort 
results, on average, in higher test scores. Under this assumption we can 
compute that the probability of admission is r = exp(-t/f). 
To model incentives, suppose that 0 is the reward for not being admitted 
to college, that w is the reward for success and that the cost of providing 
a unit of effort is 1. Then the objective function or “utility” of a student 
is given by reward times the probability of reward, minus the expense of 
effort: u(  f ) = w exp(-t/f ) - f. 
I’m afraid the next bit is kind of technical. The bottom line is that if 
students choose the “optimal” or “rational” level of effort, then the level 
of effort as a function of the probability of admission is f = - wr log r, the 
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so-called “entropy” function much beloved of physicists. If that is enough 
for you, please skip to the next paragraph. Otherwise, observe that the first 
derivative of the objective function is u’ = w exp (- t/f  )(- t/f 2 ) - 1. Now I will do 
a brief study of this function so that you can picture it in your mind. As effort 
goes to zero (that is, the student procrastinates all the time) f ® 0 we can use 
L’Hospital’s rule to show that u’ ® 0, and that as effort grows (the student 
spends more and more hours studying) f ® ¥ we have u’ ® - 1, that is, this 
function is bounded. The second derivative is w exp (-t /f  )(-t /f 3 ) (-t /f - 2) 
which is initially positive for values of effort that satisfy f < t/2, then 
changes sign once and becomes negative. The objective function, in other 
words, is single-peaked – think of the shape of a volcano or other isolated 
mountain. What this means is that the optimum is the unique solution of 
the first order condition u’ = w exp (-t/f  )(-t/f  2) - 1 = 0 which may be rewritten 
as ¦ = w exp (-t/f  ) (t/f  ). Intuitively, there exists only one level of effort that 
gives the maximum possible level of utility to the student. We can further 
rewrite the “optimal” level of effort in terms of the probability of admission 
as f = -wr log r.
What does the entropy function f = -wr log r look like? It is always 
non-negative, when r = 0 it is zero, and when r = 1 it is also zero, and 
in between it has a single peak. Intuitively, what this means is that if 
the probability of admission is either very high or very low, you should 
provide little effort (heavy discrimination against, or heavy discrimination 
in favor) and for intermediate chances of admission – you should provide 
a lot of effort.
We can pit this theory against reality. Prior to 1995 the University of 
California discriminated in favor of African Americans. In that year it 
abolished discrimination based on racial considerations. Bearing in mind 
when you actually apply to college, it is a bit late to change your effort 
level, we would expect that the immediate effect of ending affirmative 
action would be to lower acceptance rates for African American students. 
However, over a longer period of time, we would expect the effort level 
of younger students to adjust upwards, so that after an initial drop, over 
time, admissions rates would start go up. A report of the Office of the 
President of the University of California in 2003 provides the relevant data. 
And indeed we see that after an initial four-year decline in admission rates, 
they begin to go back up again. 
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Summing Up
As the introduction to this section says and the previous chapters 
show – economic theory has its weaknesses. Unfortunately, as this chapter 
and the next show, behavioral economics is driven by the concerns of 
psychologists not economists, so does little to remedy the weaknesses of 
economic theory.
It is easy to be dismissive of standard theory on the grounds that 
clever theorists can explain anything. It is equally fashionable to complain 
that economic theories have too many explanatory variables – which for 
behavioral economists is a case of the pot calling the kettle black. These 
critiques miss a deeper point: are people functional in the decisions they 
make or not? In fact people (and for that matter, as we will see, pigeons) 
are quite clever. Seemingly dysfunctional behavior is often quite sensible 
when the circumstances and incentives are understood properly – but 
circumstances and incentive can be subtle. The evolutionary biology 
literature is a case in point – a lot of very strange seeming behavior by 
animals – changing sexes over the lifecycle, for example – makes quite a lot 
of sense when properly understood. 
There is a line between understanding something that is truly 
functional and rationalizing everything we see. In the end, though, the 
test isn’t that hard. A good definition of a behavioral mistake is – when 
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we explain to people why they are doing the problem wrong they agree 
and change their behavior. If their behavior was functional in the first 
place they aren’t terribly likely to do this. My complaint against a lot of 
“behavioral economics” is that there is such an obsession with people 
being dysfunctional that not only are the subtle reasons why behavior 
may be functional overlooked – but often the extremely obvious reasons 
are overlooked as well. The example of procrastination in the next chapter 
is one of many.
Let me conclude with a suggestion for behavioral economists. If 
there is something glaringly missing from economics it is a theory of 
imagination. Imagination plays a key role in our preferences: besides the 
obvious things such as novels and movies, our imagination contributes 
to our enjoyment of goods and services in many dimensions. At the 
same time imagination is crucial to innovation – it is the driving force 
behind our ever increasing production and the material benefits that 
brings. Yet there is a trade-off in imagining things. Living a life entirely of 
fantasy – pretending we are Nobel Prize winning scientists and Olympic 
athletes – is not terribly satisfying. Useful imagination must be grounded 
in reality. The serious research of understanding the trade-off between 
fantasy and reality may not be as much fun as fantasizing that people are 
irrational – but in the long run it provides greater benefits.
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7. Behavioral Theories II: Time 
and Uncertainty
The previous chapter discussed various irrationalities and biases alleged 
by behavioral economists. Much of the work in behavioral economics, 
however, has focused on the elements of time and uncertainty. Unlike the 
biases of the previous chapter – which generally attack issues that are not 
of great interest to economists – time and uncertainty lie at the very heart 
of modern economics. So let us examine these topics from the behavioral 
point of view.
Present Bias
One distinguished critic of “standard economics” is David Laibson of 
Harvard who had drawn the profession’s attention to the phenomenon 
known as present bias. As an example, most people given a choice between 
$175 today and $192 in four weeks time will take the immediate payoff of 
$175. On the other hand given a choice of $174 in 26 weeks time and $192 
in 30 weeks time (also four weeks later) most people will take the $192. 
The data from Keren and Roelofsma [1995] below puts specific numbers 
to this.1
1  This experimental result is confirmed by Weber and Chapman [2005], and discussed in 
Halevy [2008], who proposed an objective function that is consistent with these choices. 
Note that the experiment was in Dutch Florins. I converted from Dutch Florins to U.S. 
Dollars using an exchange rate typical of the early 1990s of 1.75 Florins per Dollar.
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Scenario Choices Fraction Making Choice
1
$175 now 0.82
$192 in 4 weeks 0.18
2
$175 in 26 weeks 0.37
$192 in 30 weeks 0.63
Fraction of People Making Choice2
This type of behavior has been long established in psychology, for example, 
in the 1996 work of Green and Myerson. Notice that the fact that people 
discount the future is present in virtually all of economic thought. Yet 
present bias violates the standard economic model in which people 
discount the future using geometric weights.
The first thing to observe is that this type of present bias is only apparently 
inconsistent with the standard model of geometric discounting. A number of 
economists such as Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukherji [2003] have pointed 
out that in practice we have much more knowledge of our immediate desires 
than our future desires. That is: some of us could really use some money 
today rather than in four weeks time and we know it. Still, many fewer of 
us know that twenty-six weeks from now we will be in desperate need of 
a cash infusion. In the presence of uncertainty we may well observe what 
appears to be a “present bias” even with standard homo economicus. 
Present bias raises yet another issue: if we really feel today that we’d 
rather have $192 in thirty weeks time than $175 in twenty six weeks time 
but, given the choice, twenty six weeks from now rather than today would 
choose the $175 then there is a conflict between our current self and our 
future self. So given a choice today between $175 in twenty six weeks, $192 
in thirty weeks, or being allowed to wait and make the decision twenty 
six weeks from now – some of us would choose the $192 over the option 
of waiting. This can’t be due to uncertainty about our future desires: 
in that case the best thing to do is wait and see what they are. A single 
rational decision maker would always prefer the flexibility of waiting, so 
self-commitment – intentionally limiting our future options – is not consistent 
with standard economic models.
2  The sample consists of 60 individuals.
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It is not so hard to think of examples of self-commitment. The Nobel 
Prize winning game theorist Tom Schelling tells a story of trying to stuff 
a carton of cigarettes down the garbage disposal in the middle of the 
night. Given the likely effect on the garbage disposal this cannot have 
been a good idea – but the reason for it was sound enough; he was afraid 
of facing the temptation of smoking and wanted to take it off the table. 
A less obvious example can be found in DellaVigna and Malmendier’s 
2006 study of health club memberships. People who chose long-term 
memberships rather than pay per visit paid on average $17 per visit 
against a $10 per visit fee. Leaving aside the hassle factor of availability 
of lockers and the need to pay each visit, we can agree that this is some 
evidence that people are trying to make a commitment to attending the 
health club. 
As we said, in the idealized world usually studied by economists, 
there is no need for a single decision-maker ever to commit. In reality 
we often choose to make commitments to avoid future behavior we 
expect to find tempting but with bad long-term consequences: the drug 
addict who locks himself in a rehab center would be another obvious 
example. The long-term membership in a health club has a similar 
flavor. Skipping a workout can be tempting but has bad long-term 
consequences for health. Having to pony up $10 makes it easier to find 
excuses to avoid going. 
There is little new under the sun: the economist Richard Strotz was 
studying problems of self-commitment in the rather mainstream Review 
of Economic Studies back in 1955. However the type of models he proposed 
were not widely used until the “behavioral economics revolution.” Two 
models that have come into widespread use are called respectively 
hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting (also known as the beta-delta 
model) – as opposed to the more ordinary and familiar geometric sort of 
discounting. David Laibson’s [1997] paper examining the consequences 
of hyperbolic discounting models for consumption behavior – a topic of 
great interest to economists, although quite possibly nobody else – was 
published in the also mainstream Quarterly Journal of Economics and has 
been cited some 1543 times, so cannot be said to have been overlooked. The 
only problem with the model is that it predicts that present bias should not 
depend on whether or not the reward is uncertain. Unfortunately this is 
not the case. 
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Scenario Choices Probability of reward 3
Scenario 1.0 (60) 0.5 (100)
1
$175 now 0.82 0.39
$192 in 4 weeks 0.18 0.61
2
$175 in 26 weeks 0.37 0.33
$192 in 30 weeks 0.63 0.67
Fraction Making Choice with Uncertain Reward3
Turning back to the data from Keren and Roelofsma [1995] as displayed in 
the table above – they examined what happened to preference reversals 
when there was only a 50% chance of getting the money.
A fair summary of the data is that when the chance of reward is only 
50% people behave pretty much the same way with respect to both the 
present and future reward as they do with a certain future reward. If a 
non-standard model of discounting is needed to understand the first 
column, the standard model is needed to understand the second. This 
makes it hard to argue that the “behavioral” model is better than the 
standard one.
While it isn’t at all obvious that present bias has much to say about 
why we have economic crises or some countries are so poor, the topic 
has still gained the interest of economists, even economists such as 
the Princetonian pair Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer who are 
strongly declared opponents of any notion of behavioral. In 2001 the 
two wrote a paper proposing that people have preferences over menus 
– lists of which options will be available – that exhibit a preference for 
commitment. Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini proposed a similar model 
at about the same time. Variants of these models including models of 
internal conflict called self-control models are a major topic of ongoing 
research. For example, the enormously distinguished and mainstream 
economists Drew Fudenberg and David Levine wrote about self-control 
models in the American Economic Review in 2006 and again in Econometrica 
in 2012.
3  Sample sizes are in parentheses.
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Models of self-control may reasonably be described as behavioral: they 
postulate that rather than a single decision maker each of us has several 
conflicting selves and that the resolution of internal conflict leads to our 
final decisions. These models were pioneered by behaviorists: Shefrin 
and Thaler in 1981 and Ainslie in 2001. They have an obvious role in 
explaining things such as impulsive behavior and drug addiction. On 
the other hand, while I personally think that these types of models have 
a great deal to say about behavior – there is still a need for caution in 
interpreting what people do. 
The fact is that a lot of behavior that is commonly thought to be 
impulsive – spur of the moment, giving in to temptation and taking 
immediate gratification at the expense of the future – is nothing of 
the sort. Gambling and sexual behavior are common examples of 
supposedly impulsive behavior. Nevertheless this so called “impulsive” 
behavior – giving in to temptation – is often anything but. Take Eliot 
Spitzer who lost his job as governor of New York because of his 
“impulsive” behavior in visiting prostitutes. The reality is that he paid 
months in advance (committing himself to seeing prostitutes rather than 
committing himself to avoiding them) and in one case flew a prostitute 
from Washington D.C. to New York – managing to violate Federal as well 
as State law in the process. Similarly, when Rush Limbaugh was discovered 
to be carrying large quantities of Viagra from the Dominican Republic it 
was widely suspected that he had gone there on a “sex vacation” – hardly 
something done impulsively at the last minute. Or perhaps a case more 
familiar to most of us – the Las Vegas102 vacation? This is planned well 
in advance and we spend months enjoying the anticipation of the rush of 
engaging in impulsive behavior. Of course, the more sensible among us 
may plan to limit the amount of cash we bring along. 
The point here is simple: our “rational” self is not intrinsically in 
conflict with our impulsive self. The evidence is that our rational self 
often facilitates rather than overrides the activities of our impulsive self.
Procrastination
Prominent on Akerlof’s list of “behavioral” phenomena is procrastination. This 
is something we are all familiar with – but what is it exactly? When I quizzed a 
behavioral economist for examples he came up with the following list. 
•  Paying taxes the day before the deadline
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•  Christmas shopping on Christmas eve
•  Buying party supplies for something like a New Years Eve party or 
a 4th of July party at the last minute
•  Buying Halloween costumes at the last minute
•  Delaying the purchase of concert tickets
•  Waiting to buy plane tickets for Thanksgiving
Here is the thing: none of these is the least irrational. In each case an 
unpleasant task is delayed until the deadline. But if the task is unpleasant 
and we are impatient – as economists assume we are – then the best thing 
to do is to wait until the deadline. In the folk story:
The king had a favorite horse that he loved very much. It was a beautiful and 
very smart stallion, and the king had taught it all kinds of tricks. The king 
would ride the horse almost every day, and frequently parade it and show 
off its tricks to his guards.
A prisoner who was scheduled to be executed soon saw the king with 
his horse through his cell window and decided to send the king a message. 
The message said, “Your Royal Highness, if you will spare my life, and let 
me spend an hour each day with your favorite horse for a year, I will teach 
your horse to sing.”
The king was amused by the offer and granted the request. So, each day 
the prisoner would be taken from his cell to the horse’s paddock, and he 
would sing to the horse “La-la-la-la” and would feed the horse sugar and 
carrots and oats, and the horse would neigh. And, all the guards would 
laugh at him for being so foolish.
One day, one of the guards, who had become somewhat friendly with 
the prisoner, asked him, “Why do you do such a foolish thing every day 
singing to the horse, and letting everyone laugh at you? You know you can’t 
teach a horse to sing. The year will pass, the horse will not sing, and the king 
will execute you.”
The prisoner replied, “A year is a long time. Anything can happen. In a 
year the king may die. Or I may die. Or the horse may die. Or... The horse 
may learn to sing.”
The focus on procrastination is behavioral economics at its worst. Here a 
phenomenon that for the most part is rational and sensible is promoted 
to a glaring contradiction of standard theory that requires an elaborate 
psychological explanation. It is true in some of the examples above that 
there might be a cost of delaying: tickets might sell out before the deadline 
and so forth. However that simply introduces a trade-off between buying 
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early and closer to the deadline, and different rational people with different 
degrees of patience, and who value the tickets differently may well choose 
to behave differently, some procrastinating and some not.
We previously discussed the DellaVigna and Malmendier [2006] study 
of health club memberships. They provide evidence that people pay extra 
to self-commit to exercising. They also discuss procrastination: the fact 
that people after they stop attending delay canceling their memberships. 
Unlike the example above there is no issue of delaying an unpleasant 
task until a deadline. So: is this the irrational procrastination Akerlof is 
concerned about? DellaVigna and Malmendier’s data shows that people 
typically procrastinate for an average of 2.3 months before canceling their 
self-renewing membership. The average amount lost is nearly $70 against 
canceling at the first moment that attendance stops. 
Leaving aside the fact that it may take a while after last attending to 
make the final decision to quit the club, we are all familiar with this kind of 
procrastination. Why cancel today when we could cancel tomorrow instead? 
Or given the monthly nature of the charge, why not wait until next month. One 
behavioral interpretation of procrastination is that people are naïve in the sense 
that they do not understand that they are procrastinators. That is, they put off 
until tomorrow, believing they will act tomorrow, and do not understand that 
tomorrow they will face the same problem and put off again. There may indeed 
be some people that behave this way. But if we grant that people who put off 
cancellation are making a mistake, there are several kinds of untrue beliefs they 
might hold. One is that they falsely believe that they are not procrastinators. 
DellaVigna and Malmendier assert that canceling a membership is a simple 
inexpensive procedure. Supposing this to be true, it might be that people 
falsely believe that it will be a time consuming hassle. Foolishly they think 
canceling will involve endless telephone menus, employees who vanish in 
back rooms for long periods of time, and all the other things we are familiar 
with whenever we try to cancel an automatic credit card charge.
The question to raise about the “naïve” interpretation is this. Which 
is more likely: that people are misinformed about something they 
have observed every day for their entire lives (whether or not they are 
procrastinators) or something that they have observed infrequently and for 
which the data indicates costs may be high (canceling)? Learning theory 
suggests the latter – people are more likely to make mistakes about things 
they know little about. Behavioral economics argue the former is more 
likely.
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Risk Preferences: the Allais Paradox
Uncertainty surrounds us, and is central to modern economic models. 
People’s attitude towards risk and uncertainty is at the core of economic 
theory. Although behavioral economists sling around terms such as “loss 
aversion” to explain that the standard model is deficient deviations from 
the theory are in fact quite subtle, and indeed, impossible to understand 
without knowing something about the standard theory.
The basic economic theory of choice under uncertainty is called expected 
utility theory – the theory dates back to Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. However: 
utility theory is a construct. What is always fundamental in economics are 
preferences – in this case preferences between different risky prospects or 
lotteries. 
For concreteness, suppose that there are four possible outcomes of 
equal probability. For example we might put four numbers in a hat and 
pull one out at random. Or we might flip two coins – this also leads to four 
equally probable outcomes: both coins heads, both tails, the first heads the 
second tails, and vice versa. One lottery might assign a certain amount of 
one dollar to each outcome. Another might assign a loss of two dollars to 
the first outcome and a gain of two dollars to the other three outcomes. 
Which would you choose? Or more relevant – does your choice depend on 
whether the outcome is determined by flipping two coins or drawing one 
of four numbers from a hat? Economists suspect it does not, and if it does 
not they say that your preferences satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries 
axiom. We also imagine that if you prefer lottery A to lottery B and B to C, 
then you prefer lottery A to C. This is called transitivity. 
Now look at the table below with three equally likely outcomes
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3
Lottery 1 1 x 3
Lottery 2 2 x 2
Lottery Winnings
This describes the amount of money you get paid based on the outcome, or 
more accurately it describes many different possible lotteries, depending 
on the amount x you get if outcome 2 occurs. Do you prefer Lottery 1 or 
Lottery 2? Does it depend on x? Economists imagine that x doesn’t really 
matter to most people since you get the same x in outcome 2 in both lotteries. 
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So really the choice is between 1 in Outcome 1 with 3 in Outcome 3 versus 
2 in both outcomes. If you prefer lottery 2 for x = 2 then we suspect you will 
prefer it when x = 5 or some other number. This is called the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives or just the independence axiom: the result of Outcome 2 
is irrelevant as you get the same amount in both lotteries.
Finally, suppose that given three outcomes A, B and C, where A is better 
than B is better than C, we can find some probabilities between A and C 
that would leave you indifferent to B. That is, since B is in between A and C 
in your ranking, if you had a low enough probability of A and high enough 
probability of C, you should be willing to take that in place of B and vice 
versa. This is called the continuity axiom. 
If your lottery preferences satisfy all of these axioms: reduction of 
compound lotteries, transitivity, independence and continuity, then it is 
possible to give a mathematical description of your preferences by means 
of a utility function – often called the Von-Neumann Morgenstern utility 
function4 – that assigns utility numbers to outcomes and in which you rank 
lotteries by the expected value – the probability weighted average – of 
those utility numbers. That in brief is expected utility theory.
Most people find the axioms relatively plausible – few argue that they 
wish to behave otherwise: for example that there are lotteries A better than 
B better than C, but really C is better than A. Or that they would reverse 
their choices based on irrelevant alternatives. Unfortunately, when given 
real (or hypothetical) choices, people do violate the axioms. This was first 
pointed out by the economist Maurice Allais in 1953.
In the original version of the Allais paradox you are offered a 
(hypothetical for obvious reasons) choice between getting $1 million for 
sure versus a risky choice giving $1 million with 89% probability, $5 million 
with 10% probability and nothing with 1% probability. Most people choose 
the $1 million for sure. You are then offered an alternative scenario in which 
you choose between an 11% chance of $1 million (and 89% of nothing); or a 
10% chance of $5 million. Most people prefer the 10% chance of $5 million. 
Unluckily the only difference between the two scenarios lies in an irrelevant 
alternative: in the first scenario there are 89 cases where you get $1 million 
in both lotteries and the second scenario differs only in that in those same 89 
cases you get nothing. Therefore, if you choose the sure thing in Scenario 1 
and the $5 million in Scenario 2, you have violated the independence axiom.
4  Their 1944 book systematically developed the theory first proposed by Bernoulli.
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I don’t know if this example will work for you but give it a shot. I give 
this to my undergraduate students in class, and it worked well for years. 
Then one year – the year that all the students said that their life ambition 
was to become rich by selling commercial real estate – it stopped working 
because nobody chose the $1 million for sure in the first scenario. What 
I did was to – understanding that $1 million isn’t worth what it was in 
1953, especially not to a group of people hoping to earn much more than 
that – change the millions to billions and all was well. Thus, if the numbers 
above don’t work for you, try it again with billions.
There are a number of possible explanations of the Allais paradox 
examined over the years by economists. Rubinstein [1988] and Leland [1994] 
suggest people might focus on the fact that a 1% chance of getting nothing 
is quite different than a 0% chance, but be less cognizant of the difference 
between 89% and 90%, while Andreoni and Sprenger [2010] presume 
that people perceive the probabilities zero and one quite differently than 
other probabilities. Machina [1982] suggests a systematic non-linearity of 
preference in probabilities. Behavioral economists and psychologists have 
their own theory – prospect theory – that we will come to shortly.
Risk Preferences: the Rabin Paradox
The Allais paradox is not widely viewed as an important deviation from the 
theory of expected utility by economists. The reason is that to get the paradox 
the numbers in the gambles must be very carefully chosen. As I mentioned, 
with my undergraduates the paradox vanished one day because the value 
of a million fell enough that they decided that it was worth giving up a sure 
million for a 10% chance at $5 million and an 89% chance of the $1 million 
despite the 1% risk of getting nothing. If we don’t craft the numbers just right, 
we don’t get a reversal. Typical economic choices don’t involve such carefully 
chosen numbers, so the paradox does not have much practical import.
A much more significant puzzle is that raised by Matthew Rabin in 
Econometrica in 2000. To explain that puzzle we must examine the most 
important application of expected utility theory – the idea of risk aversion. 
There are few terms more misused than this one – even by economists 
who should know better. People say “I don’t buy tickets in the state lottery 
because I am risk averse.” As it happens for every dollar you bet in the state 
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lottery you will win on average about 50 cents.5 That isn’t risk aversion. 
Risk aversion means that if for every dollar you bet in the state lottery you 
will win on average more than one dollar, you still don’t bet because of the 
risk of losing. For example, I hold up a $100 bill and a $10 bill and offer to 
flip a coin: if it is heads you get the $110; if you lose you give me $100. If you 
say no, then you are risk averse. This is because the expected value of a 50% 
chance of $110 and a 50% chance of -$100 is five dollars. If a gamble has a 
positive expected value and you reject it you are risk averse. By contrast, if 
it has a negative expected value and you accept it you are risk loving. So 
in the case of the state lottery, we can say that someone who purchases 
tickets is risk loving, but we can’t say whether or not someone who doesn’t 
purchase tickets is risk loving or risk averse.
Turning back to the win $110 lose $100 with equal chance, if you are just on 
the margin between accepting and rejecting the bet, then we say you have a 
risk premium of $5 because you are willing to give up an expected gain of that 
amount to avoid the uncertainty of the gamble. Economists have a measure 
of how risk averse people are called the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Exactly what this is can be a bit complicated to explain, but the key idea is 
this: let us measure the stakes by the proportion of your lifetime wealth. For 
example if you are worth a million dollars, then a loss of $100,000 represents 
a 10% loss. The key feature of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is that 
if my coefficient is twice your coefficient, then for any given gamble, I will 
demand twice the risk premium you do. If we have the same wealth, and 
your risk premium is $5 for the win $110 lose $100 with equal probability, 
then my risk premium is $10, meaning in addition to foregoing the gamble 
and giving up $5, I’d be willing to pay an extra $5 to avoid it.
With these tools under our belt, let me give my own version of the Rabin 
paradox – drawn from years of watching experimental papers presented 
in which coefficients of relative risk were measured – and in which the 
presenters never once mentioning that the results are nonsense by three 
orders of magnitude. Suppose that your lifetime wealth is $860,000 
which is about the median in the United States. Suppose also that you 
are indifferent between a 70%:30% chance of $40 and $32 and the same 
chances of $77 and $2 – which many people are in the laboratory (Holt 
and Laury [2002]). Then your coefficient of relative risk aversion is 27,950. 
If this sounds like a big number, it is. One important puzzle much studied 
5  See for example Garrett and Sobel [1999].
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by economists is why the rate of return on stocks is so much higher than 
on bonds, given that stocks are not all that much riskier. One thing we 
can do is to calculate how risk averse a person would be who is on the 
margin between buying stocks (an S&P 500 index mutual fund) and U.S. 
government bonds – a situation many of us are in. The answer is that the 
corresponding coefficient of relative risk aversion is 8.84. This is over three 
orders of magnitude different than the answer we find in the laboratory.
This enormously higher risk aversion for small stakes gambles 
than for large stakes gambles was documented in a clever way by 
Matt Rabin. It poses an enormous challenge for economics and one 
that by and large economists have not attempted to address. It flavors 
laboratory research, which sometimes take as given the relatively low 
risk aversion observed for large stakes gambles and proceeds to ignore 
the fact that we know that for the small stakes gambles we observe in 
the laboratory people are far more risk averse. It poses also a difficult 
theoretical challenge since the existing theory of expected utility is not 
able to explain this enormous discrepancy. While several explanations 
have been offered, none has achieved widespread acceptance. The 
most widely used theory that can potentially explain the discrepancy is 
the psychological theory called prospect theory – which however is not 
widely used by economists.
Risk Preferences: Prospect Theory to the Rescue?
Because of the Allais and Rabin paradoxes psychologists widely regard 
the expected utility theory used by economists as nuts. As mentioned 
they also have a serious alternative called prospect theory. Prospect theory 
differs from expected utility theory in two ways. First, it allows for what is 
called a probability distortion. This says that people tend to exaggerate low 
probabilities. Second, it incorporates what is called a reference point. This 
says that people are not concerned with the effect of a gamble on some 
sort of measure of overall well-being, but rather with the gains and losses 
relative to a reference point. If I seem vague about what the reference point 
is there is a reason: it is treated as an unknown value that varies from setting 
to setting in an unexplained manner. From the perspective of an economist 
this is a bug that renders the theory unusable. A theory that says behavior 
depends on some unknown variable that changes in an unexplained way 
does not make very useful predictions.
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Let us start with the part of prospect theory that says that people 
over-weight low probabilities and under-weight high probabilities. Is this 
true? Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper [2007] (economists, by the way) carry 
out a careful experimental study to find what the probability weighting 
function might be. Suppose that Pi is the chance of winning one of two 
prizes xi ³ 0, where i is the generic name for prize 1 and prize 2. For the 
mathematically inclined – and if you think you can do behavioral economics 
without mathematics, think again – they find that for many people if we 
define a utility function over the probability and prizes by the formula
U =  ∑i    
.846 Pi
  ________________  
.846Pi.414 +(1–Pi).414
 xi1.056
then the gambling behavior of these people is described by picking the 
gamble that yields the highest numerical value of the utility.
One issue with theories, however, is that they make a range of 
predictions – not only in the laboratory, but also outside the laboratory. 
Which would you rather have?
A. $5,000 for sure (or)
B. a 50–50 coin-flip between $9,700 dollars and nothing
People I have asked all prefer alternative A. However the utility function 
above yields a higher numerical value for option B, thus according to Bruhin, 
Fehr-Duda, and Epper, such an individual will choose B. As the “typical” 
person doesn’t do this, prospect theory is not without its own paradoxes.
To pursue this further, prospect theory is motivated in part by the 
Allais paradox. Recall that there are two scenarios: in Scenario 1 you 
choose between a certain $1 million and a lottery offering a nothing with 
a 1% probability, $1 million with an 89% probability, and $5 million with 
a 10% probability. Most people choose the certain $1 million. In Scenario 
2 you are offered the choice between two lotteries. The first lottery offers 
nothing with 89% probability and $1 million with 11% probability, while 
the second offers nothing with 90% probability and $5 million with 
10% probability. Here most people choose the 10% chance of $5 million. 
Prospect theory offers a possible resolution of this paradox because 
smaller probabilities are exaggerated, making the first choice relatively 
unattractive in Scenario 1, but not so much so in Scenario 2. Unfortunately 
the Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper [2007] utility function above while 
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explaining the laboratory data also predicts that the “typical” person will 
not exhibit the Allais paradox.
Prospect theory is largely an empirical and experimental based theory. 
Many of the experiments on which it is based are for hypothetical money 
or for very small amounts of money. A question that is always important in 
this context – the more so given the Rabin paradox – is how the laboratory 
results reflect on real behavior. Indeed, it turns out that the empirical 
research underlying prospect theory is a case study in how problematic 
this can be. One of the main hypotheses in prospect theory is that people 
are risk averse for gains, but risk loving for losses. However: it isn’t all 
that easy to present people with the possibility of losses in the laboratory. 
We can’t easily force people to engage in gambles that involve them losing 
money. If we start them off with an initial stake that they can lose, we have 
to worry about the impact that stake has on their “reference point.” As 
a result experiments involving gains have typically been done for larger 
stakes than experiments involving losses and indeed most of the losses 
have been hypothetical rather than real. That raises the possibility that 
people aren’t risk averse for gains and risk loving for losses at all, but rather 
that they are risk loving for small (real) stakes and risk averse for (real) 
large stakes – quite different than is assumed in prospect theory. 
In 2006 two clever investigators, Bosch-Domenech and Silvestre 
examined the possibility that risk aversion and risk loving are driven 
by the stakes rather than by gains and losses. To allow the possibility of 
substantial losses, they endowed subjects with money in one experiment, 
then – to avoid any possible effect of having given them money – they 
conducted the gambles in a second experiment several months later. What 
they found is that prospect theory is wrong: risk aversion and risk loving 
are in fact driven by stakes and not by losses and gains.
Interestingly there is evidence outside the laboratory that people 
are risk loving with respect to losses. For example: in the recent crisis, 
and historically as well, bankers have always appeared to be willing to 
gamble a small probability of a large loss for a modest increase in the 
average return. Prospect theory appears to predict this kind of behavior, 
and indeed we find Godlewski in 2007 proposing exactly this possibility. 
There are two problems with this analysis. First, as we just pointed out, 
laboratory data does not show that people are risk loving for substantial 
losses. Second, standard expected utility theory predicts that bankers 
should gamble on losses. 
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Have you heard of the “hail Mary pass” in football? That’s when a team 
just throws the ball wildly down the field gambling that somehow they 
will get lucky and someone on their team will grab it and score. Usually 
the opposite happens, the other team grabs it and scores instead. Of course 
the reason teams do this is because the game is ending, they are behind, 
and it is unlikely that they will win the game. Losing the game by 13 points 
rather than 6 doesn’t matter, and the only way they can hope to win is by 
gambling. Bankers face a similar situation – not that their game is about to 
end, but rather that their loss is truncated. If they win, they get to pocket a 
nice commission. If they lose – then the government steps in and bails them 
out. When bigger losses don’t matter – either because it doesn’t matter 
how much you lose the game by or because the government will bail you 
out no matter how great the loss – expected utility theory – and common 
sense – indicate that gambling is a good idea.
This notion that prospect theory is somehow needed to explain the 
gambling behavior of bankers is once again behavioral economics at its 
worst. Expected utility theory provides a simple and obvious explanation 
for what we see. Prospect theory is not needed here.
In summary, expected utility theory has its paradoxes. Prospect theory 
is an effort to explain those paradoxes. Unfortunately when subject to the 
same scrutiny as expected utility theory it has its own equally serious 
paradoxes.
To give credit to psychologists – the fact that prospect theory allows 
attitudes towards risk to depend on the context (or a reference point) at 
least attempts to come to grips with the Rabin paradox. I do not know of 
any way to explain the wildly different attitudes towards large and small 
risks without some model of context dependence. Unfortunately the lack of 
an adequate theory of the reference point renders prospect theory useless 
for economists.6
Risk Preferences: How Research in Economics Works
Critics of economic theory seem to be under the impression that economists 
are wedded to elegant models and oblivious to any facts that might fly in 
the face of those models. Nothing could be less true. A case study involving 
a famous and important paradox helps to illustrate the point.
6  Plott in his 1996 review of one of Kahneman’s many attacks on standard economics 
carefully examines why his proposed theory is useless for economists.
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In 1981 Shiller gathered over 100 years of data on stock market returns, 
bond returns, and consumption data. He observed that under rational 
expectations the price of stocks is supposed to be a weighted average of 
future dividend payments. For any fixed weights this implies that prices 
should fluctuate less than dividends: something that is not true in the data. 
Unfortunately for this calculation – the so called excess volatility puzzle – this 
is only true for fixed weights, and theory and evidence suggests that the 
weights fluctuate enough to cause the observed fluctuations in prices. 
Several years later in 1985 Mehra and Prescott pointed out a rather more 
serious puzzle in Shiller’s data, the equity premium puzzle.
If we look at the returns in Shiller’s data, properly adjusted for inflation, 
we find that safe government bonds had a return of about 1.9%, while 
stocks had a much higher return of 7.5%.7 This of course isn’t much of a 
puzzle: it is much easier to lose your shirt by investing in stocks than in 
bonds, as many investors recently have had the misfortunate to verify. In 
fact, we can measure relatively well the amount of risk involved in stock 
investment: in the Shiller data a measure of the risk is the standard error of 
the stock return, which is 18.1%. This means that roughly 68% of the time 
stock returns lie between 7.5% - 18.1% = -10.6% and 7.5% + 18.1% = 25.6%. 
That seems pretty risky, but when we apply our tool of relative risk aversion 
to ask how risk averse an individual would have to be to be indifferent 
between investing in stocks and bonds, we find that it should be around 
8.84, which is the result we reported before in our discussion of the Rabin 
paradox. That number is pretty small compared to the laboratory value of 
27,950, but never-the-less it turns out to be too large.
What can we mean by too large? After all, people are how risk averse they 
are. Perhaps their risk aversion is indeed 8.84. However, the coefficient of risk 
aversion governs behavior in a number of domains, so it may be that their 
behavior in other domains is inconsistent with 8.84 for stocks and bonds. 
And indeed there are two major problems with this number. First, as pointed 
out by Boldrin and Levine [2001], any coefficient of relative risk aversion 
bigger than one implies that the stock market prices respond to bad news by 
going up – the opposite of what we observe. Second, as observed by Mehra 
and Prescott, in standard theory the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
determines our willingness to save. In particular in the same Shiller data 
7  Stock returns are measured by returns on the Standard and Poor’s 500 index. 
This is the broadest measure of stock returns that is available over such a long 
period of time.
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used to compute stock and bond returns, real per capita consumption in the 
United States grew on average 1.8% per year. It turns out that an individual 
with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 8.84 faced with a 1.9% return 
on bonds would not wish their consumption to grow nearly this fast: they 
would wish to borrow heavily against the future. It is this contradiction 
between the amount of risk aversion observed in choosing between stocks 
and bonds and savings behavior that is the equity premium puzzle.
So what have economists done in response to this puzzle? Built ever more 
elegant and less relevant models? They can’t easily be accused of ignoring 
it: a citation count on Google Scholar8 shows 3,726 follow-on papers to 
Mehra and Prescott. Many of these papers were published in top journals 
such as the Journal of Political Economy, the American Economic Review and 
Econometrica. Did anyone turn to prospect theory? Of course that was tried – 
and discarded along with various other approaches for a very simple reason 
– because it didn’t help explain the puzzle. One can fairly easily find various 
papers by “behavioral economists” claiming that the puzzle was solved by 
various means including prospect theory, however what these papers have 
in common is that they don’t recognize that the puzzle involves not the fact 
that people are very risk averse, but rather that their risk aversion in the 
stock/bond decision contradicts their behavior in other domains.
What is striking about this is that prospect theory appears to have at its 
core an idea that might help explain the equity premium puzzled: the idea 
of a reference point that leads to different behavior in different domains. 
Unfortunately prospect theory’s reference point doesn’t say anything about 
the stock/bond domain versus the savings domain. In 1990, fortunately, 
Constantinides (an economist) produced a model of habit formation that not 
only provided a reference point governing risk behavior and intertemporal 
behavior, but provided a clear theory of what determined the reference 
point. The idea is a simple and intuitive one: as we consume at a particular 
level it becomes a habit, and as the novelty wears off, we need increases in 
consumption to feed our utility. Conversely, declines in consumption are 
very difficult to bear, having habituated ourselves to a higher level. This 
makes us very risk averse. At the same time it causes us to demand ever 
growing consumption as we race to get ahead of our habit.
One question – rarely asked by behavioral economists – is whether such a 
substantial change in assumptions about individual behavior might – while 
8  Search conducted October 23, 2011 at 3:32 AM Pacific Standard Time.
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explaining one thing, namely the equity premium – also unexplain 
other things. For example, we can explain around 50% of business cycle 
fluctuations using a straightforward model of growth – without habit 
formation. Naturally economists have examined whether the habit 
formation model has unpleasant as well as pleasant implications. One reason 
the model has become popular is because in 2001 Boldrin, Christiano and 
Fisher showed that introducing habit formation into a real business cycle 
model if anything improves its ability to explain economic fluctuations.
It is worth mentioning also a related class of models called consumption 
lock-in models. These models are technically a bit different than habit 
formation models but have a very similar flavor: they assume that after you 
choose a particular level of consumption it is costly to adjust it right away, 
either up or down. These models also date back to 1990 when they were 
introduced by Grossman and Laroque. As Grossman and Laroque argued, 
while standard theory says that people ought to adjust their consumption 
in response to changes in stock market prices, nobody is terribly likely 
to sell their house and buy a slightly larger or smaller one in response 
to a modest change in stock prices (although they might skimp a bit on 
maintenance if prices fall). 
In 2001 Gabaix and Laibson produced a very simple version of the 
consumption lock-in model showing that a lock-in of about a year and a 
half is what is needed to explain the equity premium. One advantage of 
these models over habit formation is that when combined with a model of 
self-control they can also produce the Rabin paradox: this was shown by 
Fudenberg and Levine in 2006.
The key thing to note is that these models were a response to a real 
problem that concerned economists. None of them are “behavioral” in 
the sense of Akerlof or Ariely, and indeed, nobody has come yet up with 
a sensible explanation of asset prices based on irrationality. Moreover: 
there is no shortage of explanations of the equity premium – explanations 
ranging from taxes to problems with the way the data were chosen have 
been proposed. Our problem is a surfeit of riches: we have too many 
explanations of the equity premium puzzle, not too few.
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Nash equilibrium describes a situation in which players have identical and exactly 
correct beliefs about the strategies each player will choose. How and when might 
the players come to have correct beliefs, or at least beliefs that are close enough to 
being correct that the outcome corresponds to a Nash equilibrium? Fudenberg and 
Kreps, 1993
Do economists blindly assume that people are rational and have rational 
expectations? Ironically the notion of rational expectations that is widely 
attacked by non-economists as unrealistic is the least obnoxious of the 
assumptions about beliefs that economists make. The notion that would 
be attacked if the attackers had any idea what they were talking about is 
the idea of common knowledge. Common knowledge asserts that not only 
do I know what you are going to do and you know what I am going to 
do – but that I know that you know what I am going to do, and so forth and 
so on. To take a somewhat non-economic example, a husband and a wife 
love each other, and both know that the other loves them, and each knows 
that the other knows that they are loved and so forth and so on. In the case 
of a marriage this might indeed be true… but to take a more economic 
example – can this reasonably be believed to be true of stock traders? 
Rational expectations theory merely says that we share the same beliefs; 
common knowledge says that we have a mutual deep understanding of 
each others’ beliefs.
The further irony is that economists have not generally assumed either 
rational expectations or common knowledge for the last two decades. Rather, 
in modern theory, these are conclusions rather than assumptions – and 
conclusions that are only true under certain circumstances. 
Game theory entered economics in a big way in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. At that time the assumptions of rationality and common 
knowledge were taken for granted. From the standpoint of a science this 
behaviouraleconomics.indd   111 9/6/12   5:43 PM
112 Behavioral Economics Doomed
is understandable: one walks before running, and there is little point in 
challenging assumptions before their implications are known. By the late 
1980s – long before behavioral economics was in vogue – the inadequacy 
of the strong rationality assumptions underlying game theory was 
creating discontent among game theorists. In 1988 two top theorists, 
Drew Fudenberg and David Kreps, wrote a very influential – although 
never published – paper examining how equilibrium in games might 
arise from a process of boundedly rational learning rather than some sort 
of hyper-rational introspection. The theoretical work that flowered over 
the next two decades is now very much part of mainstream economics: 
in addition to economists, computer scientists have been very active in 
developing theories of learning in games.
I can hardly do justice to the subject of learning in games in a single 
chapter of a non-technical book. Yet from the perspective of someone who 
works on learning theory behavioral economics poses a great puzzlement. 
It talks extensively of biases and errors in decision making. However the 
great mystery to learning theorists is not why people learn so badly – it is 
why they learn so well.
Back up for a moment – behavioral economists, psychologists, 
economists and computer scientists model human learning by what can 
only be described as naïve and primitive models. Some of these models 
have various errors and biases built in. Even those models designed by 
computer scientists to make the best possible decisions cannot come close to 
the learning ability of the average human child – indeed, it is questionable 
that these models learn as well as the average chimpanzee or even rat.
The motivation for equilibrium models – and the rational expectations 
revolution – is simply that if we have to choose between our best models of 
learning and simply throwing in the towel and assuming that people learn 
perfectly – for most situations of interest to economists the assumption of 
perfect learning fits the facts far better than our best models of learning.
This is not to say that learning theory has not contributed to our 
understanding of economics. A fundamental tenet of learning theory is 
you can only learn to the extent that you have experience or other data 
to learn from. In the absence of information there is no reason to imagine 
that people are unbiased, or do not exhibit “irrational” or “behavioral” 
modes of decision making. In many ways the idea of incorrect beliefs is 
fundamental to learning theory – if beliefs were always correct there would 
be nothing to learn about. 
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To understand more clearly how learning theory helps us understand 
real behavior, let’s examine the central modification to equilibrium theory 
that arises from the theory of learning – the notion of self-confirming 
equilibrium.
Learning and Self-confirming Equilibrium
An important aspect of learning theory is the distinction between active 
learning and passive learning. We learn passively by observing the 
consequences of what we do simply by being there. However we cannot 
learn the consequences of things we do not do, so unless we actively 
experiment by trying different things, we may remain in ignorance. 
In mainstream modern economic theory, a great deal of attention is 
paid to how players learn their way to “equilibrium” and what kind of 
equilibrium might result. It has long been recognized that players often 
have little incentive to experiment with alternative courses of action and 
may, as a result, get stuck doing less well than they would if they had more 
information. The concept of self-confirming equilibrium from Fudenberg and 
Levine [1993] captures that idea. It requires that beliefs be correct about the 
things that players see – but they may have incorrect beliefs about things 
they do not see.
We can illustrate this idea with the ultimatum bargaining game from 
Chapter 4. Recall that one player proposes the division of an amount of 
money – often $10, and usually in increments of 5 cents – and the second 
player may accept, in which case the money is divided as agreed on, or 
reject, in which case neither player gets anything. If the second player is 
selfish, he must accept any offer that gives him more than zero. Given this, 
the first player should ask for – and get – at least $9.95. That is the reasoning 
of subgame perfect equilibrium. As we observed the prediction that the 
first player asks for and gets $9.95 is strongly rejected in the laboratory. 
Now let us apply the notion of self-confirming equilibrium to this 
game. Players know the consequences of the offer they make, but not the 
consequences of offers that they do not make. Using this concept we can 
distinguish between knowing losses, representing losses a player might 
reasonably know about, and unknowing losses that might be due to imperfect 
learning. We earlier computed (in Chapter 5) that in the Roth et al. [1991] data 
on average players are losing about $0.99 per game. Of that amount, $0.34 
are knowing losses due to second players rejecting offers. The remaining 
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$0.63 are due to the first mover making demands that are either too great 
and too likely to be rejected, or too small.1 Since the first mover only observes 
the consequences of the demand actually made, any loss due to making a 
demand that is too high or too low can be unknowing. Given that players 
only got to play ten times, it is not surprising that first movers did not have 
a good idea of the likelihood of different offers being accepted and rejected.
Notice that there is an important message here. Between social 
preferences – a major focus of behavioral economics – and learning – a 
major focus of mainstream economics – in the ultimatum bargaining 
experiment the role of learning is relatively more important than social 
preferences. In addition a reasonable measure of the failure of standard 
theory is not the $0.99 loss out of $10.00, but rather the $0.34 knowing loss. 
Self-confirming Equilibrium and Economic Policy
The use of self-confirming equilibrium has become common in economics. A 
simple example adapted from Sargent, Williams and Zhao [2006a] by Fudenberg 
and Levine [2009] illustrates the idea and shows how it can be applied to 
concrete economic problems. Consider a game between a government and a 
typical or representative consumer. First, the government chooses high or low 
inflation. Then consumers choose high or low unemployment. Consumers 
always prefer low unemployment. The government prefers low inflation to 
high inflation, but cares more about unemployment being low than about 
inflation. If we apply “full” rationality (subgame perfection), we may reason 
that the consumer will always choose low unemployment. The government 
recognizing this will always choose low inflation. 
Suppose that the government believes incorrectly that low inflation 
leads to high unemployment – a belief that was widespread at one time. 
Since they care more about employment than inflation they will keep 
inflation high – and by doing so never learn that their beliefs about low 
inflation are false. This is a simple example of self-confirming equilibrium. 
Beliefs are correct about those things that are observed – high inflation – but 
not those that are not observed – low inflation.
Such a simple example cannot possibly do justice to the long history 
of inflation – for example in the United States. Some information about 
the consequences of low inflation is generated if only because inflation is 
accidentally low at times. Sargent, Williams and Zhao [2006a] show how 
1 The details of these calculations can be found in Fudenberg and Levine [1997]. 
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a sophisticated dynamic model of learning about inflation enables us 
understand how U.S. Federal Reserve policy evolved post World War II 
to ultimately result in the conquest of U.S. inflation. More to the point, it 
also enables us to understand why it took so long – a cautionary note for 
economic policy makers.
Self-confirming Equilibrium and Economic Crises
While the current economic crisis is surprising and new to non-economists, 
it is much less so to economists who have observed and studied similar 
episodes throughout the world. Here too learning seems to play an important 
role. Prior to the current crisis Sargent, Williams and Zhao [2006b] examined 
a series of crises in Latin America from a learning theoretic point of view. 
They assume that consumers have short-run beliefs that are correct, but have 
difficulty correctly anticipating long run events (the collapse of a “bubble”). 
Periodic crises arise as growth that is unsustainable in the long run takes 
place, but consumers cannot correctly foresee that far into the future.
In talking about the crisis, there is a widespread belief that bankers and 
economists “got it wrong.” Economists anticipate events of this sort, but 
by their nature their timing is unpredictable. Bankers by way of contrast 
can hardly be accused of acting less than rationally. Their objective is not to 
preserve their banks or take care of their customers – it is to line their own 
pockets. They seem to have taken advantage of the crisis to do that very 
effectively. If you can pay yourself bonuses during the upswing, and have 
the government cover your losses on the downswing, there is not much 
reason to worry about the business cycle.
The Persistence of Superstition
What could be more irrational than superstition? If people are rational 
learners, won’t they learn that their superstitions are wrong? How can 
superstition persist in the face of evidence?
In fact no behavioral explanation is needed. Rational learning predicts 
the persistence of certain kinds of superstition. Take the code of Hammurabi2 
as an example. 
If anyone bring an accusation against a man, and the accused go to the river 
and leap into the river, if he sink in the river his accuser shall take possession 
2  The code of Hammurabi consists of 282 laws and was created circa 1750 B.C. It is the 
earliest known written legal code and was inscribed on stone. 
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of his house. But if the river prove that the accused is not guilty, and he 
escape unhurt, then he who had brought the accusation shall be put to death, 
while he who leaped into the river shall take possession of the house that 
had belonged to his accuser. (2nd law of Hammurabi)
As Fudenberg and Levine [2006] observe, this is puzzling to modern 
sensibilities for two reasons. First, it is based on a superstition that we do 
not believe to be true – we do not believe that the guilty are any more likely 
to drown than the innocent.3 Second, if people can be easily persuaded to 
hold a superstitious belief, why such an elaborate mechanism? Why not 
simply assert that those who are guilty will be struck dead by lightning?
Consider three different games. In the Hammurabi game the first player, a 
culprit, has to decide whether or not to commit a crime. He prefers to commit 
the crime if unpunished, but would not do so if he expects to be punished. 
If he does commit the crime a second player, a witness, must decide whether 
or not to correctly identify the culprit. The witness prefers to identify a 
particular enemy rather than the true culprit. After testifying, the accused 
objects, and the witness is tossed in the river – and most likely drowns.
In the game without the river, the witness simply identifies someone as 
the culprit and that person is punished.
Finally, in the lightning game, there is no witness, and the culprit – regardless 
of whether or not the crime was committed – has a small chance of being struck 
dead by lightning.
In each of these games a superstition can lead to a decision by the first 
player not to commit a crime. In the first game, the Hammurabi game, the 
witness believes that she will drown if she lies and survive if she tells the truth. 
She is definitely wrong: she will drown in both cases. However her beliefs 
lead her to tell the truth, and knowing this the culprit sensibly decides not to 
commit the crime. In the second game, the game without the river, the culprit 
believes that the witness will tell the truth. He is wrong: without any chance of 
punishment, the witness will lie and identify her enemy. Because of his wrong 
belief, however, the culprit will again choose not to commit the crime. In the 
third game, the lightning game, the culprit believes if he commits a crime he 
will be struck dead by lightning. He is wrong: he is very unlikely to be struck 
by lightning regardless of whether he commits a crime. Nevertheless, based on 
this wrong belief, he again optimally chooses not to commit the crime.
3  A behavioralist might argue that if the superstition is believed, the guilty might be less 
inclined to try to swim, so that the superstition would be self-fulfilling. However, no 
such explanation is needed
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In each case the decision not to commit a crime is supported by a 
superstitious belief: a belief that is objectively false, a belief that evidence 
should show is false. What differentiates these games? When and why can 
superstition survive?
Take the lightning game first. From the perspective of Nash equilibrium, 
the culprit should know that the probability of being struck dead by lightning 
doesn’t depend on whether a crime is committed, so should commit the 
crime. From the standpoint of self-confirming equilibrium, however, if the 
culprit chooses not to commit the crime, his belief that he will be struck dead 
by lightning is purely hypothetical and is never confronted with evidence. 
Therefore the superstition is a self-confirming equilibrium, but not Nash.
While self-confirming equilibrium is a reasonable description of 
short-run behavior, it is an unlikely basis for a social norm. Over time some 
people will commit crimes for one reason or another, and of course they 
will not be struck dead by lightning. Hence we should not expect “being 
struck dead by lightning” to be the basis of criminal justice systems, and 
indeed, historically it does not seem to be so.
Let’s look at the game without the river next. Here it is a Nash 
equilibrium for the culprit not to commit the crime and the witness 
to tell the truth. Since the witness is never called upon to testify she 
is indifferent between telling the truth and lying, so it is “rational” to 
tell the truth. This equilibrium, while not merely self-confirming, but 
actually Nash, is no more plausible in the long-run than the lightning 
equilibrium. If people do occasionally commit crimes, the witness – being 
in fact called upon to testify – will lie, and eventually the superstition 
that witnesses tell the truth should die in the face of evidence.
In the game without the river, the superstition is consistent with 
Nash equilibrium, but not subgame perfection. This is relevant because 
Fudenberg and Levine [2006] show that when people are patient enough to 
try crimes to see if they “can get away with it” the kind of equilibrium that 
results is a sort of hybrid between subgame perfection and self-confirming 
equilibrium called subgame confirmed equilibrium. Basically this says that 
deviations from a Nash equilibrium into a particular subgame should 
result in a self-confirming equilibrium. 
Let’s see how this theory works in the game with the river. Here the 
culprit is supposed to commit the crime only rarely to “see if he can get 
away with it.” He can’t in fact get away with it since the witness will tell 
the truth, so has no reason to commit the crime except for the purpose of 
learning. The witness tells the truth because she superstitiously believes she 
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has a better chance of surviving the river if she does so. Since she doesn’t lie, 
she doesn’t learn that her belief about the river is wrong.
If the culprit commits crimes occasionally to see if “he can get away with 
it” why does the witness not lie occasionally to see if “she can get away 
with it?” Neither one expects to “get away with it” – but contemplates the 
possibility they might. The reason for experimenting is that if the belief of 
“not being able to get away with it” is wrong, then you will know that in 
the future that you can “get away with it.” Hence “trying it out to see” is an 
investment in the possibility of future benefits.
When do we invest in the future? If we are patient and the future 
rewards are not in the too distant future. For the culprit, the rewards are 
immediate: if you discover you can get away with murder, you can start 
on a life of crime straight away. It is different for the witness: we don’t 
expect to be called as a witness in a trial very frequently. Thus the benefit of 
“trying it out to see” is that at some far distant date in the future when called 
upon to testify again the witness can again lie. The return to the investment 
is too distant to be worth the trouble.
The bottom line here is that in the Hammurabi game with the river the 
superstition is about something that lies “off the equilibrium path.” That is 
to say, the superstition is about something that happens very infrequently 
when the social norm is adhered to. Hence it is not worth investing to see 
whether or not the superstition is wrong. According to learning theory 
superstitions of this type are far more robust than superstitions that we 
have reason to test every day. As Fudenberg and Levine say “Hammurabi 
had it exactly right: (our simplified interpretation of) his law uses the 
greatest amount of superstition consistent with patient rational learning.”
Self-Confirming, Nash Equilibrium and Agreeing 
to Disagree
Common knowledge can be puzzling even to economists. One particularly 
puzzling conclusion that (seemingly) derives from common knowledge is 
the no-trade theorem. The no-trade theorem says that in the absence of other 
reasons to trade, people should not trade merely based on informational 
differences. That is when you offer to bet that a particular horse will win at 
the race-track I should refuse the bet on the grounds that the only reason 
you are willing to make the offer is because you know something I don’t 
know. Put that way it seems pretty absurd.
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Here is the thing: as Fudenberg and Levine [2005] point out, even in 
the absence of such rationality, there shouldn’t be trade based purely on 
informational differences. Learning theory alone gives rise to the no-trade 
theorem. If we are going to on average lose by trading then some of us 
must be losers – and eventually we should find that out and stop betting. 
Even in self-confirming equilibrium there can be no trade.
So: should we conclude that people are irrational because they bet on 
the ponies? Not necessarily. The theorem gives us two reasons why we may 
have information based trading. First, people may have some reason to 
trade. For example, at the race-track some people may simply enjoy betting. 
They happily lose money – and that money serves as incentive for everyone 
else to bet based on information differences. Second, there may indeed be a 
sucker born every minute. Over time they discover they are losers and stop 
betting, but new suckers arrive to take up the slack.
Keynes Beauty Contest
If John Maynard Keynes is not a hero to behavioral economists, he should 
be. Nobody believed more strongly that economics was governed by forces 
of irrationality than he. Stock markets, in particular, he believed were 
driven by mysterious animal spirits of investors.
Keynes theory of stock markets can be found in Chapter 12 of his 1936 
General Theory. His notion was that investors want to buy stocks because 
they think that other investors like those stocks. He gives as an analogy his 
beauty contest game. In this game players must choose the most beautiful 
woman from six photographs. Players who pick the most popular face 
win. This in fact is a rather boring coordination game: every face is a Nash 
equilibrium. Whether this is really how stock markets work may be doubted: 
it is true that Keynes made a fortune for King’s College Cambridge through 
his stock market investments. It is equally true that at various times he also 
lost a fortune, so that if he had stepped down as Bursar at a different time 
his name would be as infamous there as it is today famous.
Be that as it may, in 1995 Rosemarie Nagel conducted some very 
influential experiments with a simple variation of Keynes beauty contest. 
In Nagel’s game, the players had to choose a number between 0 and 100. 
The players getting the closest to half the average value of the choices win. 
Like Keynes beauty contest, what you want to do in this game depends 
on what you think average opinion is. For example, if you think that 
people choose randomly, the average should be 50, so you would win by 
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guessing 25. Unlike Keynes beauty contest, this game has a unique Nash 
equilibrium: it is pretty easy to see that any average greater than 0 can’t be 
an equilibrium since everyone would want to guess less. So everyone has 
to guess zero. The graph below is taken from Nagel’s paper and the dots 
show choices the third and fourth time the game was played.
Nagel’s Beauty Contest Results
As you can see, the dots are in fact very close to the lower left corner where 
the theory of Nash equilibrium says they should be.4
What is interesting about this experiment is not that we find that 
experienced players get to Nash equilibrium. What is interesting is that the 
first time they played they did not get to Nash equilibrium. Nagel’s graph 
reproduced below shows the distribution of choices the first time players 
played the game.
Not exactly a Nash equilibrium. Since by now we hopefully know 
not to expect Nash equilibrium in first time play, what is the point? The 
point is that there is another theory – developed by economists – that 
does do a good job of explaining what is going on. The idea originates 
with Nagel, and is further developed by Stahl and Wilson [1994], with 
recent incarnations in the work of Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta 
[2001] and Camerer, Ho and Chong [2004]. It has come to be called 
level-k theory.
4  I cherry-picked her data: she also reports experiments where you win by guessing 
2/3rds the average and 4/3rds the average. These were much less close to a Nash 
equilibrium – although since people only got to play 4 times, it is hard to regard it as a 
meaningful violation of the idea that with enough experience players get to equilibrium.
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Nagel’s Beauty Contest: Results of First Time Play
The idea is relatively simple. People differ in their sophistication. 
Very naïve individuals – level-0 – play randomly. Less naïve 
individuals – level-1 – believe that their opponents are of level-0. In general 
higher level and more sophisticated individuals – level-k – believe that 
they face a mixture of less sophisticated individuals – people with lower 
levels of k. It turns out that a single common probability belief about the 
relative likelihood of degrees of sophistication can explain first time play in 
a variety of experimental games.
While it is impressive that such a simple theory can do a relatively 
good job of explaining first time play, the idea has yet to gain wide traction 
in economics. There are likely several reasons for this. First, the types of 
games in which the theory has been shown to work are relatively simple 
and unlike the kinds of situations economists are interested in. More to 
the point, in real markets – stock markets for example – participants are 
generally relatively experienced, so more likely to exhibit equilibrium 
behavior than level-k behavior. Still: in modern finance so called “noise 
traders” who are inexperienced and naïve despite being small in numbers 
play an important role both in the transmission of information through 
prices and in price fluctuations. Perhaps level-k theory will ultimately 
enable us to better model the behavior of these “noisy” individuals.
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Conclusion
Behavioral economics seems to presume that we are most ignorant about 
the things we are the most familiar with. Despite a lifetime of evidence 
that we are procrastinators, we stubbornly stick to the belief that we are 
not. Despite our complete ignorance of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
elicitation procedure and absence of experience with second price auctions, 
we comprehend that procedure perfectly, being confused only about how 
much we are willing to pay for a coffee mug.
Learning theory, by contrast, points the opposite direction. It says that 
things we are most likely to be mistaken about are the things we know 
the least about. This is not only common sense, but is supported by 
overwhelming evidence. If I drop this computer from my lap nobody will 
argue that it will fly to the ceiling rather than fall to the floor. We have a 
lifetime of evidence about the law of gravity – and I think we may reasonably 
say it is common knowledge. I know that you know that I know the law of 
gravity. By contrast, there is broad disagreement about the possibility and 
nature of life after death. Some disbelieve in the notion entirely. Others 
believe in heaven, or hell, or purgatory, or all three. Yet others believe we 
will be reincarnated as grasshoppers. Of course from a learning theoretic 
point of view this makes a great deal of sense: if you are reading this book 
it is unlikely that you are dead, and very few people have come back from 
the dead to relate their experiences.
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Economics is commonly condemned for favoring rigor and mathematics 
over relevance. Perhaps apocryphally the economist Kenneth Boulding 
is quoted as having said “Mathematics brought rigor to Economics. 
Unfortunately, it also brought mortis.” In 1973 Wassily Leontief in his Nobel 
Prize lecture – apparently a popular forum for criticizing economics – said 
Page after page of professional economic journals are filled with mathematical 
formulas leading the reader from sets of more or less plausible but 
entirely arbitrary assumptions to precisely stated but irrelevant theoretical 
conclusions.
Much more recently the historian of economic thought, Mark Blaug, said
Economics was condemned a century ago as “the dismal science,” but 
the dismal science of yesterday was a lot less dismal than the soporific 
scholasticism of today. To paraphrase the title of a popular British musical: 
“No Reality, Please. We’re Economists.” (at http://www.autisme-economie.
org/article26.html)
If all these distinguished economists agree, they must be right. And no 
doubt the solution is behavioral economics!
One version of the solution can be found in a quotation attributed to 
the dissident economist John Kenneth Galbraith: “In economics it is a far, 
far wiser thing to be right than to be consistent.” Unfortunately this makes 
little sense: it is hard to see how you can be right in a useful sense by being 
inconsistent. I can say “the stock market will go up tomorrow.” An hour 
later I can say “the stock market will go down tomorrow.” This is certainly 
inconsistent, and I am bound to be correct (as well as equally bound to be 
incorrect), but in what respect is it useful? Fortunately if you have read 
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this book, you will have discovered that economics is concerned not with 
rigor over relevance, but with rigorous relevance, which is an altogether 
different matter. Economics does not need saving. 
If economics does not need saving, it can certainly use improving. 
Unfortunately behavioral economics does not seem at all focused on the 
weaknesses of economics. It is true that people have an emotional irrational 
side that is not well captured by mainstream economic models. By way 
of contrast, psychologists have long been fascinated with this side of 
humankind, and have many models and ideas on the subject. In this sense 
it is perhaps not surprising that much of behavioral economics attempts to 
import the ideas and models developed by psychologists.
Unfortunately psychology is no more perfect than economics. There is 
evidence, for example, that pigeons are more intelligent than psychologists. 
In the 1950s psychologists conducted choice experiments with lights that 
could flash one of two colors. The goal of the subjects was to guess what 
light would flash next. If the colors are chosen independently the best thing 
to do is to guess the most likely color all of the time. Subjects did not do 
this: they tended to guess each color roughly in proportion to the frequency 
of the color – for example if the light flashed green 2/3rds the time, they 
would guess green about 2/3rds of the time. This “failure to optimize” was 
called probability matching. It has been replicated with pigeons as well, for 
example by Graf, Bullock and Bitterman [1964]. Here is the thing. In 1971 
Fiorini went back and examined the data. He found that the light flashes 
were not independent. If a light flashed green, then the next flash was more 
likely to be green than red. That means that the best thing to do is to guess 
whatever color you saw last – resulting in choices roughly proportional to 
the frequencies of the different color lights. In other words: the pigeons 
computed the optimum correctly – the psychologists who were studying 
them did not.
Interestingly these probability matching experiments are the basis of 
the psychological theory of learning called reinforcement learning. That 
reinforcement learning results in probability matching behavior was 
pointed out by two economists Borgers and Sarin [2000]. 
We can make endless jokes about who is smarter: economists, 
psychologists or pigeons. The point is that both economists and 
psychologists make mistakes – and both disciplines learn from their 
mistakes. Psychologists today no more subscribe to probability matching 
as a theory than economists subscribe to the idea that burying money in the 
ground is a cure for recessions.
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More to the point – it is crucial to recognize that the goals of psychologists 
and economists are different, and that this has implications for importing 
ideas from psychology into economics.
The key difference between psychologists and economists is that 
psychologists are interested in individual behavior while economists 
are interested in explaining the results of groups of people interacting. 
Psychologists also are focused on human dysfunction – much of the 
goal of psychology (the bulk of psychologists are in clinical practices) is 
to help people become more functional. In fact, most people are quite 
functional most of the time. Hence the focus of economists on people who 
are “rational.” Certain kinds of events – panics, for example – that are of 
interest to economists no doubt can benefit from understanding human 
dysfunctionality. But the balancing of portfolios by mutual fund managers, 
for example, is not such an obvious candidate. Indeed one of the themes 
of this book is that in the experimental lab the simplest model of human 
behavior – selfish rationality with imperfect learning – does an outstanding 
job of explaining the bulk of the type of behavior that economists are 
interested in.
Another science that is changing the way we think about decision 
making is neuroscience. With modern technology such as the fMRI scanner 
it is now possible to study what happens physically in the brain while 
decisions are made. As Camerer, Lowenstein and Prelec said in the Journal 
of Economic Literature in 2005.
This “rational choice” approach has been enormously successful. But now 
advance in genetics and brain imaging (and other techniques) have made it 
possible to observe detailed processes in the brain better than every before. 
Brain scanning [...] shows which parts of the brain are active when people 
make economic decision. This means that we will eventually be able to 
replace the simple mathematical ideas that have been used in economics 
with more neurally-detailed descriptions.
Or as Aldo Rustichini said in 2003
This new approach, which I consider a revolution should provide a theory 
of how people decide in economic and strategic situations.1
So will peering into the brain revolutionize economics? Almost certainly 
not. First, when we ask what the revolution is to be, we find from Camerer, 
Lowenstein and Prelec (for example) that
1  Quoted in Blakeslee [2003].
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Much aversion to risks is driven by immediate fear responses, which are 
largely traceable to a small area of the brain called the amygdala. The 
amygdala is an “internal hypochondriac” which provides “quick and dirty” 
emotional signals in response to potential fears. But the amygdala also 
receives cortical inputs which can moderate or override its responses.
Unfortunately, as Gul and Pesendorfer [2005] point out in some 
detail – economists have no interest in what happens in the amygdala. 
Worse: not only to we not care what happens in the amygdala, for the kind 
of decisions we are interested in much of the action does not take place in 
the brain, nor is it subject to memory and other limitations. Even before we 
all had personal computers, we had pieces of paper that could be used not 
only for keeping track of information – but for making calculations as well. 
For most decisions of interest to economists these external helpers play a 
critical role – and no doubt lead to a higher level of rationality in decision 
making than if we had to make all decisions on the fly in our heads. 
That is merely the tip of the iceberg. The human brain is a general 
purpose computing device – with external support it is what computer 
scientists call a Universal Turing Machine. And it is a theorem in computer 
science that all Universal Turing Machines are capable of exactly the same 
computations. That is – any decision algorithm that is possible we can 
carry out. We will have as much success understanding decision making 
by peering into the brain as we will in understanding how Microsoft Word 
works by peering into a computer chip.
This is not to say that neuroscience will add nothing to economics. If 
it is not going to replace existing theory or create a revolution, it may be 
potentially useful. While economic theories are not intended to predict 
what will happen in the amygdala they may nevertheless be successful 
at doing so. Insofar as they are, we have an additional way of measuring 
preferences. Much of “neuroeconomic” research focuses on decisions taken 
under uncertainty: for example, Glimcher [2002] or Dickhaut et al. [2003]. 
While trying to understand the decision making process by peering into 
the brain is useless, our understanding of preferences may be enhanced 
through brain studies. This is true not only for risk preferences – for 
example research such as that of Padoa-Schioppa and Assad [2006] show 
how neurons encode economic values. It must be, after all, that at some 
level our preferences are biologically determined – if neuroeconomics can 
help us better measure or understand those preferences it will have indeed 
helped to improve economics.
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Both psychology and neuroscience are focused on individual behavior. 
Economics is focused on group behavior. This difference is crucial in many 
ways. There is a small segment of the psychology literature that effectively 
commits a fallacy of composition, reasoning that if we can explain 
individual behavior, then this carries over immediately to the group. The 
most obvious example of this is the idea that if we could somehow make 
people better – more altruistic, say – then society at large would be better 
off. This is far from the case – as we discussed earlier, a nice example of an 
interactive setting where better people result in an inferior society can be 
found in Hwang and Bowles [2008]. 
There is a more intuitive way of making this point. From the perspective 
of his psychiatrist helping Tony Soprano become more functional is a good 
thing. From a social point of view if this enables him to be a more functional 
criminal it is a bad thing. Medical ethics are entirely focused on the patient, 
with no allowance for the role of the patient in society. The bottom line is 
that what is good for the individual is not always good for society, and we 
need to use game-theoretic and related models in order to understand the 
consequences of individual behavior for the entire group.
The need to study groups of potentially large numbers of people – as 
I write this we are approaching seven billion – imposes constraints on 
economic models of individual decision making that are not present for 
psychologists. Economists need simple and broad models of behavior. 
Narrow complex models of behavior – neurally-detailed descriptions, for 
example – cannot easily be used to study the behavior of many people 
interacting. Hence the focus by economists on axiomatic models that 
provide a reasonable description of particular data while also giving decent 
results over a broad range of social settings. To take an example, research in 
psychology on hyperbolic discounting focuses on finding clever functional 
forms that will fit a broad range of data on human (and animal) behavior 
involving delayed rewards. From an economist’s perspective, such models 
can be useful in testing and calibrating our own models – but they cannot 
be usefully embedded in complex social situations.
Another main theme of this book is that behavioral economics can 
contribute to strengthening existing economic theory, but, at least in its 
current incarnation, offers no realistic prospect of replacing it. Certain types 
of “behavioral” models are already important in mainstream economics: 
these include models of learning; of habit formation; and of the related 
phenomenon of consumer lock-in. Behavioral criticisms that ignore the 
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great increase in the scope and accuracy of mainstream theory brought 
about by these innovations miss the mark entirely. 
In the other direction are what I would describe as not part of 
mainstream economics, but rather works in progress that may one day 
become part of mainstream economics. The idea of level-k thinking is one 
such. Another that I did not discuss is the idea of ambiguity aversion. This 
captures the fascination economists have had since Frank Knight’s 1921 
work with distinguishing mere risk from uncertainty. It is connected as 
well to the instrumental notion that some of the people we interact with 
may be dishonest.
The subtitle of this book is “The Ordinary and the Extraordinary” the 
idea being of course that rationality is the ordinary and irrationality the 
extraordinary. Mainstream economics focuses on the essential rationality 
of most people faced with familiar circumstances. Behavioral economics 
focuses on the irrationality of a few people or with people faced with 
extraordinary circumstances. Given time economists expect that these 
same people will rationally adjust their behavior to account for new 
understandings of reality and not simply repeat the same mistakes over 
and over again.
If we accept learning as a real phenomenon – we may never the less 
wonder how long it takes and whether it is really relevant. As John 
Maynard Keynes famously said “In the long run we are all dead.” In 
laboratory studies a situation may need to be repeated 10, 50 or even 
500 times before an equilibrium is reached. What does that translate 
to outside the laboratory? Would it take years to reach an equilibrium? 
Decades? In practice the adjustment can be astoundingly fast. A dramatic 
example took place on September 11, 2001.
In the 1990s there were around 18 aircraft hijackings a year. Most ended 
peacefully and the longer a hijacking persisted the more often there was a 
peaceful ending. Rationally flight crews were trained in the FAA-approved 
“Common Strategy.” Hijackers’ demands should be complied with, the 
plane should be landed safely as soon as possible, and security forces 
should be allowed to handle the situation. Passengers should sit quietly, 
and nobody should play “hero.” This advice was well-established, rational, 
successful, and strongly validated by decades of experience.
Things changed abruptly on September 11, 2001 when hijackers, rather 
than landing planes and making demands, used the hijacked aircraft for 
suicide attacks on ground targets. The rational response was no longer the 
passive “Common Strategy” but rather to resist at any cost. Indeed since 
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September 11, 2001 passengers and flight crews – who rarely resisted prior 
to that time – have equally rarely failed to resist.
How long did it take to overturn the long-established and successful 
“Common Rule?” The timeline is instructive. At 8:42 a.m. on September 11, 
2001, United Airlines Flight 93 took off. The first evidence of a regime change 
occurred four minutes later when American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into 
the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Forty-two minutes after, at 9:28 
a.m., United Airlines Flight 93 was hijacked. It took only another twenty-nine 
minutes for passengers and flight crews to adjust their behavior. At 9:57 a.m. 
the passengers and crew on United Airlines Flight 93 assaulted their hijackers. 
Only an hour and 11 minutes elapsed from the first evidence of a regime 
change until the rational response was determined and implemented. It 
happened on a plane already in the air based on limited information obtained 
through a few telephone calls. Yet the response was no minor adjustment. 
It was dangerous and dramatic. The passengers and crew of flight 93 
risked – and sacrificed – their lives. I find this very hard to reconcile with a 
behavioral view that people “are more like Homer Simpson than Superman.”
Despite the joke about every four economists having five opinions, 
economists agree on many things. We agree that you are probably pretty 
good in your everyday economic decisions. We think you have little reason 
to invest a lot of time and effort in figuring out which economic policies will 
be the most favorable for you given that your vote counts for so little. For 
example: if you had to pay the 50% of the social security tax now paid by 
your employer, you’d probably correctly figure you’d lose some money. But 
economists figure your salary would adjust upwards (or less downwards) 
just enough that it wouldn’t make much difference after a year or so. Are 
you going to spend a lot of time figuring out whether that is right or wrong?
By way of contrast behavioral economists seem to think that you are 
pretty bad at your job and at your day-to-day living. For some reason they 
also seem to think you are pretty good at evaluating the effect of different 
tax policies – and so will elect the politicians that will get it right. Well 
some behavioral economists anyway – a good place to conclude is with the 
writing of two behavioral economists George Loewenstein and Peter Ubel 
in 2010:
… [behavioral economics] has its limits. As policymakers use it to devise programs, 
it’s becoming clear that behavioral economics is being asked to solve problems 
it wasn’t meant to address. Indeed, it seems in some cases that behavioral 
economics is being used as a political expedient, allowing policymakers to 
avoid painful but more effective solutions rooted in traditional economics.
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Behavioral economics should complement, not substitute for, more 
substantive economic interventions. If traditional economics suggests that 
we should have a larger price difference between sugar-free and sugared 
drinks, behavioral economics could suggest whether consumers would 
respond better to a subsidy on unsweetened drinks or a tax on sugary drinks.
But that’s the most it can do.
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It is fashionable to criti cize economic theory for focusing too much on rati onality 
and ignoring the imperfect and emoti onal way in which real economic decisions 
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